The ten days between Adolf Hitler's death and Heinrich Himmler's departure from the Flensburg area are often treated as a footnote in the history of the Third Reich. In reality, they were a period of intense political intrigue, as the former Reichsführer SS refused to accept that power had passed him by.
Himmler had believed he would be named Hitler's successor. When the Führer instead designated Grand Admiral Karl Dönitz as his heir, Himmler was shocked by the betrayal he felt had been done to him. Yet he did not withdraw quietly.
He met Dönitz at Plön and asked for a position in the new government. Once the shock of the succession had settled, he asked to be Dönitz's number two man, in effect his prime minister. Dönitz said such an arrangement was impossible.
But the new Reich president had to tread carefully. Himmler still commanded the loyalty of thousands of SS troops based in Schleswig-Holstein, Denmark, the western Netherlands, and Norway. He had enough local muscle to remove Dönitz by force had he chosen to do so.
Once again, Himmler shrank from violence. Instead he tried to maneuver his way into a legal position. Dönitz humored him.
After being told he could not be premier, Himmler joined a lengthy meeting on the new government's future policy. He effectively forced Dönitz to proclaim the removal of Foreign Minister Joachim von Ribbentrop, one of Himmler's enemies, and his replacement by Count von Krosigk.
Himmler believed Dönitz had no understanding of his political maneuvers toward the Western Allies. For months he had been trying to end the war in a way that would leave him in charge of Germany under Western Allied protection.
British Prime Minister Winston Churchill had been playing secret games with Himmler for some months concerning a German surrender engineered by the Reichsführer. On May 1, 1945, Churchill sent a top secret telegram to Field Marshal Sir Harold Alexander, the Allied Supreme Commander in the Mediterranean.
Churchill said he had information via Sir Stewart Menzies, the Director-General of MI6. He was confident they were, in his words, perhaps only a day or two from surrender on all fronts through Himmler.
Himmler continued to issue orders. That same day, SS-Obergruppenführer Hans Adolf Prützmann, who had been responsible for setting up the Werewolf guerrilla campaign within Germany, arrived at Dönitz's headquarters as Himmler's personal representative.
Himmler was also determined that the remaining German territory in the Alps of Bavaria and Austria be held. He radioed SS-Obergruppenführer Gottlob Berger, who had taken command of the remnants of the 13th SS Army Corps in that region.
Himmler ordered Berger to collect the SS units under his command and lead them himself, and to defend the entrances to the Alps. The order made sense in light of Himmler's later move south.
Berger was effectively in command of the semi-mythical Alpine Redoubt, a mountainous area Himmler considered a last refuge for the SS. If properly held, it would be a nightmare for the Americans to capture. In the event, it proved largely a propaganda exercise.
On May 2, Himmler contacted General August Ritter von Ringel, commanding Army Group Ostmark in Austria and western Czechoslovakia, with the same exhortation he had issued to Berger. He also countered the idea that he had betrayed the Führer, blaming what he called the greatest intrigue by Martin Bormann from Berlin.
Dönitz was a realist. He had his own reasons for continuing the war: Operation Hannibal, a naval operation to rescue as many German soldiers and civilians trapped on the Baltic coast as possible from the vengeful Soviets.
But he was also ready to negotiate a German surrender, relatively slowly. As he said in a meeting on May 2, the military situation was hopeless, and the main objective of the government must be to save as many German people as possible from annihilation by the Bolsheviks.
At 11:50 a.m., Dönitz met with von Krosigk, Generalfeldmarschall Wilhelm Keitel, the head of the armed forces, and Himmler. The military situation in Schleswig-Holstein was rated as good, with supplies and munitions sufficient to last several weeks.
A further meeting at 1:10 p.m. with Himmler brought news that the Gauleiter of Hamburg, Karl Kaufmann, was asking permission to surrender the city to the British. He wanted the last German city on the western front still holding out to be declared an open city to spare the population. Dönitz and Himmler agreed.
At 8:00 p.m., in view of the approach of British forces to Plön, Dönitz began the evacuation of his headquarters to the Naval Academy at Flensburg-Mürwik, close to the Danish border.
Himmler made changes to his own headquarters. His adjutant, Heinz Macher, was ordered to take command of 15 hand-picked SS men chosen as Himmler's personal protection detail, after his 600-man guard battalion had been committed to the fighting in Berlin, which surrendered on May 2. At this time, Himmler's total headquarters staff numbered some 150 SS.
Before Dönitz left for Flensburg, Himmler discussed with him at length the possibility of an armistice with the Western Allies, which is what Himmler had long desired, and whether it would be wise for him to remain a member of the new German government.
Dönitz wanted Himmler gone, but had to humor him to prevent some kind of military coup. Later that day, Himmler was seen sitting in a Führer car in the market square of Bramstedt Lund, a settlement 11 km west of Flensburg, reviewing the 12th SS Panzergrenadier Training and Replacement Battalion of the fanatical SS Hitler Youth Division.
Dönitz was not the complete master of his own house. Himmler was effectively a shadow government.
On the night of May 2 to 3, Himmler drove to Flensburg, dodging Allied air attacks along the way. He gave a lift to SS-Obergruppenführer Dr. Werner Best, the civil administrator of German-occupied Denmark.
During the long journey, Himmler filled Best in on recent events. He said that in recent times the Führer was no longer the same, that Hitler had become much changed, and that Bormann and the Armed Forces High Command had used their influence against him.
Himmler told Best that if he could just talk to Eisenhower for two hours, he would convince him that together they needed to go against the Russians.
Best carefully observed Himmler during the journey. He described him as nervous, absent-minded, moody, and quite despondent. Best said Himmler had had an exciting and exhausting time behind him, and before him he saw a way out, but no job. He did not have in mind becoming a prisoner with the task of defending a lost cause. Best was sure that if they had been surprised that night by enemy troops, Himmler would have taken poison.
Himmler moved that night into a new headquarters at the requisitioned Lorenzen farm, 10 km southeast of Flensburg. This would be his headquarters until about May 7.
The location later became the focus of a big search effort by the British after Himmler's death. One of his bodyguards, Wilhelm Walter, told his British interrogators that the farm was the place where Himmler had buried the files.
What files, we do not know, but they were important enough to bury, perhaps as some kind of insurance policy. The farmer and his daughter were subjected to intensive interrogation by the British in attempts to locate these documents, but it appears the files had been moved by Himmler at some point, and searches of the property came up empty-handed.
On May 3, 1945, Himmler convened meetings with high SS officials. He met SS-Standartenführer Hans Hinch, the police president of Flensburg, to discuss the situation in Schleswig-Holstein. Also present was the chief of the Order Police, Obergruppenführer Alfred Wünnenberg, who admitted that any defense of the region was now futile.
Arriving at Dönitz's headquarters at 9:30 a.m. for a meeting with Dönitz, von Krosigk, Keitel, Generaloberst Alfred Jodl, the army chief of staff, and Albert Speer, Himmler discussed the Bohemia question, that part of western Czechoslovakia still in German hands. Himmler seemed interested in transferring the new government to Bohemia.
At 6:30 p.m., Himmler gatecrashed a meeting between Dönitz and the German leaders in Norway, Reichskommissar Josef Terboven and General Franz Böhme, the military commander in Norway. Himmler was accompanied by his spy chief, SS-Brigadeführer Walter Schellenberg.
Böhme reported that Norway, home to a 350,000-man German garrison and several operational U-boat bases, remained quiet. Schellenberg suggested that Dönitz offer to surrender Norway to Sweden and asked that the massive German occupation force be allowed to enter Sweden and go into internment camps.
Himmler told the meeting that he had already discussed this with Sweden through the offices of Count Bernadotte, and that Sweden was willing to agree. Dönitz was very suspicious, thinking Sweden would not act without British approval. Schellenberg was asked to find out.
At 8:00 p.m. that night, Himmler met privately with Dönitz. Negotiations to surrender German forces in northwest Europe to the British were ongoing. At 11:00 p.m., Generaladmiral von Friedeburg, the new head of the German navy, returned from negotiations at Field Marshal Montgomery's headquarters to report on their progress.
Following all this, Himmler sent out orders for what remained of the concentration camp inspectorate, the men who actually ran the system, to report to him at Flensburg. He met SS-Obersturmführer Rudolf Höss, the former commandant of Auschwitz-Birkenau, for the last time.
Himmler said he had just come from a government meeting. Höss said Himmler was hale and hearty and in the best of humor, greeting him and at once giving orders. Himmler ordered the senior concentration camp officers to disguise themselves as army NCOs and cross over into Denmark that night as military stragglers. All future concentration camp matters were to be dealt with by Standartenführer Hinch, the Flensburg police president.
Höss said Himmler shook each of them by the hand and dismissed them. Höss had the impression that Himmler intended to go into hiding, perhaps in Sweden.
Himmler told SS-Gruppenführer Richard Glücks, one of the principal organizers of the Holocaust, and Standartenführer Gerhard Maurer, deputy head of Office D of the Reich Main Security Office, responsible for forced and slave labor, that he was getting in touch with Montgomery to arrange an armistice with the Western Allies in order to carry on the war against Russia. He advised these two war criminals to go into hiding for some weeks, by which time, he said, all grievances would be forgotten. All the concentration camp administrative leaders then obtained fake papers and went their own ways.
On May 4, Generalfeldmarschall Ernst Busch, commanding Army Group Northwest, deployed mostly in the German-occupied Netherlands and Schleswig-Holstein, set up his headquarters with 350 personnel at the Johannes Christensen farm in the village of Kollerup. The village was then sealed off.
Himmler immediately visited Busch. Incredibly, during their discussions, Himmler demanded from Busch an army paybook that he could use. Busch refused. Clearly, Himmler was at this time thinking about fleeing in the not-too-distant future.
At 12:25 p.m., Dönitz, Himmler, von Krosigk, and Obergruppenführer Arthur Seyss-Inquart, the Reichskommissar of the Netherlands, discussed the ongoing surrender negotiations with Montgomery and further steps to be taken.
Albert Speer, who was also present, revealed that despite Flensburg being threatened by the advancing British, Dönitz refused to leave. Speer also said Himmler was thinking about flying to Prague in still German-occupied Czech areas, where he had a power base. Himmler's Focke-Wulf Fw 200 Condor aircraft was held for such an eventuality at Neumünster Airfield in Schleswig-Holstein.
At 6:30 p.m., Generaladmiral von Friedeburg signed the surrender document in a tent at Montgomery's Lüneburg Heath headquarters. The following generals agreed to capitulate: Johannes Blaskowitz in the Netherlands, Generalfeldmarschall Busch in the Netherlands and northwestern Germany and the Frisian Islands, and Generaloberst Georg Lindemann commanding all German troops in Denmark.
This left the Nazis in control of Schleswig-Holstein, Norway, parts of Czechoslovakia, a little bit of Bavaria and Austria, the Channel Islands, and the Atlantic coast ports of La Rochelle, Lorient and Saint-Nazaire, plus the Channel port of Dunkirk. In the east, the Heiligenbeil pocket in East Prussia and the Hel Peninsula in Poland, plus the city of Breslau, which was under siege, and the islands of Crete and Rhodes in the Aegean Sea. That was pretty much what was left of the Third Reich at this stage.
The surrender came into effect at 8:00 a.m. on May 5, 1945. The capitulation at Lüneburg to Montgomery of the remnants of the northern German army and navy was not only the signal of Germany's total defeat, it was the signal for the liberation of those countries still remaining under German occupation.
Himmler next met General Böhme, the German military commander in Norway. He told Böhme that he had actually retained all his officers of state, contrary to what had been reported, that they had been formally stripped by Hitler on April 28. Himmler said that as Reichsführer SS, he had also taken over responsibility for the maintenance of law and order.
On the morning of May 5, the capitulation became effective. A government reshuffle was now undertaken in Flensburg. Walter Schellenberg was appointed envoy with plenary powers, meaning he was given complete executive power to conduct peace negotiations. This referred to his mission to Sweden to have the German garrison in Norway interned and to accept the German surrender.
In England, Bletchley Park, the British decoding center, intercepted a radio message from Generalfeldmarschall Keitel concerning the treatment of POWs. It said that, in agreement with Himmler, all prisoners of war, foreign workers, and concentration camp inmates were to be handed over to the enemy under a small guard.
May 5 saw Himmler's last conference with his Obergruppenführers, his cabal of lieutenant generals. Thirteen were present. Himmler told these men that Martin Bormann had admonished him for having initiated peace parleys with the Western powers without the Führer's authority.
He said his intention was to establish a reformed government in Schleswig-Holstein, where it could conduct peace negotiations with the Western powers on its own territory.
One of those present, Obergruppenführer Maximilian von Herff, chief of the SS personnel main office, later said that all present were unanimous in their opinion that Himmler was unduly optimistic in his estimation of future events.
Von Herff would later tell Gottlob Berger, in British captivity, that at this point Himmler had seemed very positive that Schleswig-Holstein would remain as a refuge where the government could at least work in an extremely small area. The SS should then be used as a police force and show what they were made of, so that their worth would be acknowledged by the English.
Obergruppenführer Hans Jüttner, head of the SS Leadership Office, recalled that Himmler stated he had no intention to end his own life or be killed, but on the contrary was full of vitality. All he now wanted was an interview with Montgomery.
Jüttner said that he and Prützmann and some of the others got the impression that Himmler intended to strike some sort of bargain with the Western Allies in order to save his own life. They also added the impression that he was quite sure to succeed with his plan.
At this point a document appeared that is much discussed concerning Himmler: his letter to Field Marshal Montgomery. Heinz Macher, one of Himmler's two adjutants, saw this letter on May 5 or 6. Himmler's order was that the letter be handed to Keitel or Jodl for delivery by military courier to Montgomery.
Macher recalled its general contents: that Himmler recognized he was defeated and Montgomery was the victor, but that many things remained to be done in re-establishing order in Germany. In view of these things, and the possible help Himmler could give, a meeting was suggested.
Werner Grothmann, Himmler's other SS adjutant, added that Himmler wanted to place the Waffen SS at the disposal of Montgomery for the fight against the Soviet Union.
On May 6, Bletchley Park intercepted a radio message from Himmler to Obergruppenführer Dr. Ernst Kaltenbrunner, the dreaded head of the Reich Main Security Office and Gestapo, that the King of the Belgians, until that point held hostage by Himmler with his family, be driven to the Swiss frontier and released. It was evidently another gesture toward the Allies.
At 5:00 p.m. that afternoon, Grand Admiral Dönitz formally dispensed with Himmler's services. He was no longer recognized as Minister of the Interior, Chief of the Replacement Army, and Head of the Police. Dönitz appeared confident enough that the surrender was imminent, and any pretense of further flattering Himmler could now be ended.
Obergruppenführer Otto Ohlendorf said that after this meeting, Himmler gave the impression that he wanted to disappear and go underground. Though he still had a 150-man headquarters staff, and always had four large fuel cars at his disposal, plus a radio truck, and traveled constantly with many armed guards and aides.
The surrender was in fact fast approaching. Colonel General Jodl arrived at Eisenhower's headquarters at Reims, in France, on the afternoon of May 6, to sign the capitulation documents for all German armed forces in Europe.
Himmler had asked Jodl for his advice before he left for Reims, asking what he should do next, and whether he should fly by night fighter to southern Germany, where a considerable number of SS troops remained under arms.
Wilhelm Walter of Himmler's staff later told his interrogators that Himmler had given 24 members of his staff instructions to go to Bavaria and Austria, presumably for some important reason.
Himmler transferred his headquarters to another farm near Satrup, just south of Flensburg, closer to Field Marshal Busch's headquarters at Kollerup. Members of his staff made frequent flying visits to Flensburg in search of news.
The next day at 2:21 a.m., Jodl signed the unconditional surrender at Eisenhower's headquarters. It would become effective the following day. On May 8, Dönitz made a radio address to the German people announcing the end of the war.
Himmler also signed an order to all troops under his command on the western front to surrender. He retained an escort unit of about 12 officers and men under the command of Standartenführer Josef Kiermaier, and four large cars. The following day at 11:01 p.m., the total German surrender became effective.
At some point, Himmler had given his letter, addressed to Montgomery, to Jodl for delivery to the German liaison officer at Montgomery's headquarters, General Eberhard Kinzel.
Albert Speer later said at Nuremberg that the letter included a plea from Himmler to Montgomery that Himmler be given safe conduct for the meeting he was proposing. If taken prisoner, he expected under the laws of war to be treated as a high-ranking general, since he had commanded Army Group Vistula on the Eastern Front.
But Himmler's letter was never delivered. Jodl later admitted that he had torn it up.
Himmler's plan now appeared to be to go into hiding while he awaited a reply to his letter. Macher said that on May 9 or 10, 1945, he had received orders from Himmler to go with him to the Harz Mountains as a bodyguard.
On May 10, Himmler's party, consisting of the Reichsführer and just over a dozen officers and men, extremely well-armed, would drive south in four large fuel cars.
Grothmann said that since no reply had been received from Montgomery, Himmler, having no idea that Jodl had destroyed the letter, had decided to move in order to remain at liberty and to be able to talk to Montgomery as a free man, not as a captive.
Himmler remained in contact with some of his men in the Flensburg area and checked daily for a reply from Montgomery. Grothmann was explicit about where Himmler was going: the isolated Harz Mountains region of central Germany, where it was felt the group could remain safely in hiding for a considerable time.
Himmler had a large stash of gold coins and foreign currency hidden in a local bank, sufficient to finance his further evasion south if needed. According to Grothmann, Himmler would, if Montgomery refused to reply to his letter, eventually move down to the Alps, determined to stay out of Allied hands as long as possible.
Himmler was a master of organization and a master planner, and by all indications a man absolutely determined to survive. His decision to head south would ultimately lead to his capture and death.