In a letter written a decade after the Battle of Gettysburg, Confederate General John Bell Hood offered a rare, deeply personal account of the assault on Little Round Top—describing how he protested the orders three times before reluctantly sending his men forward. The letter was sent to General James Longstreet in 1875, who had reached out to Hood for his perspective on the Gettysburg campaign. In it, Hood detailed his actions on July 2, 1863, and the growing conviction that the attack he was ordered to make was doomed from the start. Hood wrote that he arrived with his division near Gettysburg Heights shortly after dawn that morning.
The troops stacked arms and rested while awaiting further instructions. Earlier that day, Hood had joined Generals Robert E. Lee and A. P.
Hill in observing the Union Army’s positions. According to Hood, Lee was eager to launch an assault that morning, telling him: “The foe is here, and if we do not defeat him, he will defeat us. ” Hood, however, believed it wiser to wait for General George Pickett’s division, which had not yet arrived. Longstreet reportedly shared Hood’s hesitation, telling him: “The general appears somewhat uneasy this morning.
He is urging me to attack, but I am reluctant to do so without Pickett. ” Longstreet added that he never wished to enter a battle half ready. Around 3:00 p. m.
, a decision was made. They could delay no longer for Pickett’s division. The focus shifted to the extreme right, and preparations began to advance along the Emmitsburg Road. Major General Lafayette McLaws moved forward, with Hood following closely behind.
Hood then received orders to quicken his march and advance ahead of McLaws. His instructions were clear: position his division astride the Emmitsburg Road, form a battle line, and prepare to commence the assault. Before reaching the road, Hood sent several of his trusted Texas scouts ahead to locate the enemy’s extreme left flank. They returned quickly with a critical report.
The Union flank rested upon Round Top Mountain, and the ground was open enough to allow a movement through a wooded pasture around the mountain. The scouts believed a strike against the enemy’s side and rear was possible, noting that the federal supply trains were densely packed behind their lines. When Hood reached the Emmitsburg Road, he positioned artillery and opened fire. The enemy’s response revealed their positions.
Their left flank was around Round Top, with their formations curving inward in a concave shape. A substantial force was also stationed ahead of their main line, positioned between the road and the mountain. Hood realized that following his orders to advance along the Emmitsburg Road meant he would first have to confront and dislodge this forward battle line. Worse, the base and ascent of the mountain were covered in massive boulders, creating narrow gaps that would break up his formations as his men climbed.
He also recognized that his division would be exposed to punishing fire from the enemy’s main line on the heights. Because of the concave shape of that line, his men would face deadly fire from the front, flank, and rear simultaneously. Hood considered it nearly impossible to ascend the steep, rugged mountain through those boulders under such conditions and still dislodge the enemy. He later wrote that any victory would come at a terrible cost to some of the most gallant soldiers ever to serve under arms.
After gathering this intelligence, Hood felt it his duty to inform Longstreet that an assault directly up the Emmitsburg Road was unwise. He petitioned instead to move around Round Top and strike the enemy’s flank and rear. He dispatched a staff officer with this request, explaining his reasoning. Longstreet’s response was prompt and firm: “General Lee’s orders are to attack up the Emmitsburg Road.
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Hood sent a second officer to express his apprehension that the attack would yield minimal success and again request permission to turn Round Top. The reply was identical. Hood continued his artillery fire, growing increasingly convinced the federal line extended to Round Top. He could not reasonably anticipate success through the attack as ordered.
In his letter, he described the enemy’s position as so naturally formidable it could be called impregnable, suggesting they could repel an assault merely by rolling stones down the slope. For a third time, Hood sent a staff officer to explain the situation and urge Longstreet to come see it personally. He chose his adjutant general, Colonel Harry Sellers, knowing he was competent and persuasive. Colonel Sellers returned bearing the same communication: “General Lee’s orders are to attack up the Emmitsburg Road.
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Almost immediately afterward, Colonel Fairfax of Longstreet’s staff arrived and reiterated those orders. Hood wrote that he then lodged his first and only formal objection of his entire military career. After that protest, he ordered his line forward to commence the assault. As his men advanced, Longstreet came to him personally.
They held a brief conversation in which Hood again expressed his concerns and his regret at not being permitted to flank Round Top. Longstreet replied, emphasizing their necessity to adhere to General Lee’s orders. Hood proceeded with his line under heavy fire. Approximately 20 minutes after reaching the Peach Orchard, he suffered a severe wound to his arm and was carried from the field, ending his participation in the battle.
In his letter, Hood recalled being carried away on a litter, feeling profound distress and fearing for the fate of his soldiers, who composed what he called one of the finest divisions in that celebrated army. The offensive he launched that day became legendary. Devil’s Den and Little Round Top remain two of the most recognized locations from the Battle of Gettysburg, infamous for ferocious and sanguinary engagements that stand among the most brutal episodes of the entire Civil War.
Hood’s personal account stands as a remarkable testimony to that day—a soldier’s reckoning, written in regret, with the full knowledge that an order he considered doomed had sent his men into the carnage anyway.