For nearly two decades, the official record of the Battle of Gettysburg framed the Confederate artillery bombardment preceding Pickett’s Charge as a coordinated prelude to the infamous infantry assault. But a firsthand account from the man who commanded those guns reveals a far more chaotic and tragic sequence of events, marked by wasted ammunition, missed opportunities, and a commander paralyzed by the order he was forced to obey. Colonel Edward Porter Alexander, the Confederate artillery officer tasked with softening the Union lines, left a detailed narrative of the events of July 3, 1863. His account offers a unique perspective, not from an infantry leader or a general, but from the officer who was to make the charge possible.
Alexander’s record describes how the order to begin the barrage was to be issued personally by General James Longstreet once all infantry units were properly arranged. Alexander was told that a group of trees within the enemy’s position was the designated focus of the offensive, which he was mistakenly informed was the town’s burial ground. Around 9 a. m.
, he began reorganizing his batteries and positioning them for the bombardment. He noted that the enemy offered surprisingly little resistance during these preparations, only firing intermittedly, a silence he could only explain by imagining they understood the difficult situation the Confederates would soon face. Of Longstreet’s 83 cannons, eight were kept on the far right to protect the flank. The remaining 75 were arranged in an uneven line roughly 1,300 yards long, stretching from the Peach Orchard to the northeastern edge of Spangler’s Wood.
During this time, General Pendleton proposed that Alexander use nine 12-pounder howitzers from Hill’s Corps, remarking that the core had no use for weapons with such limited reach. Alexander accepted and placed them under shelter near the rear of the leading column, planning for them to accompany the advance. The artillery deployment was marked by significant failures. Alexander noted that a few hundred yards to the left and behind his line, the Third Corps under Colonel Walker had 60 pieces spread along Seminary Ridge.
Within this space were also 20 rifled guns from the Second Corps under Colonel Carter, and another four rifles under Captain Graham located roughly a mile and a half northeast of Cemetery Hill. These 24 guns were instructed to fire solely solid shot because their explosive shells were undependable. It is remarkable, Alexander wrote, that of the 84 guns from the Second and Third Corps scheduled for action, 80 were in a single line parallel to the enemy’s position, leaving 56 guns inactive. He called it an extraordinary failure not to position these pieces and many others to create a crossing fire.
The Federal artillery in place at the start of the cannonade numbered 166, but during the action, 10 additional batteries were brought forward from reserve, increasing their total engaged to 220, compared to the 172 employed on the Confederate side. The arrangement of the infantry ranks took considerable time, and the formation selected was not well fitted for such a formidable objective. Six brigades of approximately 10,000 men formed the front line, while only three brigades formed the second line, which was considerably shorter on the left. The remaining brigade, Wilcox’s, was stationed behind the right of the column and was not set in motion with the main force.
Directed forward 20 minutes or more afterward, it was far too delayed to provide any help whatsoever. Alexander observed that both sides of the attacking column were exposed and the left flank lacked any supporting units, making it certain to deteriorate quickly under enemy fire. He added that no formation could have prevailed, though the sparse arrangement likely resulted in fewer losses than a denser one. Shortly before noon, a fierce artillery duel erupted on the Confederate left, lasting a full half hour.
It has frequently been assumed to be part of the ordered bombardment preceding Pickett’s charge, but it actually originated between skirmishers in front of Hill’s Corps contesting control of a house. Hill’s artillery initially joined the fray, reportedly by his command. Alexander called this extremely ill-advised, as it wasted a considerable quantity of ammunition, the shortage of which was keenly felt in the later combat. Not one gun from Alexander’s core discharged, nor did the enemy across from them.
While waiting for the signal from Longstreet, Alexander ordered the nine howitzers under Major Richardson to move forward. Only after the cannonade had commenced did he discover these guns had been relocated and could not be located. It later emerged that Pendleton had withdrawn four of the pieces, and Richardson, with the remaining five, had shifted away to seek shelter from federal fire. Alexander made no objection, believing that had these guns gone forward, they would inevitably have been abandoned on the field.
Around 30 minutes before the bombardment began, Alexander was taken aback by receiving a note from Longstreet which read: “Colonel, if the artillery fire does not have the effect to drive off the enemy or greatly demoralize him so as to make our effort pretty certain, I would prefer that you should not advise Pickett to make the charge. I shall rely a great deal upon your judgment to determine the matter and shall expect you to let General Pickett know when the moment offers. ”
Until that moment, Alexander had not doubted the army’s ability to carry the position, trusting in General Robert E. Lee’s decision to order the attack.
But here was a proposition that he should be the one to decide the question. Overwhelming reasons against the assault immediately seemed to confront him. He showed the letter to General Wright of Anderson’s division and expressed his opinion. Clearly, the cannonade was to be permitted to start, and then the responsibility would fall upon him to determine whether or not Pickett should charge.
If not, they must retreat to Virginia to replenish their ammunition, and the campaign would be a failure. Alexander asked Wright, “is it as difficult to get there as it appears? ” Wright replied, “The trouble is not in going there. I went there with my brigade yesterday.
There is a place where you can catch your breath and reform. The trouble is to remain there after you arrive, for the whole Yankee army is there in a bunch. ” Alexander failed to grasp fully all that this might imply, seeing the issue as merely one of support, which was General Lee’s responsibility. Alexander resolved to see Pickett and engage his frame of mind.
He found him both cheerful and confident. He felt that if the artillery fire commenced, Pickett must make the charge, and he wrote to Longstreet: “General, when our fire is at its best, I will advise General Pickett to advance. ”
Alexander reflected that it must have been with profound disappointment that Longstreet witnessed the collapse of his hope to prevent a futile massacre, for he was completely convinced of its hopelessness. Yet even he could scarcely have understood how utterly unprepared Hill and Ewell were to provide aid to the assault.
None of their artillery had been placed with any intention of offering cooperative fire, nor to follow the charge, and a great deal of their ammunition had been squandered prematurely. It was precisely 1 p. m. by Alexander’s watch when the signal guns were fired and the bombardment commenced.
The enemy answered somewhat slowly at first, though soon with growing rapidity. Having decided that Pickett must charge, Alexander grew impatient to launch him as soon as he could perceive that the Confederate fire was achieving any effect. He estimated that a half hour would pass between his sending the order and the column reaching close combat. He dared not count on using more ammunition than one hour of firing would consume, as they were distant from their supplies and had already fought for two days.
At the end of 20 minutes, no favorable development had taken place. The entire federal line, about two miles in length, was blazing like a volcano. It appeared sheer madness to order a column in the heat of a July afternoon to undertake an advance of three-quarters of a mile over open ground against the center of that line. But something had to be done.
At 1:25 p. m. , Alexander dispatched a note to Pickett: “General, if you are to advance at all, you must come at once, or we will not be able to support you as we ought, but the enemy’s fire has not slackened materially, and there are still 18 guns firing from the cemetery. ”
Scarcely had Alexander sent this note when a noticeable decline in the enemy’s fire occurred.
As he watched, he observed other guns being hitched and withdrawn. After waiting several minutes and seeing no fresh guns replace those pulled back, he felt certain the enemy was suffering. At 1:40 p. m.
, he sent a second note: “For God’s sake, come quick. The 18 guns have gone. Come quick, for my ammunition will not let me support you properly. ” He followed this with two verbal messages to the same effect.
The 18 guns had occupied the precise point toward which the charge was aimed. Soon only a few scattered federal guns remained in action, and still Pickett’s line had not advanced, though it was positioned scarcely 300 yards behind Alexander’s guns. Alexander later learned what had transpired after his first note was sent. It reached Pickett in Longstreet’s presence.
Pickett read it and handed it to Longstreet, who read it and remained silent. Pickett asked, “General, shall I advance? ” Longstreet knew it must be done, but unwilling to speak the words, he turned in his saddle and looked away. Pickett saluted and declared, “I am going to move forward, sir,” before galloping off.
Longstreet, having sent away his staff, rode out alone and joined Alexander near the left flank of the artillery. Alexander explained the ammunition situation, and Longstreet responded sharply, “Go and halt Pickett where he is and replenish your ammunition. ” Alexander replied, “We can’t do that, sir. The supply train has very little.
It would take an hour to distribute it and in the meantime the enemy would use the delay to their advantage. ”
Longstreet appeared to hesitate. He then spoke slowly and with deep feeling: “I do not want to make this charge. I do not see how it can succeed.
I would not make it now, but that General Lee has ordered it and is expecting it. ” Alexander sensed that Longstreet was inviting a word of agreement and that if offered, he would again order Pickett halted. But Alexander was too aware of his own youth and inexperience to volunteer an opinion not directly requested. He remained silent while Longstreet wrestled with his decision alone and ultimately obeyed his orders.
The tension was short-lived and ended when General Garnett emerged from the woods behind them, riding at the front of his brigade. Alexander had served on the Plains with him and with Armistead back in 1858. He mounted and rode alongside Garnett while his brigade swept past the guns. Alexander then rode down the line of artillery, inquiring what ammunition each piece had left.
Many had only canister remaining. Those with a moderate supply of suitable ammunition were directed to limber up and advance, but only about one gun in four from the center could be ordered forward. Once the guns commenced firing, troops began to advance to attack the right flank of Pickett’s division. The charging brigades were now very close to the federal lines, and the musketry was intense.
As the attackers disappeared into the enemy’s position amid smoke and dust, Alexander ceased firing to await the outcome. It soon became clear through a gradual slackening of the fire and a stream of fugitives falling back to the rear what the result was. To Alexander’s astonishment, after about 20 minutes, Wilcox’s fine Alabama brigade, which had secured the victory at Salem Church just 60 days prior, was now moving forward alone. It had been sent to reinforce Pickett but was not incorporated into the main column.
Now, when everything was finished, this single brigade of about 1,200 men was advancing forward with no one present with the authority to stop it. On their left were roughly 250 men, the remnant of Perry’s Florida brigade. Alexander called the sight both absurd and tragic. They advanced several hundred yards beyond the guns under a sharp fire, then halted and opened fire from brushwood along a small ravine.
Federal infantry soon moved out to assault their left flank. When Perry’s men fell back past the guns, Wilcox shifted by his right flank and, making a wide circuit, regained the lines at the Peach Orchard. His loss in this charge was 204 killed and wounded, with Perry’s loss roughly proportional and some prisoners taken. While Wilcox’s brigade was making its charge, General Lee rode up and joined Alexander.
He was completely alone. Alexander had no doubt that Lee was apprehensive of an enemy pursuit and had come to the front to help rally the retreating men if necessary. Lee remained with them for perhaps an hour and spoke to nearly every soldier who passed, using words such as, “Don’t be discouraged. It was all my fault this time.
Form your ranks once more when you reach cover. All good men must remain together now. ”
At one point, loud cheering arose from the federal lines, and Lee instructed an aide to ride forward and learn the cause. The aide’s horse balked at the spur, and Lee advised gentle measures, recalling a foolish horse of his own.
The aide returned and reported that the Federals were cheering an officer riding along their line. Lee observed that he had thought it possible Johnson’s division operating in the federal rear might have achieved some success. Clearly, he was not yet aware that Johnson had withdrawn to a defensive position around noon. General Kemper was brought by on a litter.
Lee rode over and said, “General, I hope you are not badly hurt. ” Kemper replied, “Yes, General. I’m afraid they have got me this time. ” Lee pressed his hand, saying, “I trust not.
I trust not. ”
After all the fugitives had passed and there was still no indication of a counterattack, Lee rode away. Alexander continued to hold his line of artillery until dark. There were some advances by federal skirmish lines which he kept in check with his guns, occasionally having to use canister decisively.
Throughout the afternoon, he quietly withdrew guns one at a time to be refitted, and by 10 p. m. , the entire line had been retired roughly to the position from which the attack had begun on the second day.
History remembers the generals, but Alexander’s account forces a view of the battle through the eyes of the man tasked with making it possible—a man burdened with a terrible split-second choice.