Hermann Göring, the former Reichsmarschall and one of the most powerful figures in Adolf Hitler's regime, faced the twilight of his life at the Nuremberg tribunal in 1946. Subjected to lengthy interrogations, he was determined to defend his role and secure a place in German history.
According to the prison psychiatrist Dr. Douglas Kelley, Göring was considered the most physically fit man in Germany. He was docile and accepted his misfortune with dignity, focusing on preserving the prestige of his authority.
Göring never considered himself a criminal. Full of pride, he declared that he was prepared to be hanged but was determined to go down in German history as a great man. He said that if he could not convince the tribunal, he would convince the German people that everything he did was for the great German Reich, predicting that in 50 or 60 years there would be statues of him all over Germany.
On March 13, 1946, with permission of the high court, the defense called the former Reichsmarschall to testify. He stated his name and repeated the oath, swearing by God the omnipotent and omniscient that he would speak the clear truth and would not hide or add anything.
Göring testified that he was born on January 12, 1893, in Rosenheim, Bavaria. He described an ordinary education, first with a home teacher, then a cadet corps, then officer service. He noted that his father was the first governor of Southwest Africa and had connections with Cecil Rhodes and the elder Chamberlain, and that his father was attached to Bismarck.
He said he spent half of his youth in Austria and already felt an attachment to it and its kindred people. When World War I broke out, he served as a lieutenant in an infantry regiment. From October 1914 he served as an altitude adjuster, became a pilot in June 1915, first of a reconnaissance aircraft and then briefly of a bomber, and in the autumn of 1915 became a fighter pilot.
Severely wounded in an air battle, he recovered and became commander of a fighter squadron. After Richthofen's death, he became commander of the famous Richthofen Squadron. His awards included the Iron Cross second class, the Iron Cross first class, the Zähringen Lion with swords, the Order of Karl Friedrich, the Hohenzollern with swords third class, and finally the Order of Pour le Mérite, the highest honor.
Göring described how he first met Hitler. After the collapse of the First World War, he demobilized his squadron and refused to serve in the Reichswehr because he had been an opponent of the Republic from the beginning. He went abroad, then returned, spent time at a hunting lodge studying, and enrolled at the University of Munich to study history and political science.
One Sunday afternoon in October or November 1922, a protest meeting was held after another demand from the Allies to extradite German military leaders. Göring attended only as a spectator. Toward the end, Hitler was invited to speak and refused, saying he did not want to disturb the unanimity of the crowd and that empty protests were pointless without sufficient support.
Göring said this made a deep impression on him. He went to hear Hitler speak the following Monday evening, where Hitler spoke about the events of the demonstration and the Treaty of Versailles, arguing that a protest is only valid when it has real support and that as long as Germany was not strong such protests were aimless. Göring said this conviction coincided word for word with his own position.
A few days later he went to the headquarters of the NSDAP. He said he knew nothing about the party's program, only that it was a small party. He told Hitler he was at his complete disposal and would do his best to fight the Treaty of Versailles.
Göring said Hitler explained that it was impossible to cooperate only with elements that proclaimed themselves national, and that only one who attracted the masses of German workers could win. Hitler explained the concept of national socialism as an amalgamation of nationalism and socialism.
Hitler asked him to support his point of view within the party and selected men who were staunch supporters. Hitler told him to be aware of how strong Marxism and communism were, and that he faced the necessity of countering physical violence at meetings by force, for which he had created the SA. Hitler said he had long wished to find a leader who had distinguished himself in the recent war and had the necessary authority, and considered it a stroke of luck that Göring, the last commander of the Richthofen Squadron, had arrived.
Göring said he did not want to assume a leadership position immediately, as it might appear he had come only for a position. They decided he would remain in the shadows for a month or two and then assume leadership, but would strive to use his influence immediately. Göring agreed and became an associate of Adolf Hitler in late October or early November 1922. He joined the party a few days later.
Before November 1923, his tasks derived from his position as commander of the SA. He worked to make the SA a stable, disciplined, and reliable unit capable of carrying out orders at any time. He tried to attract young and idealistic party members willing to devote their time and resources to the fight.
He said things were not easy for these men, as they were few in number and the enemies were far more numerous. He also began looking for new additions in the work environment. Party rallies, largely confined to Munich, Upper Bavaria, and Franconia, were carried out satisfactorily and trouble was avoided in most cases, though sometimes they came up against strong groups of adversaries.
During 1923, differences between Bavaria and the Reich became more pronounced. The Reich government was infected with Marxism, while the Bavarian government was free of it and was bourgeois. The Bavarian government was replaced, with von Kahr accountable and delegated authority. A conflict arose when the Reichswehr's seventh division stationed in Bavaria was released from its oath to the Reich, and the same occurred with the Bavarian police.
The Bavarian government enjoyed the confidence of so-called national associations, partly composed of military or paramilitary formations in possession of arms, generally opposed to Berlin and against the November Republic. Göring said their positions coincided.
On the Sunday before November 9, a big parade was held in Munich with the entire Bavarian government, the Reichswehr, the police, and patriotic associations, and they marched too. They discovered that it was not von Kahr but the Bavarian Crown Prince Rupprecht standing on the platform, which was extremely disconcerting. They suspected Bavaria might break away from the Reich, but they wanted a strong, united Reich free of certain parties and current leaders.
They had given up on the so-called march on Berlin. When von Kahr called the famous meeting at the Bürgerbräukeller, the time had come to thwart these plans and take concrete steps toward a greater Germany, thus bringing about the events of November 9, 1923. Göring said he was prepared and never made any secret of his willingness to take part in any revolution against the so-called November Republic, with the exception of left-wing actions.
After these events, Göring was in an Austrian hospital, then in Upper Bavaria in serious condition, then arrested at the border and transferred by Bavarian police. The Bavarian People's Court heard the case concerning November 9, with Hitler as the main defendant. Göring asked Hitler whether he should appear before the court, and Hitler assured him he would not, so he did not.
After recovering, he spent a year in Italy and then in another country. In 1926 or 1927 there was a general amnesty for those prosecuted for illegal actions, applying not only to them but also to leftists and peasants, and he was able to return to Germany. He met Hitler again in 1927 at a short meeting in Berlin. At that time he was not involved in party work and tried to remain more independent.
Shortly before the Reichstag elections on May 26, 1928, Hitler called him and told him he wanted him to be first on the list of candidates for the Reichstag for the National Socialist Party. Göring agreed. This meant his involvement in party work would increase.
He said he was not involved in SA affairs at that time. New appointments had been made and the new SA chief von Pfeffer clung to his position and was not interested in seeing Göring involved. After 1923 his active work in the SA ceased, and only after the seizure of power, when honorary offices were created, did he receive an honorary office, the highest rank in the SA.
In 1928 he was elected to the Reichstag and began traveling around the country as a party representative. The SA was reformed and extended to the entire Reich. It had been banned for a time after 1923, and the ban was lifted before he returned to Germany.
Göring noted that the larger parties of that time all had so-called combat units. The most active was the Red Front, an association of combat units of the Communists, their greatest adversaries, with whom they had constant skirmishes. There was also the Reichsbanner of the Social Democrats, the Steel Helmet, a right-wing nationalist organization, and their SA.
He said the SA suffered great losses. Most members came from the broad masses of the people, the smallest employees and workers who participated in the ideology. They were often badly wounded, many were shot dead during clashes, and they were persecuted by the government. Civil servants could not join the SA. He paid great respect and honor to these people, saying they were not only bearers of cruelty but men who voluntarily subjected themselves to the most difficult tests and restrictions because of their idealism.
From 1928 until the seizure of power, Göring held no position in the party and was never a political leader of the party. He was a member of the Reichstag and a member of the party faction, and at the same time a representative of the party traveling from town to town, trying to expand and strengthen the party, attract new members, and especially attract communist and Marxist supporters to create a broad base among the people.
From the middle of 1932, after participating in countless elections and making speeches three times in an afternoon and often all night long, he was elected president of the Reichstag because the party had a strong representation. Shortly before that, at the end of 1931, when he saw the party was growing, the Führer told him he would like a personal representative independent of the party who could carry out political negotiations, not bound by party obligations. Göring accepted this assignment, which was not a post but a mission.
He explained that he was free to negotiate with all parties from the Communist to the extreme right, to counteract certain actions in the Reichstag and implement appropriate political measures. At the same time he had to spread their ideas in industrial and intellectual circles, where he had connections and access. The Führer considered him particularly suitable for such a task and could absolutely count on him.
When he became president of the Reichstag, his task became easier. He could act in the legal field and was obliged to take part in political events, for example if a government resigned or in the event of a vote of no confidence. His main duty was to propose to the Reich president, after negotiations with the parties, options for a new coalition government. The Reich president always had to receive him for these matters, creating a personal bond between them, though such a bond already existed because Field Marshal von Hindenburg had known him since the World War.
Regarding his involvement in Hitler's appointment as Reich Chancellor, Göring described the situation at the time. The balance between the parliamentary parties had already been broken at the end of 1931 or beginning of 1932. Things were going badly in Germany and it was impossible to form a parliamentary majority, while the decree on emergency measures came into force, partly excluding the operation of the Constitution.
He recalled the Brüning government working on plans to extend the emergency decree and concerned about Article 48 of the Constitution. Then came the von Papen government, which also did not succeed in creating a parliamentary basis. Von Papen turned to the National Socialists, the strongest party at that time, to form a basis with other parties. There were talks with von Papen's name considered as a candidate for Reich Chancellor while Hitler was to be appointed Vice Chancellor.
Göring said he told von Papen that Hitler could be any number but not number two. If he was to deal with any matter he would have to play the leading role, so it would be unacceptable and unthinkable for the Führer to play a secondary role. They categorically rejected this.
He told von Papen that after such a gesture they would not support him but would oppose his government in the Reichstag, simply because they would fight against any government that did not consider them as a majority. Later there was a well-known conflict between von Papen as Reich Chancellor and Göring as president of the Reichstag, in which Göring was determined to bring his government to a standstill. He knew the Communists had planned a vote of no confidence which the rest could support. A vote of no confidence was necessary to demonstrate to the Reich president that no government could be maintained without sufficient reserves.
Göring had seen the red briefcase and knew the order for dissolution was ready, but first he wanted to take a vote. Thirty-two votes were for von Papen and almost 500 against. The von Papen government resigned. Until then all parties had participated in the formation of governments except for very small parties. Toward the end, Reich Defense Minister von Schleicher and Cardinal Bertram began to play an increasingly important role. There were now only two possibilities: either the appropriate share of power was given to the leader of the strongest party, as is usually the case, or the man acted behind the scenes.
Göring described the decisive period in the negotiations. Field Marshal Reich President von Hindenburg, who had only known the Führer personally through a few sentences and had not overcome his distrust of him, demanded certain rigid restrictions. The strongest and leading party, willing to assume responsibility for the nation, was under relative restrictions and significantly underrepresented in the government.
Germany was at the lowest point of its condition, with 8 million unemployed. Every program was failing, there was no party consensus, and there was a very strong left-wing party. It was a heavy burden to take on such responsibility in such a harsh political environment.
The first condition the Reich president wanted was for von Papen to become Vice Chancellor under any circumstances, out of sympathy for von Papen's personality, though there was no party behind him. The Reich president nevertheless demanded that von Papen submit to him the reports that the Führer as Reich Chancellor had prepared. This was quickly forgotten even by the Reich president himself.
Secondly, the Reich president wanted the Foreign Office to be independent of the parties and in the hands of von Neurath, who could not give them any political resources other than his knowledge and ability. Thirdly, the post of Prime Minister of Prussia, second only to Reich Chancellor and the most important post in Germany after the World War, was to be given to von Papen's man. Fourthly, the Reich president demanded that the post of Minister of Defense be held by an independent man, a military man appointed by him personally, General von Blomberg, who was at that time at the disarmament conference in Geneva. Neither Göring nor the Führer knew von Blomberg personally.
Göring said the party came to power in a perfectly legal way because it was called by the Reich president in accordance with the Constitution. Given the strength of the party, this should have happened much earlier. The party gained strength and came to power through regular elections and in accordance with the law.
After Hitler's appointment, they had to be determined to retain power under any circumstances. They did not want power and governmental powers just for their own sake, but in order to make Germany free and strong. They could not leave room for chance, for elections, for parliamentary majorities, but wanted to carry out the task to which they had committed themselves.
Göring held the office of president of the Reichstag until the end. In the government he was first given the office of Minister and Reich Commissar of Aviation, but not of the Air Force. He soon realized the need to develop the Air Force. In Prussia he was appointed minister of the interior and on April 28, 1933, also prime minister of Prussia. The Reich commissariat was first converted into the Ministry of Aviation in March 1933.
At the beginning of 1934 he handed over the Prussian Ministry of the Interior to the Reich Minister of the Interior because it was part of the consolidation of power to clarify the need for good administration by the Reich, for which the Prussian ministries had to be merged with those of the Reich.
Asked whether his mandate as Prussian minister of the interior included the creation of the Gestapo and the concentration camps, Göring said that to strengthen power the first necessity was to create new forms of controlling the internal political instrument of power, the police. There was no Reich police, only provincial police forces, the most important being the Prussian police, already formed by their predecessors.
He said the old parties had arranged their men according to their preferences, and their opponents, who often used police measures against them, remained in the regional offices. Before he came to power there had been a slight reduction when the Social Democratic government of Braun and Severing was replaced by that of von Papen, after which their bitterest opponents were removed from the police. Since the most important posts were still in the hands of certain political opponents, he could not expect those who until yesterday had used the police as a brutal means of combating them to show loyalty to the new state.
Before Prussia came to power it already had a political police, whose task was to watch over and fight the National Socialists and partly the Communists. All Göring had to do was appoint new people to this political police and allow them to continue their work. But the situation changed when they came to power.
The Communist party was extremely strong, with about 6 million voters and a Red Front organization that could be used as an instrument of revolution. It was clear to the Communist party that the longer they were in power the weaker its position would be. The threat of political unrest and an atmosphere of conflict existed at that time, which could have provoked communist-inspired revolutionary acts. Even after the seizure of power, political assassinations took place and attempts by the National Socialists and police did not cease but rather intensified.
In view of the information he received, Göring had to take decisive measures. The office as it existed could not prevent this danger; it needed a responsible political police not only in the central apparatus but also in its subdivisions. He strengthened this instrument and called it the State Security Police. Under that name he established a network of police stations and recruited political officials in large numbers who had experience, at first also some people from party circles, because he valued professional aptitude.
He wanted this police force to be concerned primarily with the defense of the state against enemies. The leader he selected was a former police officer but not a party man, Diels, who had already served there as Oberregierungsrat and later as Ministerialrat, like most other Gestapo leaders being an officer and not a party man. Later more and more party elements appeared in the police.
Their task was above all to take all possible precautions against left-wing action as quickly as possible. Göring knew, as was later confirmed, that the Communist headquarters in Berlin, the Liebknecht House, was well fortified and contained many weapons. They also had information about serious links between the Russian trade mission and the German Communist Party. Even if he arrested thousands of communist officials at the stroke of a pen, the constant threat remained and the danger of the spread of ideas remained. It was necessary to uncover the system of secret connections and keep it under constant surveillance.
The Social Democratic party in his opinion was not so dangerous, especially considering the people who belonged to it. However, they remained absolute opponents of the new state. Some of its officials were radical, others less radical. He preferred to keep most of the radicals under surveillance, while a large number of former Social Democratic ministers, Prussian provincial leaders, and high officials were quietly retired and granted their pensions without any action being taken against them. Of course there were other Social Democratic party officials whom they kept a close eye on.
For these purposes he initially established a secret State Police in Prussia, as he had no authority in other states at that time. The subsequent organization of the rest of the police was not so important.
Concentration camps were created when necessity demanded, first of all for the creation of order and the elimination of the most dangerous elements of disorder directed against them. He immediately decided to arrest the Communist officials and leaders. He had a list for this purpose and it was clear to him that having arrested the most dangerous and important officials, there were still several thousand others involved in these activities, so it was necessary to arrest not only party officials but also members of the Red Front.
These arrests were dictated by state security and necessity. The question was how to eliminate the danger. There was only one possibility: preventive detention, in order to prevent and possibly eliminate the danger for those confirmed to be involved in activities that were treasonable or hostile to the state or who could be expected to carry out such activities. This was not something new nor invented by the National Socialists; previously this type of preventive detention had been used against Communists but above all against them, the National Socialists.
Prisons were not suitable for such a task, and he wanted to emphasize from the outset that this was a way of protecting the state. He therefore ordered that these people be interned in camps. One or two camps were then proposed because he could not say how long the detention would be necessary nor how many would arrive. When they occupied Liebknecht's house they found so many weapons, materials, and preparations for civil war that few could say how big the movement was.
Göring said that in the light of the great confrontation between the extreme wings of these political adversaries and the bitterness of the opposition caused by continuous skirmishes in the street, the situation was not always convenient for the prisoners. For this reason he ordered that the police be used as far as possible to guard the camps, and only in cases of insufficiency was it necessary to resort to outside forces.
He pointed out that the name "concentration camp" was not invented by them but first appeared in the foreign press and then came into common use. At the end of 1933, in a book which appeared in England at the request of an English publisher and which the prosecution had already introduced into evidence, he expressed his opinion on the subject very openly. He pointed out again that the book was intended for foreign countries, for English-speaking countries.
He said there were excesses at the beginning, here and there innocent people suffered, here and there there were beatings and acts of brutality. But compared with all that had happened in the past, with the grandeur of the events, the German Revolution was bloodless and the most disciplined of all the revolutions in history.
He said he gave instructions that such things should not happen. They did happen, everywhere to a greater or lesser extent. He always pointed out that such things should not happen because the important thing for him was always to get these people on their side, to re-educate them.
He became personally interested in concentration camps in the spring of 1934. At that time there were two or three camps in Prussia. At Christmas 1933 he gave the order to release the accused in minor cases, less dangerous cases, and in those cases where it was obvious that people had already stopped resisting. There were about 5,000 of them. He repeated this again in November 1934 for 2,000 prisoners. This applied only to Prussia at that time. One camp was dissolved or at least temporarily closed, and this happened at a time when no one anticipated that it would be the subject of an investigation by an international court.
Göring was actually in charge of the Gestapo and the concentration camps until the beginning of 1934. Then Diels was in charge and gave him frequent reports on the work of the Gestapo and the concentration camps. Meanwhile outside Prussia the police were being reformed, with responsibility for the police in all German states except Prussia being transferred to Himmler. Having appreciated Göring's measures, Himmler began to set up a state secret police there as well. Himmler was to be the head of all these police forces and was now also trying to get the leadership of the Prussian police.
Göring was satisfied with Diels's work and saw no need to change anything. These activities began as early as the end of 1933. Shortly afterwards he transferred the Prussian Ministry of the Interior to the Reich Ministry of the Interior, and in the spring of 1934 he was no longer minister of that department. Himmler probably strongly demanded that the Führer transfer responsibility for the Prussian police to him.
Göring did not directly object, though he found it unpleasant, as he himself wanted to be in charge of his police. When the Führer asked him to do so, saying it was right and proper and necessary to fight the enemies of the state with unified methods, he handed the police over to Himmler, who put Heydrich in charge. But formerly he continued to control it because there was no Reich police.
The rest of the police, the state police and the paramilitary police, he did not hand over to Himmler. In Prussia he had a well-organized police force with a military structure which was in a state of readiness to participate in the rearmament program. For this reason he could not and did not want to hand over the paramilitary police, since it was being prepared exclusively for military purposes. It was created by him on his own initiative and under his responsibility and had nothing to do with a real police force. Later in 1935 he incorporated it into the Armed Forces.
In 1936 the Reich police law was passed and the position of chief of the German police was created. Under this law the police were legally and formally subordinated to the Reichsführer SS, also known as the chief of the German police.
Asked about Röhm, Göring said Röhm was head of the SA, chief of the SA general staff. The meeting was then adjourned. It was 5:00 on Thursday, March 14, 1946, morning session.
Asked whether he participated in the elaboration of the party program, Göring said the party program was developed and proclaimed when he first heard of the movement and expressed his desire to join it. His attitude to the provisions was generally positive. He said it goes without saying that hardly any politically thinking person recognizes and agrees with all the provisions of a political party's program. Apart from the known provisions, there were no objectives that remained secret.
Asked whether it was considered possible to achieve these objectives by any means, including illegal methods, he said of course they could have been achieved by any means. Perhaps the notion of illegal should be clarified: if he set the goal of revolution, then it is illegal for the existing order; if he succeeded, then the revolution becomes a fact and consequently legal and legitimate. Before 1923 and the events of November 9, he and all of them had the perspective that they would try to achieve their goal if necessary by revolutionary means. After this attempt failed, the Führer, after his release from the fortress, decided that in the future they would use the methods of political struggle like the other parties, and the Führer prohibited any illegal actions in order to avoid a ban on party activities.
Asked when and for what purpose the SS was created, Göring said the SS was created when he was abroad, in 1926 or 1927. Its purpose was to create first of all within the movement a specially selected unit to keep watch over the Führer. At first there were very few of them. He never belonged to the SS in any way, neither directly nor indirectly, so the statement that he was an SS General was completely wrong.
Asked how he understood the term "master race," he said he had not understood anything about it, and that the term does not appear in any of his speeches or writings. In his opinion, if one is a gentleman one need not pay attention to it.
Asked how he understood the theory of living space, he said it was a rather controversial theory. He could understand the term in connection with the United Powers which together declared three quarters of the world theirs and came up with their own explanation for it. But for them, where there were 144 people per square kilometer, the words living space meant the necessary proportion between the population and its well-being and standard of living. The expression always mentioned is "power grab." He would call the seizure of power a technical term, reflecting quite clearly the fact that they had seized power.
Asked about his attitude toward the Führer principle, he said he supported this principle and evaluated it favorably and consciously. They must not make the mistake of forgetting that the political systems of different countries have different origins and developments. What is perfectly suitable for one country is not suitable for another. Germany during centuries of monarchy had the Führer principle. Democracy came to Germany when things were going badly and they hit rock bottom. There was a general lack of unity in Germany, a multiplicity of parties, constant anxiety caused by elections, and a complete distortion of the theories of power and responsibility. Power lay with the masses and responsibility with the leader. In his opinion Germany, especially at the time of its lowest fall, should have followed the Führer principle with all its might: power from the top down and responsibility from the bottom up. He was aware that a principle that sounded like this could involve extremes. He pointed to the Catholic Church, which rests on a pure hierarchical leadership, and said of Russia that without the Führer principle it would not have been able to withstand the hard tests of the last war.
Asked whether the measures to strengthen their power were carried out with the authorization of Reich President von Hindenburg, Göring said that as long as the Reich president was alive and working, the measures were naturally carried out in agreement with him, since his approval was a constitutional necessity according to Paragraph 48. This approval was given.
Asked whether the National Socialist government was recognized by foreign powers, he said their government was recognized from the first day of its existence and remained so until the end, with the exception of a few states with which diplomatic relations were broken. Diplomatic representatives from foreign countries attended the party congresses in Nuremberg, these great events and great demonstrations of the strength of the movement. They were present, perhaps not every year, but he remembered one very well. This continued until the last party congress in 1938.
Asked to what extent there were confiscations of assets of political opponents after coming to power, he said laws were passed to confiscate the property of persons hostile to the state as well as the property of parties hostile to the state. The property of the Communist party and its branches and that of the Social Democratic party was partially confiscated. But the personal property of party members or even of its leaders was not confiscated. Many of the leading Social Democrats who were ministers or civil servants continued to draw their pensions, which were even increased in the future.
Asked how he explained the actions against unions and independent workers' organizations, he said the trade unions in Germany, most of them or at least the most important ones, were closely connected with the Social Democratic party and also under the influence of the Communists. They were the real, if not formal, very active organs of these parties. He was not talking about the bulk of their members but about the leaders of these unions. There was also a small Christian trade union, an organ of the Center party. These unions, because their leaders maintained close contacts with the parties they considered adversaries, agreed with their adversaries that they would not participate in the organization of the new state. The trade union organizations were soon dissolved and the German Labor Front was organized for the workers.
In his opinion this did not lead to the destruction of the freedom of the German workers. On the contrary, he was convinced that they were the only ones who gave real freedom to the German workers, above all in the exercise of the right to work, thus elevating their position in the state. They certainly did away with two things which are probably characteristic of a free society and which he could not understand: strikes on the one hand and lockouts on the other. These things could not be reconciled either with the right to work or with the duty of every citizen to pursue the goal of national greatness. They were able to replace these two essential elements, which also contributed to unemployment, with their colossal work program, the creation of employment, which was the other essential provision of their social program.
He said it was the first time that a worker was entitled to holidays, paid holidays. A major welfare system was established for the workers, and huge sums were invested in building housing for the workers. Until then they had been used and exploited and had hardly any property because of the times of unemployment. He summed it up by saying that they did not enslave the workers but rather freed them from the misery of unemployment.
Asked about the Röhm Rebellion, he said Röhm since 1931 was Chief of Staff of the SA, responsible for the SA to the Führer, who in turn was the supreme commander of the SA and directed it in the name of the Führer.
On Monday, March 18, 1946, morning session, the witness was asked whether it was true, as the prosecution claims, that he was a Reichsführer of the SA. Göring said he was not a Reichsführer of the SA; such a title did not exist in 1923. On November 9 he was the commander of the SA which then existed in Bavaria and to a lesser extent in Württemberg.
Asked how long he had been an SA commander, he said until November 1923. Asked about his influence before and after 1923 in relation to the leadership of the SA, bringing people in and giving orders, he said from the beginning of 1923 until November 9, 1923, his influence was absolute and complete; he was directly in command of the SA. After 1923 he had no further connection with the SA. He held an honorary position in the SA, probably from 1936, but without any specific authority.
Asked what kind of sacrifices the SA men made, he said they gave all their free time to the movement without pay. They lived without family and without rest so that in difficult moments of struggle they could always be at the disposal of the party during election campaigns, long parades, defense meetings, and so on. In his eyes these were considerable sacrifices. The majority of SA members can be regarded as workers and small employees who needed time to rest but who were always ready to give themselves completely to the party and to work for its political ideals.
Asked whether these people were promised material benefits, he said not at all. Asked whether it was true that especially after the seizure of power many communist agitators joined the SA, he said this was a very important and vital question. Since action was taken against the Communist party after coming to power, which was only logically to be expected, many members of the Red Front, the fighting organization, joined the SA, especially in the big cities where it was easier. This was easier because the head of the SA, Röhm, did not divide the members of the SA into those who were party members and those who were not. Consequently anyone could become a member of the SA without joining the party.
Asked to explain the importance of the post of honorary leader in the SA as regards training and giving orders, he said honorary SA leaders were appointed for all occasions and for all reasons. They had purely representative functions; they participated in ceremonies in the manner of the SA. They were not active members of the SA and were not informed of the internal activities of the SA, its operations, or other tasks. Their function was decorative.
Asked whether the Gestapo in 1933, when it was created by him, was a National Socialist combat unit or rather a state institution such as the criminal police or another institution of the Reich, he said it was a purely state institution built on the basis of the existing police force, which was simply reorganized according to the new state principles. At that time it had no connection with the party. The party had no power or influence to give orders or directives of any kind. It was a purely state institution whose members and employees were civil servants with all rights and duties.
Asked whether there were any changes after the state police came under Himmler's control and up to 1945, he said up to 1934 it was exactly as he had described. Then in the course of further consolidation the SS element became stronger and probably many people from there joined, but even these at that time, everyone had to be vetted, became and remained civil servants. He heard nothing about changes in state status, but gradually over the years all civil servants, whether they wanted to or not, were given SS ranks. Gestapo officials who probably before 1939 or 1940 had nothing to do with the SS and who came there in the old days, that is who were police officials of the Weimar Republic, were automatically given SS ranks. They remained civil servants. The Gestapo was an apparatus made up of German police officials.
Asked whether it was true that after Himmler came to power as police commissioner of Munich he was in charge of the political and criminal police of Bavaria, Göring said as far as he knew, Himmler was the first police commissioner in Munich. Very quickly, probably within a week or two, he appointed himself commander of the Bavarian police. Then within a month or two, this happened very quickly, he became, he did not remember the exact name of the position, the supreme police chief of all the free German provinces and cities with the exception of Prussia.
Asked whether Gestapo officers were accepted into the SS voluntarily or whether there was a desire on the part of some authoritative leaders to have these officers join the SS, he said he thought he heard from a staff member he met before that they were not accepted into the SS but were given the rank of SS. It was probably Himmler's idea that the SS and the police should be under his direction and united. He could not say how Himmler explained it and how it was put into practice in detail. Consequently he could probably state things of which he knew little.
Asked whether in 1933 political police officers who had previously worked in the political police were recruited into the state police voluntarily or ordered to transfer without their consent, Göring said the questioner was wrong when he said that the members of the former political police were simply incorporated into the Gestapo. Because it was a political police force and contained representatives of those parties that were hostile and opposed to them, they should have been dismissed. Little by little new cadre were brought in, especially as their numbers increased. This new personnel was recruited from other units, from the criminal police or from somewhere else, and as he had already said, personnel were recruited from outside, especially of course their people were taken into account. Müller was transferred from the criminal police to the secret State Police, and Göring did not know whether he was asked about this. He was sure that he was not. Göring had by then already resigned as head of the secret State Police. After he had given the basic directives he was not concerned with the problems of individual officials of the criminal police.
Asked whether he knew Obersturmbannführer Müller, head of section four of the Reich Security Directorate, he said he knew him. Asked whether he was aware that Müller and his staff served in the Bavarian political police which existed until 1933, he said he did not know, he just knew he was from Bavaria.
Asked whether he knew that the secret State Police did not participate in the riots of November 9, 1938, he said he had always believed that they were not involved in them. He had seen the document in which they were ordered not to interfere. He was not sure that they were involved.
Asked whether he was aware that such acts were regularly committed in the Gestapo or that such acts were committed contrary to such orders, or if such acts did take place whether they were isolated cases or individual excesses, he said at the time when he was directly connected with the Gestapo such excesses occurred. As he had already said, he ordered that they be punished. Those who were discovered, punishments were imposed. The officers knew that if they did such things they would be punished.
Asked whether the conditions for occupying an honorable position in the SA corresponded to honorable positions in the SS, he said he thought so. Asked whether he was familiar with the directives or other regulations regarding the appointment of honorable leaders, he said no. Asked whether it was possible to refuse the appointment, he said he thought so.
Asked whether he knew the reasons for the growth of the Waffen SS into a large organization after 1939, he said the first Waffen SS divisions, made up of carefully selected manpower, fought with astonishing bravery. The Führer subsequently readily agreed to Himmler's proposal to increase the number of divisions. The Army and Air Force protested somewhat, and rightly so, because this selected volunteer material meant that men of the type who could make excellent officers for both the Army and the Air Force were being lost, and so they opposed this expansion. Furthermore, at first the Führer was not interested in having large armed formations outside the Army, but he increasingly allowed this when the problems of resupply became more and more acute as the war continued.
Himmler more or less deceived the Führer by claiming that he could create many SS divisions which would attract many recruits, and so on. This was of course good news for the Führer as he needed new troops. But at the same time Himmler used methods of creating divisions that were very different from voluntary ones and began to create many SS divisions on paper. He did not have enough men to do this at the time, so he told the Führer he must transfer his best NCOs from other units to new SS divisions. For this and other reasons replenishment was not to go to the Army or the Air Force, especially not to the Air Force which was already bearing the brunt of the war.
Göring had to transfer men from the ground staff and anti-aircraft batteries to these divisions. All this created frustration among the Air Force personnel because none of them wanted to volunteer for these divisions. But in the end the Führer ordered that these men be drawn from the Army Reserve units and as far as he remembered from the sailor reserves. He could only speak of the contingent that was drawn from the Air Force under his command. He estimated without referring to official reports that it was at least 50,000 men and officers. Then as very strong feelings were beginning to arise, he ordered that the Air Force personnel who were being used in ground combat should not be transferred to the SS, but that new Airborne units should be transferred. The Führer agreed because in the last stage of the war the Airborne divisions confirmed the hopes placed on them and were the most excellent of all the armed forces, surpassing the SS in morale and strength of resistance. After that no Airborne contingents were transferred to the SS and as far as he knew no more SS divisions were formed.
The interrogation of Hermann Göring by the prosecution continued on Monday, March 18, 1946, morning session. Asked whether he wanted a strong German state to overcome the conditions of Versailles, he said they wanted a strong German state independent of Versailles, but in order to leave Versailles the state had to first be strong; for a weak state this was impossible. They knew that from experience.
Asked whether he introduced the Führer principle for building a strong state, he said correct. Asked whether this goal, one of the goals of the Nazi party, to change the terms of Versailles, was a public high-profile goal designed to attract people to the party, he said the dictates of Versailles were such that every German in his opinion was aware that simply changing them would not change anything. It was clear that this was a compelling reason to join the party.
Asked whether he had no doubt that Adolf Hitler was dead, he said he thought there was no doubt. The same went for Goebbels. He had no doubt about it because he had heard people he fully trusted say that they saw him dead. Asked whether he doubted Himmler's death, he said he had not made a decision on this, but he thought the questioner had since he knew more than he did, as Himmler died while Göring was a prisoner. Asked whether he had no doubt about Heydrich's death, he said he was absolutely sure of it. Asked about Bormann, he said he was not absolutely sure about that, he had no confirmation, he did not know, but he assumed so.
Asked about the main personalities he mentioned in his testimony and who was responsible, he said Hitler for everything, Goebbels for inciting riots against the Jews, Himmler who deceived Hitler, Bormann who deceived him about his will. The influence exerted on the Führer changed over time. The main influence on the Führer at least until late 1941 or early 1942, if they were talking about influence, was his own. Then from 1943 onwards his influence gradually diminished, after which it declined rapidly. In general he was not sure that anyone had the same influence on the Führer as he did. After him or independently of him, Goebbels, with whom the Führer spent a lot of time, was influential in certain areas from the beginning. This influence varied over time, being weak then becoming much stronger in the last years of the war. Before and immediately after the seizure of power Hess had a certain influence but only in his own special sphere. Then over the years Himmler's influence grew. From the end of 1944 his influence rapidly declined. The most decisive influence on the Führer in the course of the war and especially from 1942 onwards, after Hess's flight in 1941, was exercised by Bormann. Later he had a devastatingly strong influence. In the end this was possible because after July 20 the Führer was full of mistrust and because Bormann was constantly with him and informed him of what was happening. Generally speaking these people had more or less influence at different times.
Asked whether in 1933 he was in charge of a special intelligence organization that monitored the telephone conversations of public officials and other people inside and outside Germany, he said he had a technical apparatus which monitored the conversations of important foreigners with and abroad. Telegrams and wireless messages were intercepted which were transmitted not only from Germany to abroad but also from abroad. He also monitored the telephone conversations in Germany of all important foreigners, important companies, sometimes people who for some political or police reason had to be monitored to prevent police abuse. This department was only allowed to monitor telephone conversations with his permission. Nevertheless uncontrolled wiretapping was possible as is still possible everywhere.
Asked whether he kept the results of those reports to himself, he said no. There was an order: reports that were of interest to the Foreign Office were forwarded to it, reports that were important for the Führer went to the Führer, reports that were important for the military authorities went to the Minister of War, the Minister of Aviation, or the Minister of Economics. He or his deputy decided for which department the reports were important. There was a person whose duty it was to review these secret reports and pass them on only to him. He could of course order that this or that report should come to his attention only and not be passed on. That was always possible.
Asked whether he had difficulties with other law enforcement authorities who wanted to take control of this organization, he said yes indeed, the police were eager to get hold of this instrument but they got nothing from him and probably had to keep an eye out here and there. But the decisive control remained in the hands of the post office which was technically subordinate only to him.
Asked whether he had heard the prosecution's evidence against all of the defendants, he said yes. Asked whether he could name those actions of his co-defendants that were not necessary to carry out the plans of the Nazi party, he said so far the accusation is based on assumptions only, they are not supported by facts. These assumptions contain many actions that were not necessary. Asked to point out those actions and those accused that in his opinion were outside the party's plans, he said it was a very difficult question that he could not answer right now without the data. The court believed the question was formulated too broadly.
Asked whether the party's program addressed issues unrelated to the treaty, he said of course the program contained many other provisions which did not refer to the Treaty of Versailles. Asked about a statement from Mein Kampf that the 1914 frontiers mean nothing to the German nation, that they have represented no defense in the past and represent no strength in the future, that they will give the German people neither internal security nor satisfaction nor are they militarily favorable or satisfactory, he said he must reread the authentic text in Mein Kampf to determine exactly what was read. He assumed that it was correct. If so, he could say that it is the text of a public book and not a party program.
Asked whether the first country absorbed by Germany was Austria and it was not part of Germany until World War I nor was it taken away by the Treaty of Versailles, he said for this reason this provision was very clearly separated from the Versailles provisions in the program. Austria was directly linked to Versailles only because the right of self-determination proclaimed there was violated in the most flagrant manner. Austria and the purely German population were denied the Anschluss they wanted in 1918 after the revolution.
Asked about the second territory taken by Germany, Bohemia, then Moravia, then Slovakia, he said they were not taken from Germany under the Treaty of Versailles and they did not become part of Germany until World War One. The same thing could be said of Austria as could be said of the Sudetenland. The German representatives of the Sudetenland sat in the Austrian Parliament under the leadership of the leader Lottman and voted the same way. The difference was in the case of the last action, namely the proclamation of the protectorate. These parts of the Czech territory, especially Bohemia and Moravia, were not part of the small German Reich before the Treaty of Versailles but had previously been part of the German Reich for centuries. This is a historical fact.
Asked whether the Treaty of Versailles didn't take them away from them, he said of course Austria as well as the Sudetenland, both territories were taken away by the fact that neither in the Treaty of Versailles nor in the Treaty of Saint-Germain did they become German territories by virtue of the right of the people to self-determination. To that extent that was the case.
Asked whether he testified that Hitler's information was that the United States would never go to war even if attacked and that he was counting on the isolationists to prevent the country from going to war, Göring said this interrogation was recorded incorrectly. For this reason he initially refused to take the oath until he was sure that the German transcript had been finally understood and translated correctly. Once with the Russian delegation he was given a completely correct translation of the transcript. He signed it page by page and authenticated it accordingly.
As regards this statement he had to clarify it. He said first of all that the Führer was not convinced that America would intervene in the war and that he was convinced of this by the isolationist press. However, he objected somewhat frightened that America might intervene in the war from the beginning. It is nonsense, he hoped they would forgive him for saying, that America would not intervene even if it were attacked. He never said nonsense because he realized that if a country was attacked it would defend itself.
Asked whether he knew Axel Wenner-Gren, he said he had seen him two or three times. Asked whether he had any conversations with him about this, he said he probably did talk to him about the United States entering the war. Asked whether Wenner-Gren told him that democracy would not be able to mobilize and fight, he said he did not tell him such nonsense. They had a democracy as their main enemy, England, and how this democracy could fight they knew from the last World War and they experienced it again in the course of this war. When he spoke to Wenner-Gren the war with England was already underway.
Asked whether he testified that there were two ideas constantly in Hitler's mind, to seek an alliance with Russia and to gain living space by acquiring colonies, or to make an alliance with Britain and seek acquisitions in the East, and whether given his preferences he would have preferred an alliance with Britain, he said that's right. He only had to refer to the book Mein Kampf where all these things are described by Hitler in detail.
Asked whether he told the tribunal that he, who was the second man in the Reich until 1943, knew nothing about the concentration camps, he said first of all he would like to say that he did not accept this document and that in general such words were not familiar to him. This paragraph struck him as unusual. He knew nothing about what happened or the methods used in the concentration camps later on when he was not in charge.
Asked about the evidence presented to the tribunal that 4 million people were exterminated in Auschwitz alone, he said it was a statement he had heard there but he saw no way of confirming it, meaning the figure. Asked about the written testimony of Höss, deputy head of the foreign department Security division 4 of the RSHA, who said that approximately 4 million Jews were murdered in concentration camps and another 2 million died in other ways, and asked whether, assuming these figures were convincing, even if they considered 50% of these figures, he was telling the court that a minister with his authority in the Reich could ignore such things, Göring said he maintained that for this reason such things were kept secret from him. He added that in his opinion not even the Führer knew to what extent this was going on. This also explains the fact that Himmler kept it secret. No figures or other details were ever sent to them.
Asked whether he had no access to the foreign press, to the press office of his ministry, or to foreign broadcasting, and whether he knew there was joint evidence that while Jews and other people were being deported some 10 million people died of hypothermia not counting those who died in combat, and whether he said he never heard about this in the foreign press or in broadcasts, he said firstly the figure of 10 million had not been established in any way. Secondly during the war he did not read the foreign press because he considered it to be enemy propaganda. Thirdly although he could have listened to foreign broadcasts he did not do so because he did not want to listen to propaganda. He never listened to propaganda. It was only in the last four days of the war that he did so, and he could attest to this, listening to foreign broadcasts for the first time.
Asked whether he told Mr. Jackson the previous day that there were several representatives in the Eastern territories and that he had seen a film about the concentration camps at the beginning of the trial, and whether he was aware that millions of items of clothing, millions of shoes, 20,952 kilos of gold wedding rings, 35 wagon loads of furs, all of these were the property of people exterminated at Maidanek and Auschwitz, and whether anyone under the four-year plan or anyone else told him that they had this amount of human material, he said no, and how could he imagine such a thing. He was outlining the general arrangements of the German economy and he certainly did not include here the production of mattresses from women's hair or the recycling of old shoes and clothes. He left the question open but objected to the reference to him as Himmler's friend. He asked what he should say, Himmler's enemy or simply Himmler, whatever they preferred.
Asked about exhibit number USA 228, document number 407 VPS, which stated that it was possible to provide 3,638,056 new overseas workers for the German war economy between April 1 of the previous year and March 31 of that year, in addition to the overseas civilian workers, 1,622,829 prisoners of war were involved in the German economy, and told that about 5 million foreign workers came to Germany, not the 200,000 who came voluntarily, from the minutes of the central Planning Commission on March 1, and asked whether he in his position as the architect of the German economy was saying that he knew nothing about the 4.8 million foreign workers who were forced into labor, Göring said he never said that to the tribunal. He said he knew very well that workers were brought in and not always voluntarily. Although the figure of 200,000 was correct he was not sure about the rest. The number of volunteers was large but that does not invalidate the fact that a large number of workers were forced to work in the Reich. He had never denied this and had even confirmed it.
Asked whether he admitted, and wanted this to be clear, that large numbers of workers were forced into forced labor in the Reich, he said yes, absolutely.
Asked whether he remembered what he said about the relationship between the Führer and him, and whether he could repeat his words that the main influence on the Führer at least until the end of 1941 or the beginning of 1942 was exerted by him, then from 1943 onwards his influence gradually diminished, after which it declined rapidly, and that in general he was not sure that anyone exerted the same influence on the Führer as he did, he said yes, that was his view on the matter.
Asked whether he told the tribunal that it was right for him to maintain his loyalty to the Führer to the end, he said correct. Asked whether he continued to justify and exalt Hitler even after he ordered the murder of 50 young officers in Stalag number three, he said he was not there justifying or praising Führer Adolf Hitler. He was only emphasizing his loyalty to him because he was convinced that if an oath is not kept in good times it is much more difficult to keep it in difficult times. As for the 50 airmen, he never opposed the Führer so clearly and forcefully as on this question and he gave him his point of view on the matter. After that he had no further discussions with the Führer.
Asked whether the Führer could know what was happening in the concentration camps, the treatment of the Jews, the treatment of the workers, he said he had already mentioned that in his opinion the Führer did not know the details of the concentration camps and the atrocities described there. From what he knew of him, it did not seem to him that he was informed. Asked not about the details but about the murder of four or five million people, and whether he was suggesting that no one in power in Germany with the exception of Himmler and probably Kaltenbrunner knew about it, he said he still shared the opinion that the Führer was not aware of the figures given.
Asked whether he remembered Mr. Dalí describing the relationship between him and Hitler on page 53 of his book, from the beginning of their conversation he resented his manner towards Göring, his best friend and comrade in years of struggle, his desire to dominate was understandable but to demand such civility from Göring, his closest comrade in arms, seemed repugnant, and whether this is how one should behave towards Hitler, Göring said he was not required to behave like this and he did not. These were journalistic statements by Mr. Dalí made after the war. If Germany had won, the question would have been different. Mr. Dalí was his witness. Mr. Dalí was not asked for his journalistic opinion, he was only asked about matters in which he acted as his messenger to the British government on matters of military strategy.
Asked who advised Hitler, he said there were several people. On the basis of a purely departmental order the three commanders in chief of the branches of the armed forces and their chiefs of staff were involved in the discussion of strategic questions to some extent. The headquarters of the operational directorate which reported directly to the Führer was also involved. Asked which of the accused he could name as such advisers, he said when the Führer requested it the strategic adviser was Colonel General Jodl, chief of staff for operational directorate. In matters of military organization it was the three commanders in chief: himself, Grand Admiral Raeder, and later Grand Admiral Dönitz. The last two were concerned with naval affairs. The other representatives of the army were not involved.
Asked whether all these advisers could have been kept on the sidelines and whether they exerted influence on Hitler's decisions with their advice and counsel, he said if one leaves aside the purely formal point of view and assumes that it only deals with the military sphere, then the position was no. He meant all spheres, issues of all kinds such as economic, domestic political, foreign policy, military and strategic. Asked whether his recommendations had a significant influence on Hitler's final decisions, he said to a certain extent yes. His rejection depended on whether they affected the rights of the Führer. Asked whether he said to a certain extent, he said yes of course. If a reasonable offer was made and if it seemed reasonable to him it was probably used. He maintained that all these advisers worked closely with Hitler. As a result they had a certain influence on Hitler's final decisions. They were not on the sidelines but they only had influence to the extent that their point of view coincided with that of the Führer.
Asked when exactly the German Air Force began to develop a plan of action against the Soviet Union in connection with the Barbarossa variant, he said the plan for the strategic concentration and deployment of air forces in connection with the Barbarossa variant was drawn up by his general staff after the Führer's first indication of the possible outbreak of conflict, that is after the November indication 1940. In 1940, but in Mein Kampf he had already made preparations for a possible conflict with all those states that were not at war with them, including Russia. In Mein Kampf he had thought it through being completely independent.
Asked whether it was true that already in November 1940, more than 6 months before the German attack on the Soviet Union, a plan for this attack had been drawn up with his participation, he said he recently spoke at length about the fact that at that time a plan had already been drawn up for a possible change in the political situation in view of the Russian threat. Asked to briefly answer yes or no, he repeated once again that in November 1940, more than 6 months before the attack on the Soviet Union, the plan for this attack was drawn up with his participation. He said yes but not in the way the questioner wanted to present it.
Asked how long the Barbarossa plan took to develop, he asked what field was being referred to, the Air Force, the Navy, or the ground forces. Asked to answer in all areas, he said in general he could say about the Air Force where things went relatively quickly. Asked how long it took to develop the Barbarossa plan, he said he could not give the exact date without material, but in the air forces the plan for strategic concentration and deployment was drawn up relatively quickly. In the field of ground forces it obviously took longer.
Asked whether he admitted that the attack against the Soviet Union was planned months before it was carried out and that he as commander of the German Air Force and Reichsmarschall was directly involved in the preparation of this attack, he said he would allow himself to point out the number of questions asked. First of all it was not a matter of a few months. Asked again whether he admitted that in November he developed a variant of Barbarossa in the Air Forces, and asked as commander in chief of the German Luftwaffe, he said that's right. Asked the last part, whether as commander of the air forces and Reichsmarschall he admitted that he participated in the preparation of the attack on the Soviet Union, he repeated that he had made preparations for a possible attack primarily because of Hitler's conviction that Soviet Russia was taking a dangerous attitude. Of course there was no talk of an attack at the beginning and this was clear from the directive of November 1940. He would like to emphasize that his position as Reichsmarschall played no role in this case, it was only a title, a rank.
Asked whether he denied that this plan was drawn up as early as November 1940, he said yes, it seemed to him that this question had already been discussed in detail before so there was no need to go into further detail about the Barbarossa plan which was clear.
Asked whether he admitted that the goals of the war against the Soviet Union were to seize Soviet territories up to the Urals, to annex the Baltic states, Crimea, the Caucasus, the Volga regions to the Reich, to subjugate Ukraine, Belarus, and other regions to Germany, he said he did not recognize it in any way. Asked whether he remembered that at the meeting with Hitler on July 16, 1941, at which he, Bormann, Keitel, Rosenberg, and others were present, Hitler defined the aims of the war against the USSR in exactly the same way, and that this document was submitted to the tribunal, he said he remembered this document exactly and he remembered this meeting very roughly. He said straight away that this document drawn up by Bormann seemed to him to be infinitely exaggerated in terms of these demands. In any case at the beginning of the war and even before this question was not discussed. Asked whether he admitted that such a protocol record exists, he said he admitted this because he had seen it. This document was drawn up by Bormann. Asked whether he acknowledged that according to this transcript he also participated in that meeting, he said he was present at that meeting and for that reason he doubted the accuracy of this record.
Asked whether he remembered that the minutes of the meeting formulated the tasks that were set in relation to the current situation, and reminded of a few points from those minutes, he asked for a copy of these minutes. Asked to sum up the answers he had given, that it was quite clear and he would agree that the aims of the war were aggressive, the sole and decisive objective was to eliminate the danger that Russia represented for Germany and seize Russian territories, he said he would try to make it clear again. This was not discussed before the outbreak of the war. The answer was that the Führer saw Russia and the advance of its troops towards the border as a mortal threat to Germany and he wanted to eliminate that threat. He felt it was his duty. What the world would have been like after a victorious war was another question that was not discussed at the time. But in answering the question he did not mean to say that after a victorious war they would not have thought about annexation.
Asked whether he remembered that in his testimony Marshal Milch stated that Göring never wanted war with Russia, he said he remembered it perfectly. Asked why he did not want war with Russia if he saw the so-called Russian threat, he said first of all he had already said that the Führer regarded such a danger as imminent. Secondly in connection with the question put by his defense counsel he had clearly and explicitly set out the reasons why he was convinced that it was not imminent and that they had to take preparatory measures. That was his conviction. Asked whether he denied Milch's testimony, he said Milch had a somewhat different opinion. He considered a two-front war to be a grave danger for Germany. He did not so much think that Russia was not a danger but rather he believed that the danger was in taking the risk and going for a preemptive strike. Göring shared the same opinion but at a certain point in time.
Asked about paragraph three of a document stating that political leaders of the troops are not considered prisoners and must be destroyed at the latest in transit camps, they will not be evacuated to the rear, and whether he was familiar with this directive, he said let him draw attention to the fact that what they had before them was not a directive but a reporting record signed by Warlimont. The list of recipients for the distribution of the document did not indicate any other service authority than the Department of National Defense. It was therefore a report record. Asked whether he didn't know about this document, he said this entry for the report is a record of the OKW operational Command Staff, it is neither a directive nor an order, it is only an entry for the report. Asked again whether he was aware of this directive or not, he said no, he didn't know anything about it.
Asked whether the directives on the treatment of Soviet prisoners of war were to be carried out in aviation units if they came from the Führer, he said yes. If they came from him, then yes. Asked whether he remembered his directives on the treatment of Soviet prisoners of war, he said no. Asked whether most of these criminal OKW orders and directives were issued before the war against the Soviet Union began in preparation for the war with the Soviet Union, and whether this did not prove that the German government and the OKW had a premeditated plan to destroy the Soviet population, he said no, this does not prove that at all. It only proves that they viewed the struggle with the Soviet Union in this way. The fighting was extremely violent and was waged on the basis of other principles as there were no agreements on the matter.
Asked whether he was familiar with the instructions given by Himmler in 1941 to exterminate 30 million slaves, and whether he had heard about this at the trial of the witness Bach-Zelewski, he said yes, but it was not an order, it was just a speech. Secondly it was Zelewski's conviction. Thirdly all the speeches Himmler gave to his subordinates were kept in the strictest secrecy. In other words it was a witness's statement of what he had heard, not an order. Later he was not aware of such nonsense.
Asked whether the German totalitarian state had a single leading center, Hitler and his inner circle including Göring as his deputy, and whether the same directives had to apply to Himmler and Keitel, and whether Himmler could give instructions on the extermination of 30 million slaves on his own without Hitler's or Göring's instructions, he said Himmler did not give any order regarding the extermination of 30 million slaves. Himmler made a speech to the effect that 30 million slaves were to be exterminated. If Himmler had really issued such an order he would have had to have asked the Führer about it if he had adhered to the decrees, but not Göring. He did not say anything about the order, he said about Himmler's instructions. Asked whether he admitted that Himmler could have given these instructions without consulting Hitler, he noted that such instructions could not have been given by Himmler. He was not aware of any such instructions or orders.
Asked again whether the OKW orders and directives on the treatment of the population and prisoners of war in the occupied Soviet territories and on the implementation of the general directive on the extermination of the slaves were similar, he said there has never been a directive given by the Führer or any other known party regarding the extermination of the slaves. Asked whether he must have been aware of the mass extermination of Soviet citizens in the occupied Soviet territory with the help of the Einsatzgruppen, the security police, and the SD, he said the activities of the Einsatzgruppen were not the result of the implementation of a predetermined plan for the extermination of Jews, slaves, and other civilians. The activities of the Einsatzgruppen were top secret.
Asked whether he knew that the German command ordered the use of Soviet prisoners of war and civilians for mine clearance and transporting unexploded shells, he said he knew that captured Russian sappers were used to clear minefields. He did not know to what extent civilians were used in this but it was possible that this was the case.
Asked whether he was aware of the order to destroy Leningrad, Moscow, and other cities of the Soviet Union, he said in his presence the destruction of Leningrad was only mentioned in the document cited and in the sense that if the Finns got Leningrad they would not need such a big city. He knew nothing about the destruction of Moscow. Asked whether he remembered the minutes of the meeting of July 16, 1941, and whether he was present at this meeting, he asked to be introduced to them and see if they looked familiar. Asked whether he was aware of these orders, he said he did not receive the order to destroy Leningrad and Moscow in the sense indicated. He was only informed about important things, and the destruction of cities and the murder of millions of people went through the so-called official authorities. If any city had to be destroyed by bombing such an order would be given directly by him.
Asked about the statement on March 8 at the court session by his witness Bodenschatz that Göring told him in March 1945 that many Jews had been murdered and that a heavy price would have to be paid for this, he said as it was translated to him he did not remember. Witness Bodenschatz did not say that. He asked to see the minutes of the meeting and what witness Bodenschatz said. He said if the war was lost it would cost them a lot of money, why, because of the murders he committed, no, not at all, and they saw it for themselves.
Asked about the so-called theory of the superior race, and whether he agreed or disagreed with this theory and the education of the German people in its spirit, he said no. He had already shown that he had never used this expression in his articles or speeches. He did recognize the differences between races. Asked whether he did not agree with this theory, he said he had never intended to place one race as superior to another, he had merely pointed out the differences between the races. Asked whether he disagreed with this theory personally, he said he didn't think that's right.
Asked how he explained that in the presence of such serious differences he considered it possible to cooperate with Hitler and follow his policy, he said they must distinguish between different periods of time. At the time of the offensive against Russia it was not a question of differences of principle but of differences of question of time. Asked to answer the question, he said he may disagree with his supreme commander, he can clearly state his opinion, but if the commander in chief insists on his opinion and he has sworn to him then the discussion is over.
Asked whether he was not a simple soldier as he had said and had also presented himself as a statesman, he said he was not only a private soldier and precisely because he was not a private soldier but held such an important position he had to set an example for the private soldiers in fulfilling the oath. Asked whether he considered it possible in the presence of these differences to cooperate with Hitler, he said he had insisted on this and he believed it was correct. His oath was not only for good times but also for bad times, although the Führer never threatened him and never told him that he was worried about his health.
Asked whether, as the second person in Germany, he considered himself responsible for the organized and state-sponsored murders of millions of innocent people even independently of his knowledge of these facts, he said no, because he knew nothing about them and did not order them to be carried out. He repeated even independently of knowledge of these facts, if he didn't really know them he couldn't be responsible for them. Asked whether he was obliged to know these facts, he said in what sense was he obliged, either he knew the facts or he didn't. But most you can ask him whether he was frivolous because he did not try to find out anything about them. Asked whether he should know himself better, that millions of Germans knew about the crimes that were being committed but he did not, he said millions of Germans did not know this. This statement is not supported by anything.
Asked whether he testified that Hitler's government led Germany to prosperity and whether he was still convinced that this was true, he said before the war yes. The catastrophe only came after the war was lost, as a result of which they led Germany to military and political defeat.
The French prosecutor was asked whether he wished to ask any questions. He asked to be authorized to make a very brief statement. He was told he could be sure that he would have the opportunity to comment on this later, but the president was now finding out whether there would be any questions from him. He concluded that the French prosecution considered that the arguments put forward by the defense of the accused Göring had not in the least succeeded in disproving the evidence provided. The indisputable evidence and allegations that they had put forward had not been shaken by what had been put forward by the defense. Therefore he had no new questions that he would like to put to the accused.
The British prosecution alleged that Göring gave direct orders to the Hermann Göring division during its operations in Italy against the partisans. Asked whether this accusation was correct, he said the Hermann Göring division was a land division and was part of the active units of the Army and the Army group. Consequently it never received tactical action orders from him from Berlin or from his headquarters which were not involved. Consequently he could not give orders to fight the partisans, only orders that concerned personnel and equipment issues or internal justice against officers. But the division did submit daily reports to him.
It was noted that the accused was not questioned in the main examination on this matter and consequently it was not mentioned in the cross-examination because the issue was not raised. Therefore it seemed inadmissible to raise the issue in this cross-examination. It was noted that the practice in foreign countries is not the same as in the United States and England, and while it is perfectly understandable that Dr. Stahmer cannot under the rules of England at any time raise this issue in cross-examination, they were governed by a law which does not technically deal with all issues of evidence.
In view of the evidence of the witness Kesselring, it was noted that the prosecution did not address the issue at all because it had not been raised previously, neither in questioning nor in cross-examination or in the interrogation. It was explained that the document was not received until yesterday and consequently no position could be formed on this issue which had already been raised by the prosecution. But if memory served, the witness Field Marshal Kesselring himself put the question and therefore the question was obvious and could have been asked in the course of the main question concerning the accused Göring. He did not refer to a specific document, he relied on the testimony of Field Marshal Kesselring who said that he was excluded, that is how it was translated, that he was excluded between the Hermann Göring Division and the accused Göring, although the Hermann Göring division was under his command but there was no documentation on that.
The witness continued. The division under his command was only in terms of personnel, officers, and equipment but not in terms of participation. He did not receive daily reports but at intervals as to events, losses, movements. In general this was the kind of communication he had with the division. He could not give orders for its use in combat as he was under the authority of the army. Asked whether he received any report on the events in Civitella, he said no, he did not receive such a report. He first learned of it there from an affidavit by an army general under whose command the division was and who was responsible for such matters and who was trying to transfer responsibility for the division to him since it bore his name.
Göring's attitude towards Hitler and his influence on him had been mentioned again in the interrogation. He was asked to summarize the facts concerning the individual periods which were necessary to form an opinion on this relationship. He pointed out during cross-examination that a long period should be taken into account. In 1923 when he was head of the SA his attitude was normal. Then for a long time, 1931.
It was noted that the interests of time conflicted with the admissibility of the witness to summarize. He had been given the benefit of answering any questions for as long as he wanted. It seemed that when he brought up the issue again and the question had already been raised four or five times in the questions put to him this should have already exhausted the issue. The question of time was complex. According to their calculations, careful calculations taking into account the witnesses, the trial would last until August. They could not allow him to play his game this way, making speeches in cross-examination and then summarizing them.
Dr. Stahmer was told the tribunal had permitted him to ask questions which broadly speaking were not permitted in reexamination and it was made clear that the questions permitted in this reexamination were only those arising from cross-examination on this issue. The accused Göring was allowed to make speeches in the main questioning without interruption and he covered the whole history of the Nazi regime up to the end of the war. The tribunal did not consider that he was free to continue in the same vein in this new questioning.
Dr. Stahmer said he simply asked the question because it had not been dealt with in depth so far and he believed that a thorough and complete examination of this question which he considered important for the judgment of this court was necessary in order to form an opinion on the attitude of the defendant at this stage. However if the court objected to the question he could agree with the judgment and withdraw the question.
He had another question. During his interrogation he stated in relation to certain charges that he admitted his responsibility for them. Asked how that could be understood as regards responsibility, Göring said one must distinguish between formal responsibility and actual responsibility. Formally he was responsible for what happened in his departments and institutions under his command although he could not see or know in advance what was adopted or discussed in them. He could nevertheless assume formal responsibility especially if it concerned general directives given by him. He saw real responsibility in those cases where he personally gave orders or directives, including in particular all actions and acts that he personally signed or personally accepted. But he wanted to say the fact is that not many general words and statements had been said by him in a narrow circle in 25 years. In particular he wanted to say very clearly about responsibility: the Führer Adolf Hitler is dead, he was considered his successor in the German Reich. Accordingly he declared that as far as his responsibility was concerned his aim was—
The court told him it did not want him to make speeches. The court was well aware of the distinction between formal and actual liability in its decisions. Göring said he was conscious of his responsibility to carry out the preparations for the seizure of power and to establish a firm authority to make Germany free and great. He did everything possible to prevent war but once it began it was his duty to do everything possible for victory. The court said they had heard him speak about this more than once and they were not going to hear it again.
On the question of labor during the war, the population of the occupied territories was brought to work in Germany and their countries were economically exploited. Dr. Stahmer was going to ask the witness, so what was the answer to that question. He was asking about responsibility. He was told he may ask questions but not general questions involving speeches. If he had individual questions arising from cross-examination he should ask them. He raised the question to what extent does one take responsibility in the interrogation of the deportation of workers. He was told he had spoken about this before and had responded to it more than once. In that case he had no further questions. The accused was told he may return.