In January 1945, the Soviet Union launched a massive offensive across the Vistula, sweeping aside German defenses and bringing Red Army units to within a few kilometers of Berlin by the end of that month. Amid this military catastrophe, Heinrich Himmler was appointed commander-in-chief of Army Group Vistula on January 24. His orders were to halt the withdrawal of all German units, stop the Soviet advance, and transition to a counterattack as quickly as possible.
On the night of February 13, Himmler met with one of Germany's finest generals, the renowned Erhard Raus. The meeting took place just days before the Germans launched one of their last offensives on the Eastern Front, known as Operation Solstice. After dinner and small talk in the presence of various comrades, Himmler and Raus withdrew to a room to speak privately.
The first topic of discussion was the planned attack from Pomerania southward, an attempt to defeat the Soviet vanguard that had established itself along the Oder River. Once again, the German attack was far too ambitious given the imbalance of forces between the two sides. Himmler asked Raus for his assessment of the operation, requesting complete honesty.
The German general told him the attack was madness and that from the second day onward, the advance would stall without achieving any results. His advice was that those troops should be used for defensive operations rather than sacrificed in a futile offensive. Himmler then told him he shared the same view, but Hitler had ordered the attack and the order had to be followed to its final consequences.
After assessing other attacks the German army was also preparing near Lake Balaton in Hungary, where Raus's advice was the same as in the previous case, the German general decided to tell Himmler everything on his mind. Raus said: "Reichsführer, allow me to express my frank opinion on everything that has happened during these war years, in front of the man who is most influential over our leader. The statements I am about to make could lead me to prison or the gallows, but I must still say them."
After these first words, Himmler gave him permission to continue. Raus said that since Stalingrad, their operational directives had raised serious doubts in all their minds. Over the past few months, their confusion had only deepened. From the very first moment, it was clear that fighting on a front stretching over 3,000 kilometers was impossible, and their armies lacked the capability for such a task. Yet they had done it for two years.
Their forces had been exhausted until they finally broke. During this war of attrition, their armies were completely drained, and they lost many allies who were also crushed by the Soviets. If they had managed to continue fighting for so long, it was thanks to the courage and resilience of their officers and soldiers at the front lines. The high command had failed to draw the conclusion that this war could no longer be won, and continued sending large German formations into battles that could not be won.
This wasteful and foolish sacrifice of lives had brought them to the abyss they found themselves in. Moreover, all those generals who tried to avoid this catastrophic situation found themselves with their hands tied, lacking the freedom to command their troops independently. Instead, they could only carry out impossible orders dictated to them by the high command. As if that were not enough, after failing to execute one of these orders, they were dismissed without honor as if they were incompetent officers.
After these first words, Raus paused to see Himmler's reaction and whether he would order his arrest. However, Himmler looked at him and ordered him to continue his presentation. Raus then continued speaking about how to conduct various military operations. Instead of organizing an offensive strategic defense in selected, pre-equipped sectors, the only strategy they were ordered to follow was never to give up a single meter of ground, despite its lack of strategic value.
As for the troop concentrations they managed to assemble as reserves, they were always thrown into local attacks of no importance, leading to their repeated waste. Raus then pointed to the disastrous attack at Kursk, where the elite of the German army was thrown against a wall, forcing them later to face Soviet counterattacks everywhere. Raus also complained that they were not allowed to build defenses in the rear to which they could withdraw to stop the Soviets more effectively, and because of this, when the Red Army broke through the first German line, the entire German front collapsed.
The next point Raus focused on was the so-called fortress cities. Raus commented that desperate and hopeless battles were fought in them, where positions and garrisons were lost without any strategic value. This made the army's distrust of the high command grow even greater. There were already many sectors of the front that had been completely encircled and forced to surrender slowly until they were totally destroyed. Whether in the Caucasus, Crimea, Courland, or East Prussia, entire armies were surrounded. They lost them completely.
At a time when they were losing experienced combat units in a foolish manner, they were forced to send other divisions to the main front that were created improvisedly and lacked combat value. Naturally, these forces were unable to confront the Red Army vanguards, which continued to advance after destroying their weak divisions. Raus also commented that because of this weakness of German units, they had to add Allied control of the air, which, in addition to preventing the production of weapons and ammunition, made transporting them to the front extremely difficult. Thus, many German units suffered from practically depleted supplies.
In conclusion, the German general deduced that in light of all this, it was not clear that Germany could win, and that they faced near-certain defeat. It should be noted here that Himmler clearly knew Germany's days were numbered, but he wanted to say so in the gentlest way possible. When Raus finished his presentation, he remained silent with Himmler, who stared at him for two minutes without saying a word. Later, to Raus's astonishment, Himmler approached him and told him he agreed with him.
With great delight, the German general, who saw that his viewpoint was shared by Himmler, said to the Reichsführer: "So, since you know all this, why haven't you told Hitler?" Himmler told him he had told the German leader everything long ago, but when he did so, he was accused of defeatism and pointed toward the door to leave his presence. Although Raus did not know at the time whether what Himmler told him was true, this event was later confirmed by another officer who was present at those discussions between Hitler and Himmler.
The conversation then returned to the new attack being prepared in Pomerania, which according to Himmler was to begin by Hitler's order, and it indeed launched on February 16. However, as Raus predicted, the attack stopped completely the following day.
In early April 1945, despite enormous efforts, it was increasingly clear that the German end could come at any moment. General Heinrici, a man the commanders disliked, had just been appointed to lead Army Group Vistula to take responsibility for the last German defensive line between the Soviets and Berlin. Although this general was not popular with the leadership of the Third Reich, there was no one better than him at establishing strict defensive systems, and because of this need, he was called to active service.
German leaders such as Hitler and Göring, who were increasingly anxious about the situation, soon requested a meeting with him to learn about the possibilities the German army had to repel the coming Soviet attack. The first to summon him was Hitler at a meeting held in his bunker in Berlin during the first days of April. Tensions were at their peak, with the Soviets on the banks of the Oder only 70 kilometers from the capital, and the Western Allies having broken through the front at the Rhine and advancing with little resistance inside Germany.
At this meeting, Keitel, Burgdorf, Krebs, Martin Bormann, Himmler, Göring, and Dönitz, among others, were present, with particular importance given to the attendance of these last three men in the trading of units that took place at that conference. The conference began when Hitler finally entered the small room in the bunker where the military commanders and other officials were gathering. It was the first time in a long while that Heinrici had seen Hitler personally, and his impression was very bad, as he saw him greatly deteriorated.
The exact words Heinrici used to describe what he felt were that the German leader looked like a man with no more than 24 hours left to live, and that he resembled a walking corpse. It should be noted that Heinrici hated these kinds of meetings because he considered them a waste of time and preferred to stay in an area close to the front. The first speaker was Krebs, to give way to Heinrici to say what he had as quickly as possible so he could return to the front immediately, since his presence there was essential.
Heinrici's intention was to make everyone realize that the situation was desperate and that it would be impossible to withstand the coming Soviet attack. Not wanting to state this information too directly, the German general began gradually preparing the atmosphere. Thus, Heinrici initially focused on describing the two armies defending the Oder River from Frankfurt to the river's mouth about 150 kilometers north.
Heinrici said in his first intervention that great efforts had been made to leave the Ninth Army in the best possible conditions, because it was the place where the main Soviet attack was expected. However, the Third Panzer Army on the northern flank was in precarious conditions and was not expected to be able to contain the attack once the river's waters receded and its level dropped. The general continued, explaining that the deficiencies in these last German armies were comprehensive.
There was a shortage of all types of weapons, ammunition, tanks, fuel, and well-trained or experienced soldiers. As if that were not enough, the best tank units Heinrici had in his sector as reserves had been sent to the outskirts of Prague. The reason was that the main attack was expected in that area, not from the Oder toward Berlin. This meant Heinrici had no forces in the rear capable of plugging any gap the Soviets created. This would lead to an immediate collapse of the front and certain defeat.
After these words, all the men in the room felt some bewilderment and surprise, because they were not used to someone explaining the facts so clearly, especially in Hitler's presence. The response came from Krebs, who simply said there was no need to worry, because he would receive all necessary reinforcements of men and equipment in the coming weeks. Heinrici did not take this comment seriously, because he knew it was an empty and unrealistic promise.
After this first intervention, and seeing that he had failed to make them realize how dangerous the situation was, Heinrici decided to raise his voice and explain the matter in another way. Heinrici then said: "My Führer, I do not believe the forces on the Oder front will be able to withstand the massive attacks the Russians will launch against us. The forces we now possess are nothing but remnants of our army's former military capability. Most front-line units lack sufficient training or combat experience. Many officers are merely civilian employees with no military training who were hastily promoted. Added to this is the shortage of ammunition, all types of weapons, and reserves."
Hitler then responded calmly, saying: "Everything necessary must be done to equip these formations. We still have time to do so before the battle." Heinrici replied that it was too late, and that in any case, a little additional training would not give them real combat experience. The two men then entered a discussion in which Hitler commented that the Soviets were throwing in their last reserves and that these men were of very poor quality, which would balance the situation. However, Heinrici made him see that this was not true and that this information was completely wrong, as the Soviets had highly experienced forces and had never reached the limits of their capabilities.
Raising his voice again so they would understand the real situation, Heinrici commented: "I must warn you that due to the transfer of armored units to Prague, I have no reserves. We have nothing. What will happen after the intense Soviet bombardment? Will our forces withstand that initial impact? Perhaps yes, but only briefly. From then on, our forces will gradually diminish without us being able to send any replacements, and then everything will be lost. In a few days, everything will be over."
After saying that, a great silence prevailed in the room. In an attempt to encourage Hitler and continue gaining his trust and approval, Göring said: "My Führer, I will immediately place 100,000 men from the Luftwaffe at your disposal. In a few days, they will appear on the Oder front." Upon hearing this, and not wanting anyone to outdo him, Himmler said: "The SS is honored to provide another 25,000 fighters for the Oder front." Finally, Dönitz, not wanting to be outdone, announced: "I will also send about 12,000 sailors who will leave their ships immediately to reinforce the Oder."
In Heinrici's words, the whole thing became a public auction, with each competing to see who could offer the most. After a series of considerations by everyone, Hitler finally told Heinrici: "Well, you already have 150,000 men, about 12 divisions. Here are your reserves." Heinrici, unable to hide his astonishment, said these forces were not prepared at all for ground combat and would only increase the number of casualties among their ranks in battle.
Naturally, these words were not accepted by Himmler, Göring, or Dönitz, who began to point out that their forces enjoyed the highest levels of readiness. Heinrici commented again that all these men would be sacrificed at the front without any positive result, and that his only demand was the return of the armored formations that had just been taken from him. However, Hitler's response was that this was impossible.
In the end, the German leader told Heinrici that the most important thing in this situation was maintaining faith in victory, since his defeatist attitude was of no use. Hitler's last words to Heinrici were: "I tell you, Colonel General, if you realize that this battle must be won, it will be won. If you can convey this faith to your troops, you will achieve victory, and with it the greatest success of the war."
This was the last hope the German leader clung to in his mind, to try to reach some kind of peace or ceasefire if he succeeded in repelling these last Soviet attacks. Heinrici then gave up and realized he had failed to achieve his goal, because he had not succeeded in making those men realize how difficult the situation was. So he immediately gathered his papers and took his leave. As soon as he left the bunker, Heinrici told his aide: "There is no point anymore. Everything is pointless. Nothing is of any use."
A few days later, on April 8, another of the strangest meetings of the last days of the Third Reich was held, and this time Hermann Göring was the star of the scene. On this occasion, Göring invited Heinrici to lunch at his private estate called Carinhall, located northwest of Berlin only 30 kilometers from the Oder River. At this meeting, Göring would appear extremely tense and would threaten Heinrici with telling Hitler a series of bad things about him in order to have him removed from his post.
As mentioned earlier, we are in early April 1945, when the Soviet attack on Berlin was imminent. In addition to threatening the German capital, the Soviets also threatened many of the palaces and castles where senior officials such as Hermann Göring lived lives of luxury. Thus, these men were determined to do everything they could to prevent the Soviets from reaching their homes.
The bad relationship between Göring and Heinrici dated back to 1942 with the air supply disaster for the Sixth Army. Heinrici had always accused Göring of mishandling the situation and promising actions he was unable to carry out. This was an opinion the general expressed publicly, and Göring clearly could not stand him. The marshal, for his part, accused Heinrici of insubordination and failure to comply with orders issued to him.
In addition to these accusations exchanged between the two men since 1943, another event had occurred a few days earlier that led to a new confrontation between them in Hitler's presence. It happened during the meeting in Hitler's bunker just analyzed, where Heinrici pointed out that the forces Göring would send from the Luftwaffe were unfit for combat. These words did not please Göring, who assured Hitler that his men were of the highest quality.
Because the situation was both personal and military, Göring invited Heinrici to lunch at his country estate, Carinhall, so they could talk. Heinrici did not like this invitation at all, because in addition to feeling no sympathy for Göring, he did not want to leave his command center, knowing the Soviet attack could happen at any moment. However, despite everything, the truth was that he could not refuse.
From the greeting the two men exchanged, the tensions and lack of cordiality between them were noticeable. As expected, Heinrici was impressed by the size and luxury of Hermann Göring's estate, which he had named Carinhall after his late wife. The first words were a series of accusations, most notably Göring accusing Heinrici of insulting him in front of Hitler when he said his paratrooper division was not ready for combat. As punishment, Hermann told him he would remove it from his command and instead send it south under Schörner, because he was a real soldier.
Once these initial accusations were finished, Heinrici and Göring sat down for lunch. Again, the marshal began attacking Heinrici. This time, he focused on what he had personally seen when he visited various sectors of the Oder front a few days earlier. These were his exact words: "I toured all the armies under your command, and in sector after sector, I found men doing nothing. I even saw some hiding to play cards," Göring said angrily. "Moreover, I saw others from the Labor Organization who did not even have shovels to do their work. In some places, I found their soldiers without field kitchens, and in other sectors almost no defenses had been built. Everywhere I saw his men idling and wandering from place to place doing nothing. I want you to know that I intend to go tell the Führer all of this," Göring concluded.
Upon hearing these words, Heinrici almost unleashed his anger on Göring, but he ultimately restrained himself and thought he was not worth it. Finally, when lunch ended, Heinrici rose from his chair and prepared to leave. As he was leaving Göring's luxurious estate, he looked at him slowly and said: "I hope my idlers can save this beautiful estate of yours from the coming battles." Göring stared at him upon hearing these words, coldly and with extreme anger, and immediately afterward turned and returned to his palace.
How much longer could he continue living there? That is certainly what Göring thought. Heinrici would later comment that if Göring had asked him the question, he would have answered that he would not stay there for more than a week, because once the attack began, it would fall into Soviet hands. Finally, Zhukov's offensive began on April 16, although Göring was a little fortunate because it fell south of his residence and did not affect it directly. In this way, he benefited greatly from the fact that Rokossovsky's army launched its attack a few days after Zhukov, because his forces had less time to organize.
On April 28, Carinhall was blown up and razed to the ground by order of Göring, who under no circumstances wanted his precious palace to fall into Soviet hands. The Reich Marshal spent the last days of the war at another residence in the Alps, where he was placed under house arrest and surveillance by Hitler's orders. That was because of the telegram he sent to Hitler's bunker that was interpreted as meaning he wanted to carry out a coup. As is known, Hermann Göring ended up surrendering to the Western Allies, after which he was imprisoned and tried at Nuremberg, and most likely committed suicide moments before his official execution.