In November 1864, William Tecumseh Sherman stood in Atlanta, watching the railroad depot light up the remnants of the city he had conquered in September after an expensive siege. The Union high command was desperate to end the American Civil War as it entered its fourth year, with the conflict in Virginia stalled between Robert E. Lee and Ulysses S. Grant.
With the November elections approaching, the pressure for a decisive victory had never been greater. On September 2, after Confederate Lieutenant General John B. Hood evacuated Atlanta and destroyed rail cars loaded with ammunition, Union forces occupied the city. The victory gave Abraham Lincoln a much-needed boost just two months before the presidential election.
Sherman, who had been promoted to major general, established his headquarters there. The surviving citizens were ordered to leave, and the dispersed Confederates gathered around Hood, attempting to disrupt Union supply routes and draw attention away from Georgia. Sherman disagreed with his superiors about his next move. He wrote to Lincoln and Grant outlining his plan: to break up the railroad from Chattanooga and strike out with wagons for Milledgeville, Millen, and Savannah.
He argued that invading Georgia was pointless unless the Union could repopulate it, but destroying its homes, roads, and citizens would severely impair its military capabilities. On November 2, after much consideration, Grant replied simply, “Go as you propose. ”
Three days after Lincoln was reelected, Union troops began demolishing Atlanta’s railroads. Sherman’s army was ready to march 225 miles to Savannah, a seaside city.
Before leaving, Sherman ordered the destruction of Atlanta’s commercial and industrial infrastructure, sparing only private residences and churches. The fires spread to several residential neighborhoods, and nearly 40 percent of the city was devastated by the time his troops departed on the morning of November 16. Sherman marched southeast with 62,000 troops, divided into two wings under Major Generals Oliver Howard and Henry Slocum. The army was primarily infantry, supported by 2,000 artillerymen with 64 guns and a cavalry division of 5,000 soldiers.
After destroying their supply line, the forces depended entirely on the Georgia countryside for food. Foraging units were sent into communities to collect as much as they could, with orders to avoid breaking into civilian residences and to focus on purchasing goods from wealthier locals. In practice, the foragers robbed homes for valuables, clothing, jewelry, and anything else that could be sold or displayed, in addition to seizing cattle, meat, and cereals. Some Southern families buried their belongings, often with the help of their slaves.
Confederate defenses against Union pillagers were weak at best. At Milledgeville, a garrison of several thousand militia under Lieutenant General William Hardee assembled to confront Howard’s soldiers, only to watch as the Union movements veered east of the town. Hardee realized that Sherman was using a feint to keep his target unclear. Nomadic cavalry under Major General Joseph Wheeler also operated in the area, executing captured Yankees in summary fashion and proving particularly effective at apprehending foragers in the act.
When Wheeler’s cavalry attacked one of Howard’s escort battalions, the Union pursuers were lured into a trap near Griswoldville, where three brigades of Georgia militia were advancing. Although the fight diverted part of Howard’s column, the Georgia militia suffered disproportionate losses as overwhelming Federal numbers quickly overpowered them. The mounted foragers traversed the richer areas of northern Georgia, taking the initiative to liberate slaves who worked on plantations. To the typical Southern aristocrat, these soldiers were thieves and raiders, but to the men, women, and children held in bondage, they represented liberation.
Thousands of newly freed slaves rushed to the Union soldiers and marched alongside them. Feeding such a large crowd from rations and foraging proved difficult, and many officers held conflicting views on how to handle it, a disagreement that would ultimately lead to catastrophe. When Slocum’s wing stormed into Milledgeville, the state capital, on November 23, the governor and state government fled. Federal troops staged a fictitious vote within the Capitol Building to revoke Georgia’s secession from the Union.
After taking the political center without firing a shot, Sherman decided to apply further pressure. Federal troops were given additional freedom to target any facility that could support the South, along with more time for foraging. Cotton mills and other manufacturing facilities were bombarded or torched, with the exception of slave quarters. Former Governor Howell Cobb’s mansion and personal plantation were also set on fire.
Federal forces carefully uprooted hundreds of miles of rail line, often working in shifts with crowbars, twisting the rails into shapes that were frequently irreparable. As the columns approached Savannah, Joseph Wheeler’s Confederate skirmishers increasingly harassed Sherman’s forces. Judson Kilpatrick, commander of Sherman’s cavalry, disengaged to pursue the Confederate base at Waynesboro. Union cavalry broke through defensive lines and blocked Confederate access to Augusta, significantly reducing Wheeler’s ability to halt Sherman’s advance.
As the Union troops moved into Georgia’s low coastal plains, the landscape began to shift. Additional runaway slaves followed the army, but the low elevations, marshes, and swamplands offered little plunder or forage, adding to the burden. On the evening of December 8, Brigadier General Jefferson C. Davis, one of Sherman’s subordinates, arrived at Ebenezer Creek, about 20 miles north of Savannah.
Army engineers had built a pontoon bridge to provide safe passage. Over the following few hours, Davis ordered his 14,000 troops to cross. At the last minute, he ordered the bridge cut and brought back ashore, preventing the 600 escaped slaves from crossing. It was likely the worst atrocity of the march.
They were left behind on the west bank as Confederate cavalry arrived to decide their destiny. Wheeler’s forces killed or captured many of the freedmen who attempted to swim across the freezing river, though some received assistance from Union soldiers. Major James Connelly, one of many who strongly objected, described the prospect of several hundred black women, children, and elderly men being sent back to slavery by such a man as Jeff C. Davis as too much to bear.
Despite the protests reaching Sherman, Davis maintained his post because there were not enough seasoned field commanders. Sherman believed the act could not be tolerated again and would use the incident as a catalyst for Special Field Order Number 15, which called for providing fertile land to freed slaves and their families. Sherman’s response to the enemy’s use of anti-personnel mines was far less sympathetic. As his forces approached the last miles to Savannah, they began encountering what were then known as torpedoes, which had a devastating effect on Union morale.
Having witnessed firsthand how Union prisoners of war were treated, Sherman ordered Confederate prisoners to clear the minefields using any available means, even if they were unaware of where the torpedoes were located. On December 10, Sherman’s main army arrived on the outskirts of Savannah, where they ran into General Hardee’s 10,000 entrenched soldiers. The Union advance was blocked. After marching hundreds of miles and hoping to be resupplied for a possible siege, Sherman dispatched a small contingent to capture Fort McAllister on the coast on December 13.
They drove out the small Confederate garrison and reached the sea, enabling the US Navy to replenish the beleaguered forces. On December 17, Sherman sent an ultimatum to Hardee, demanding the surrender of Savannah or face an overwhelming army. Hardee could not decide whether to give up or continue, so he did neither. When the Confederate garrison crossed the Savannah River and headed north on December 20, the mayor of Savannah had to hand Sherman the city’s keys himself.
Sherman had accomplished the unthinkable, subduing Georgia almost unopposed, without the assistance or communication of his fellow Northern allies. His army had marched through the countryside with the same dedication to scorched-earth methods that had defeated Georgia. The now famous commander prepared to repeat the technique throughout the Carolinas to reach Robert E.
Lee’s rear flank, ready to forge a deadly route through the remaining Confederate strongholds.