Why LBJ Banned RFK From Being Vice President

Why LBJ Banned RFK From Being Vice President

On July 30, 1964, President Lyndon Johnson made an announcement that stunned Washington. No member of his cabinet would be considered for the vice presidency. Not Secretary of State Dean Rusk. Not Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara. Not Secretary of Agriculture Orville Freeman.

Everyone knew the truth. There was only one target, one name that had to be eliminated: Robert F. Kennedy.

The day before, Attorney General Kennedy had been summoned to the Oval Office. It was not a friendly meeting. It was, by later accounts, an execution.

Johnson sat behind the desk that had belonged to John F. Kennedy. For about an hour, he lectured Bobby Kennedy. The conversation was not recorded. But the message was unmistakable: You are out.

When Kennedy left the Oval Office, he made a bitter joke to his staff. He said he was sorry that he had dragged so many good men down with him.

But the real statement, the one that revealed his anger, came later. Kennedy told a confidant what Johnson was really doing. He would do anything, Kennedy said, to pull the ground out from under my feet.

To understand why Johnson banned Bobby Kennedy from the vice presidency, you have to understand how much the two men despised each other. The hatred began in 1960.

JFK chose Johnson as his running mate despite fierce objections from Bobby. Bobby saw LBJ as a corrupt Texas politician. LBJ saw Bobby as a spoiled rich kid.

During Kennedy's presidency, Bobby wielded power like a weapon. He shut Johnson out of meetings, kept him away from decision-making, and made sure everyone knew Johnson was not part of the inner circle.

LBJ sat humiliated and powerless in cabinet meetings. Jackie Kennedy later said you never got an opinion from Lyndon at a cabinet or national security meeting.

But the real wound went deeper. According to Kennedy aide Richard Goodwin, Bobby symbolized everything Johnson hated. The wealth. The ease. The Eastern elegance. The Ivy League polish.

Johnson always saw himself as the man they considered uneducated, rough, and crude, Goodwin said.

When JFK died and Johnson became president, the hatred did not end. It intensified. Bobby resented Johnson for flying back from Dallas on Air Force One instead of the vice-presidential plane.

Our president was a gentleman and a human being, Bobby said. This man is not. He is mean, bitter, vicious, in many ways an animal.

Johnson, meanwhile, watched Bobby move through Washington like an exiled prince. The Kennedy loyalists treated Bobby as the real leader. Johnson was only keeping the seat warm.

Now Bobby wanted the vice presidency. Johnson would rather die.

In the spring of 1964, Democratic voters loved Bobby. In an informal vice-presidential poll in New Hampshire, Kennedy crushed Humphrey by a huge margin. The message was clear: We want Bobby.

Johnson's staff called it the Bobby problem. How do you reject the most popular Democrat without destroying your campaign?

Johnson was paranoid. On recorded phone calls, he told Governor John Connally that Bobby planned to force a floor fight at the convention. He feared the JFK memorial film would generate so much emotion that delegates would run to Kennedy.

He will do anything to get it, Johnson said.

But Johnson feared something deeper. Bobby was not running for vice president, he was positioning himself for 1968 or 1972. And Bobby, one heartbeat away, would undermine Johnson every day.

So Johnson devised a plan. Ruthless, brilliant, devastating. Ban Bobby from the ticket. But not directly. That would look petty.

Instead, create a rule. Neutral, reasonable, applicable to everyone, but in reality aimed at one person.

On July 29, 1964, Johnson summoned Bobby to the Oval Office. For an hour, Johnson gave him a sermon. Bobby knew about JFK's recording system and likely warned Johnson not to record. But we know what Johnson said. You will not get the vice presidency.

Bobby later told friends the meeting was unbearable. Sitting across from Johnson in his brother's office, being politely and coldly told it was over.

The next day, July 30, Johnson made his public announcement. I have concluded that it would be inadvisable to recommend a member of my cabinet to the convention.

The statement excluded Bobby. But it also excluded Dean Rusk, Robert McNamara, Orville Freeman, Adlai Stevenson, and Sargent Shriver. All of them. Casualties in Johnson's war against one man.

The press understood immediately. The New York Times wrote that what Johnson actually said was that, despite the calls of many in the party, he would in no way choose Attorney General Robert Kennedy.

Bobby issued a courteous public statement. It is up to the presidential candidate to choose a running mate and I understand the president's decision.

But privately he was furious. He sent a note to the other cabinet members. I am sorry that I dragged so many good people down with me.

And he told a confidant what he really thought. Johnson would do anything, truly anything, to keep power away from the Kennedys. He would do anything to pull that rug out from under my feet.

Johnson's maneuver worked. Bobby was out. Hubert Humphrey was in. Humphrey was loyal, manageable, grateful, everything Bobby was not.

At the convention in Atlantic City in August, Johnson delayed the JFK memorial film until the final night, after Humphrey had already been nominated. He could not risk emotions driving delegates toward Bobby.

Bobby resigned as attorney general on September 3. He ran for the Senate from New York, won, and hated that he needed Johnson's help to do it.

Johnson's ultimate revenge was signing legislation that prohibits future presidents from appointing family members to the cabinet, the Bobby Kennedy rule.

Was Johnson's cabinet ban legitimate policy or a personal vendetta disguised as principle?

Johnson claimed he needed his cabinet members to stay in their posts for continuity and stability. But that is absurd. Cabinet members leave all the time. Rusk could have been replaced. McNamara could have been replaced. There was no operational reason to exclude the entire cabinet.

The real reason was simple. Johnson could not directly ban Bobby without looking petty, so he banned everyone. Scorched earth. Collateral damage.

According to the book Mutual Contempt by historian Jeff Shesol, Johnson's major push for liberal legislation was partly to ensure he did not need RFK as vice president to win in 1964. Johnson passed the Civil Rights Act, launched the War on Poverty, and built the Great Society. Not only because it was good policy, though it was, but because it gave Johnson the political strength to reject Bobby Kennedy.

Johnson's approval ratings soared. His legislative successes proved he did not need the Kennedy name. He could win on his own.

And so he destroyed Bobby's vice-presidential dreams without firing a single shot directly at him. Brilliant. Ruthless. Effective.

The cabinet ban of 1964 remains one of the most cynical political moves in American history. It was not about governance. It was not about continuity. It was about one man's hatred for another, about Lyndon Johnson's determination to keep Robert Kennedy as far from power as possible.

And it worked. Bobby never became vice president. Johnson won the 1964 election in a landslide, without him. Humphrey served loyally. The Kennedy threat was neutralized for four years.

Because in 1968, Bobby came back, not as vice president, but as a presidential candidate. And Johnson, terrified of facing Bobby in the primaries, withdrew entirely.

The man Johnson denied the vice presidency in 1964 was about to reclaim the White House in 1968, until a shooter in a Los Angeles kitchen stopped him. But that is another story.

On July 30, 1964, Lyndon Johnson disguised a vendetta as a rule. Sometimes the most brutal attacks come packaged in the language of principle.