The failure of Pickett’s Charge on July 3, 1863, was not simply a battlefield defeat. According to the account of Lieutenant General James Longstreet, it was the result of serious communication failures, critically low ammunition, and orders issued against his own judgment. Longstreet, commanding the First Army Corps of the Army of Northern Virginia, later detailed how the Confederates had initially captured four artillery pieces and two regimental colors while maintaining their position on the right. The following morning, he began preparing to renew the assault from the right, aiming to outflank the enemy’s left.
He believed this maneuver would take time but did not appear particularly challenging. Shortly after issuing those commands, General Robert E. Lee arrived and ordered the formation of an attack column made up of Pickett’s division, Heth’s division, and part of Pender’s division. The target was the enemy’s central position on Cemetery Hill.
Longstreet noted that the open ground to be crossed under enemy fire seemed too extensive for a successful outcome, especially since two-thirds of those men had fought fiercely just two days earlier. Only Pickett’s division was fresh. Major General George Pickett received orders to position his troops using whatever cover they could find from artillery fire, with the main thrust directed at the enemy’s most fortified position. Pickett’s division was to take the lead, with General James Pettigrew and Heth’s division advancing in parallel.
Two brigades were organized at the front, with a third in support, and a brigade under Colonel Cox was placed behind Pickett’s right flank as a safeguard. All available artillery from the First and Third Corps, along with some from the Second Corps, was positioned to focus fire on the attack point and the enemy’s left flank. Colonel Walton, chief of artillery for the First Corps, and Colonel Alexander had set up the batteries and coordinated with other artillery officers on the timing of the bombardment. At approximately 2 p.
m. , Pickett communicated that his troops were ready and concealed behind the Confederate artillery. Walton was then instructed to begin firing. The signal cannons discharged, and the Confederate artillery responded in full force.
The enemy’s batteries on their left flank were quickly silenced, although those on Cemetery Hill continued to resist fiercely. Even as many of their guns were knocked out, fresh artillery pieces were brought up to replace them. Alexander was tasked with finding the best position to observe the bombardment and to recommend the optimal moment for the infantry to advance. When Longstreet realized Alexander had already notified Pickett that the time had arrived, he issued the final command for Pickett to advance.
It was at that point he learned the Confederate ammunition was so critically low that the artillery could offer only minimal effective support. Longstreet later stated he would not have approved the assault under more favorable conditions. But it was too late to rescind the order. The advance began in superb formation.
Each regiment maintained its alignment with accuracy while confronting enemy fire with determination. About halfway to the enemy line, a shallow ravine offered brief shelter where the ranks paused momentarily before surging forward again. The enemy’s artillery soon began firing canister shot, a storm of iron that caused the Confederate left flank to waver, yet the advance continued. Pickett’s men barely paused, stopping only to return fire once they were within range.
Major General Anderson’s division was sent to bolster the increasingly fragile lines of Pettigrew and Trimble. After close-quarters combat, Pickett’s forces launched a final charge but subsequently broke and retreated in chaos. More casualties were suffered during the withdrawal than in the initial advance. The breakdown allowed the enemy to concentrate on Pickett’s division, endangering its destruction before Anderson’s men could intervene.
Longstreet instructed Anderson to stop because his own position would be at risk if he advanced too far without support. The enemy soon attacked Pickett’s division from multiple angles, forcing it back and capturing half of those who had not already been killed or wounded. General Wright of Anderson’s division, along with all available officers, was ordered to regroup the scattered troops behind Anderson’s position. Staff officers were sent to assist.
Anticipating a counteroffensive, Longstreet advanced toward the artillery to oversee its operations. The enemy tested the Confederate defenses with small advances, retreating each time they encountered artillery fire. This pattern continued until nightfall, when the enemy finally disengaged. The Confederate lines fell back to the Gettysburg road, connecting with Lieutenant General A.
P. Hill’s position. After nightfall, orders came to prepare for a full retreat. Essential preparations began before dawn on July 4.
That evening, the troops began their withdrawal, with Longstreet’s command trailing the rear guard of A. P. Hill’s corps. Heavy rain and poor road conditions slowed the retreat.
The army reached the mountains by the night of July 5. On July 6, they proceeded toward Hagerstown, though weary men and animals could hardly maintain any speed. Longstreet was profoundly concerned they would not reach Hagerstown in time to assist the endangered supply trains at Williamsport. They arrived in the vicinity around 5 p.
m. and set up camp two miles from the town. Longstreet closed his report noting that casualty figures, including dead, wounded, and missing, had already been submitted. As the smoke cleared over Gettysburg, the battlefield fell quiet but was laden with unanswered questions.
Longstreet’s account highlighted not only the shortcomings of Confederate leadership but also the lingering possibility of what might have been. In retreat, Longstreet and his troops carried more than physical wounds. They bore the weight of lost opportunity. The journey toward Hagerstown represented not just a withdrawal but the beginning of a deeper confrontation with their own identity and purpose.
While the Union celebrated its victory, the Confederacy was forced to face harsh realities about the cost of the campaign and the decisions made by its commanders.