Yugoslavia 1944: When Wehrmacht Paid for What They Did

Yugoslavia 1944: When Wehrmacht Paid for What They Did

The Kingdom of Yugoslavia was drawn into the Second World War under circumstances that left it little room to maneuver. The war had begun on September 1, 1939, when Germany invaded Poland, and by the spring of 1941 it had spread across much of Europe. Caught between the Axis powers, Yugoslavia tried to maintain neutrality, but internal tensions and external pressure made that position fragile.

In March 1941, the Yugoslav government joined the Tripartite Pact, aligning itself with Germany, Italy and their allies. Only days later, a coup in Belgrade overthrew the pro-Nazi government and brought to power officers who opposed alignment with Germany. Adolf Hitler reacted with immediate force and decided to attack Yugoslavia.

On April 6, 1941, German aircraft appeared over Belgrade before dawn and began bombing the city, shattering buildings and setting entire districts on fire. Columns of Axis troops advanced from multiple directions, overwhelming Yugoslav defenses within days. The Yugoslav army collapsed in less than two weeks.

The country was then divided among occupying powers. Most of Serbia, one of the most important parts of the occupied kingdom, came under direct German military administration. The territory was strategically important, with key railway lines, rivers and industrial resources that the German war effort depended on. To control it, the occupiers established a system based on military force, repression and collaboration.

Resistance movements emerged quickly after the occupation. The Partisans, led by Josip Broz Tito, organized a communist resistance aiming to overthrow the occupiers and create a socialist Yugoslavia. The Chetniks, led by Draža Mihailović, sought to restore the monarchy and preserve national interests. Despite ideological differences, both groups initially fought against the Germans.

By the summer of 1941, their attacks intensified, targeting German patrols, supply lines and garrisons. The German command responded with a policy designed to break resistance through terror. Orders were issued that for every German soldier killed, 100 civilians were to be executed, and for every German soldier wounded, 50 more would die.

In September 1941, General of the Infantry Franz Böhme was appointed commanding general in Serbia. His task was clear: to crush the resistance. He brought additional forces, including several infantry divisions, among them the 717th Infantry Division of the Wehrmacht, which would play a central role in the events that followed. Böhme encouraged his troops to act with severity and openly supported mass executions as a tool of control over the civilian population.

Kraljevo was an important location within the German occupation system. A relatively small city of only around 15,000 inhabitants, situated about 150 kilometers south of Belgrade, it lay on a key transport route and hosted German military units. In mid-October 1941, Partisan and Chetnik forces surrounded the city in what became known as the siege of Kraljevo. The German garrison, numbering around 2,200 soldiers, came under sustained attack. During the fighting, 10 German soldiers were killed and 14 wounded.

The German revenge was swift and brutal. The garrison commander declared that not only would 100 Serbs be shot for each German, but their families and property would also be destroyed. For the German command, these losses immediately triggered the reprisal policy.

The first phase of the killings began with the arrest and execution of approximately 300 civilians. German reports described them as communists, nationalists, democrats and Jews, categories that covered a wide range of the population. These men were shot without trial, marking the beginning of a larger operation against the civilian population.

In the days that followed, the scale of the arrests increased dramatically. In Kraljevo and surrounding villages, German soldiers moved from house to house, and all males between the ages of 14 and 60 were taken. The arrested men were transported to a temporary detention center established in a rolling stock factory.

Inside the factory, the process was organized with bureaucratic precision. Documents were checked, names written down, and the men were held under guard as the numbers grew. Once the detention center was filled, groups of 100 prisoners were selected. They were marched under armed escort to sites where mass graves had been prepared in advance. There, they were lined up and executed with heavy machine guns.

After each execution, German soldiers inspected the bodies. Those who still showed signs of life were killed with a single bullet to the head. When one group had been killed, the soldiers returned to the factory and selected the next group. The same procedure was repeated again and again. The rhythm of the massacre was mechanical: arrest, registration, transport, execution. Each step followed the previous one without interruption.

The killings continued for several days between the 17th and 20th of October 1941. During this time, the German army also extended its actions beyond the city. Units entered nearby villages, burned homes and killed civilians indiscriminately. The violence spread across the region, turning the entire area into a zone of destruction.

Among the victims were all Serbian workers from a local aircraft factory that produced equipment for the German military. These men were suspected of sabotage, but no hard evidence was found by the Germans. Their deaths disrupted production and demonstrated the contradiction within German policy, in which economic needs were sacrificed to terror against the civilian population. Even members of collaborationist units were not spared. Forty members of the collaborationist Serbian Volunteer Command were also killed.

According to German records of the 717th Infantry Division, 1,736 men and 19 women were executed in Kragujevac and the surrounding area. The victims were predominantly ethnic Serbs, but also included Romani people, Jews and refugees.

The executions were carried out under the authority of General of the Infantry Franz Böhme. Immediate responsibility on the ground lay with Generalmajor Paul Hofmann, commander of the 717th Infantry Division, whose units conducted the mass arrests and executions in Kragujevac and the surrounding area. Hofmann personally oversaw the reprisals and later praised his soldiers for what he described as an enthusiastic fulfillment of what was required of them. Other officers within the division echoed this assessment, commending their troops for discipline and effectiveness during the killings.

As a result, 20 members of the 717th Infantry Division were awarded the Iron Cross Second Class, a German military decoration granted for acts of bravery in combat, despite the fact that these actions consisted of the organized executions of unarmed civilians. These awards reflected how the German command structure not only accepted but formally recognized participation in mass murder as a form of military merit.

Despite the scale of the massacre, the results did not match German expectations. Instead of suppressing resistance, the killings intensified hostility toward the occupiers. Civilians who had remained neutral or cautious were pushed toward supporting resistance movements.

The massacre also had a direct impact on the strategies of resistance leaders. Draža Mihailović, observing the consequences of German reprisals, concluded that continued attacks would lead to further mass killings of civilians. He decided to limit Chetnik operations, waiting for a moment when conditions would be more favorable.

Within the German command, doubts also began to emerge. The policy of executing 100 civilians for every soldier killed proved to be counterproductive. In February 1943, the ratio was reduced by half and eventually abandoned during the autumn of the same year. Future executions required higher levels of approval, reflecting a shift in policy driven not by humanitarian concerns, but by practical considerations.

After the end of the war in Europe in May 1945, the process of bringing those responsible for the killings in Serbia to justice began. The 717th Infantry Division, which had played a central role in the events of the Kragujevac massacre, was later reorganized as the 117th Jäger Division. Its troops took part in a massacre of hundreds of Greek civilians at Kalavryta in December 1943. In September 1944, the division took part in the general withdrawal through the Balkans and suffered heavy losses, with several thousand men killed, wounded or missing during fighting with the Partisans.

Field Marshal Wilhelm Keitel, head of the Oberkommando der Wehrmacht, the German Armed Forces High Command, which had issued the reprisal orders, was among the first to be tried. He was found guilty by the International Military Tribunal in Nuremberg, and for his war crimes and crimes against humanity he received the death sentence. Keitel was executed by American Army Sergeant John C. Woods, who is believed to have been deliberately bad at his job, causing the 10 Nazi war criminals from the Nuremberg trials whom he executed on October 16, 1946, to suffer as they died a long, agonizing death.

With Keitel, however, it was even worse. The 64-year-old was hanged, but because the trapdoor was too small, it caused him painful head injuries. As he fell from the gallows with insufficient force to snap his neck, his convulsing and trembling lasted 28 long minutes before he died.

Franz Böhme, who had commanded the German forces in Serbia and directly enforced the reprisal policy that led to massacres such as Kraljevo, was captured by Allied forces but did not stand trial. When his extradition to Yugoslavia to face trial for his crimes there seemed imminent, Böhme committed suicide by jumping from the fourth story of the prison building in which he was being held.

That same year, proceedings continued against other senior commanders. Field Marshal Wilhelm List, responsible for German operations in Southeast Europe, was tried during the subsequent Nuremberg trials, a series of military tribunals organized after the main trial to prosecute additional war criminals. In 1948, he was found guilty for his role in hostage executions in Serbia and sentenced to life imprisonment, though he was released in 1953 due to ill health.

The massacre at Kraljevo revealed the logic of occupation in its most direct form. It showed how military orders could transform civilian populations into targets, how numbers could replace names, and how systems of power could turn violence into routine.