Lieutenant General James Longstreet’s official report on the Battle of Gettysburg presents a stark account of confusion, delayed orders, and devastating losses within the Confederate command during the summer of 1863. His narrative details how miscommunication and tactical disagreements shaped the three-day battle and its bloody aftermath. Longstreet reported that on the evening of June 28, a scout brought word that the enemy had crossed the Potomac and was likely following the Confederate forces. He directed the scout to general headquarters with a recommendation that the army concentrate east of the mountains to meet the threat.
The following day, Longstreet received orders to shift part of his command and make camp at Greenwood. The bulk of his troops marched on the morning of June 30, with the exception of Pickett’s division, which remained at Chambersburg to protect the rear. By mid-afternoon, two divisions and the reserve artillery had established camp at Greenwood. Longstreet directed General Hood to place a brigade and a battery with Pickett at New Guilford, on the route toward Emmitsburg.
On the next day, the troops advanced toward Gettysburg, apart from Pickett’s division, still on guard at Chambersburg, and a brigade Hood had left at New Guilford. The march was slowed considerably by Johnson’s division of the Second Corps, which entered the road from Shippensburg with a lengthy wagon train. McLaws’ division reached Marsh Creek, four miles from Gettysburg, just after nightfall, while Hood’s division came within a similar distance of the town near midnight. Law’s brigade was ordered forward to rejoin its division and arrived around noon on the second.
Before that, Longstreet received directions from the commanding general to maneuver his available troops to secure the Emmitsburg Road on the enemy’s left flank. The enemy had been driven back the previous day by Lieutenant Generals Ewell and A. P. Hill and had taken a powerful position stretching from Cemetery Hill along the Emmitsburg Road.
Concerned that his forces were insufficient for an assault, Longstreet decided to wait until Law’s brigade rejoined its division. After its arrival, the movement began, but engineers dispatched by both Longstreet and the commanding general led the column along a path that might have exposed their intentions. Delays followed as the troops sought a more concealed route. McLaws’ division positioned itself opposite the enemy’s left around 4:00 p.
m. , while Hood’s division moved farther to the right and partly enveloped the enemy’s flank. The enemy’s original position along the Emmitsburg Road was not considerably stronger than those occupied by these two divisions. The Confederate batteries opened fire.
Hood’s division struck from the left and McLaws from the front, quickly compelling the enemy to retreat onto a steep hill made difficult to climb by rugged ground. Numerous stone fences at its base increased its defensive strength. The enemy sheltered behind these fences and held stubbornly as the Confederates drove them back step by step until nearly dusk. At that point, a powerful force met brigades from Major General Anderson’s division supporting Longstreet’s left flank.
This caused one brigade to withdraw and reduced support for another, leaving his left side somewhat open and outflanked. Wofford’s brigade of McLaws’ division was also driven back at this time. Longstreet judged it prudent not to advance further until his remaining troops arrived. General Hood received a serious wound soon after entering the fight and was forced to leave the field, causing a delay in the action.
Brigadier General J. T. Anderson of Hood’s division also suffered grave wounds and had to depart. During the assault, McLaws lost two brigade commanders: General Barksdale was fatally wounded, and General Semmes was badly injured and later died from his wounds.
By that stage, the command was organized to hold the ground taken on the right, while Longstreet’s left fell back to the enemy’s first position at Peach Orchard. During the day’s fighting, the Confederates captured four artillery pieces and two regimental flags. The next morning, Longstreet prepared to resume the assault from the right, intending to flank around the hill held by the enemy on their left. He believed this would be a lengthy procedure but not excessively difficult.
Shortly after he issued orders for that plan, the commanding general joined him and ordered instead the creation of an attack column using Pickett’s division, Heth’s division, and part of Pender’s division. The charge was to be made directly against the enemy’s central position at Cemetery Hill. Longstreet considered the distance to be crossed under enemy fire and in plain view too great to promise major success, particularly since two-thirds of the troops in the charge had fought a difficult battle just two days earlier. Only Pickett’s division was fresh.
Orders were given to Major General Pickett to form his line using whatever shelter he could find from the enemy’s batteries, ensuring that the center of the attacking column would reach the salient point of the enemy’s position. Pickett’s line was to assault the enemy’s defenses while General Pettigrew and Heth’s division advanced on the same line simultaneously. Pickett’s division was arranged with two brigades in front, supported by a third behind them. Wilcox’s brigade was ordered to advance behind his right flank to shield it from any enemy attempt to attack.
Heth’s division under Brigadier General Pettigrew formed in two lines, supported by part of Pender’s division under Major General Trimble. All batteries from the First and Third Corps, along with some from the Second Corps, were placed for effective fire on the point of attack and on the hill held by the enemy’s left. Colonel Walton, chief of artillery of the First Corps, along with Colonel Alexander, had positioned the batteries and coordinated with artillery officers from other corps on when to commence fire. Around 2:00 p.
m. , Pickett reported that the troops were ready and located on sheltered ground. Walton was then ordered to open fire. The signal guns were fired, and all the batteries replied very effectively.
The guns on the hill at the enemy’s left were soon quieted, but those at Cemetery Hill resisted fiercely. Many of their guns were driven off, but fresh ones rapidly replaced them. Alexander was instructed to find an observation point where he could best judge the effect of the Confederate fire and notify the command of the correct moment to begin the charge. After the batteries opened fire, Longstreet rode over to Major Dearing’s battery.
It seemed the enemy was swiftly bringing in new batteries as others were driven off. Longstreet decided that an attack needed to begin very soon if anything was to be accomplished before nightfall. He ordered the batteries to refill their ammunition chests and prepare to follow the advance. He then learned that Alexander had advised Pickett that it was indeed time for the attack, and Longstreet gave Pickett the order to move forward.
Longstreet found that the ammunition supply was so limited that the batteries could not reopen fire effectively. He wrote that the order for the attack, which he would not have supported under better conditions, would have been cancelled if he had believed that option was available. The advance was made impressively. All troops kept their lines accurately while enduring fire from the enemy’s batteries with great calm and resolve.
About halfway between the two positions, a ravine provided some cover, allowing a short stop for rest. After a pause, the advance continued in good order. The enemy’s batteries soon opened fire with canister shot, causing the left side to waver slightly under the heavy barrage. Nevertheless, the troops kept moving forward.
Pickett’s troops did not appear deterred and only halted briefly to return fire when they were near enough for musket-range engagement. Anderson’s division was ordered forward to support the wavering columns of Pettigrew and Trimble during this critical moment. After delivering fire against the enemy positions, Pickett’s troops charged forward, but then broke ranks and retreated in great disorder. Longstreet noted that many more men fell under enemy fire while withdrawing than had fallen during the initial attack.
This gave the enemy valuable time to concentrate their entire force against Pickett’s division, posing a strong risk of breaking his lines or destroying his troops before Anderson’s division could reach him. This would also greatly expose Anderson if he moved too far forward without support, so he was ordered to halt his advance immediately. In a short time, the enemy, advancing against both flanks and the front of Pickett’s division, overwhelmed it and pushed it back, capturing about half of those who were not killed or wounded. General Wright of Anderson’s division, along with all the officers, was ordered to regroup and gather the scattered troops behind Anderson’s division.
Many of Longstreet’s staff officers were sent to assist. Anticipating an enemy attack, Longstreet rode to the front of the batteries to oversee their operations. The enemy advanced forces at various times and from different points, but these were merely probing attacks that retreated as soon as the batteries opened fire. These small advances and retreats continued until nightfall, when the enemy withdrew to their stronghold.
Longstreet’s line was then pulled back to the Gettysburg Road on both the right and left, joining Lieutenant General A. P. Hill’s right flank. After dark, he received orders to make all necessary preparations for a retreat.
Preparations began before dawn on July 4. On the night of the 4th, the troops were withdrawn from the line, and Longstreet’s command began marching following A. P. Hill’s lead.
The march was significantly hindered by heavy rains and extremely poor roads. The command managed to reach the mountaintops early in the night of the 5th. On the 6th, the command moved toward Hagerstown, since the exhausted men and animals were not in condition for rapid movement. Longstreet expressed regret when he discovered he could reach Hagerstown in time to relieve the trains at Williamsport, which were under serious threat from enemy forces.
Arriving in Hagerstown around 5:00 p. m. , the column moved down Sharpsburg Pike and set up camp about two miles from town. Reports detailing casualties from the campaign, including those killed, wounded, and missing, were forwarded for review.
Longstreet signed the report as Lieutenant General commanding the First Army Corps of the Department of Northern Virginia. The aftermath of Gettysburg left the Confederacy withdrawing under the weight of defeat. Longstreet’s account highlights not only tactical missteps and confusion among the Confederate commands, but also the enduring questions that followed the battle.
His report stands as a firsthand record of leadership tested under impossible conditions, and of decisions whose consequences would shape the remainder of the war.