Lieutenant General James Longstreet’s official report on the Battle of Gettysburg laid bare the chaos and missteps that crippled the Confederate command during the decisive clash in July 1863. His account, filed after the army’s retreat into Maryland, described a campaign undone by faulty communications, stalled assaults, and an assault launched against overwhelming odds. Longstreet’s report detailed his initial assignment: hold the ground taken on the Confederate right while his left withdrew to the enemy’s original position at the Peach Orchard. That first day’s fighting secured four artillery pieces and two regimental colors, but the following morning brought a dramatic shift in orders that would define the battle’s tragic course.
According to Longstreet, the commanding general, Robert E. Lee, arrived shortly after these orders were issued and directed the formation of a massive attack column using Pickett’s division, Heth’s division, and part of Pender’s division. The objective was a direct assault on the enemy’s central position at Cemetery Hill. Longstreet was openly doubtful.
He wrote that the open ground to be crossed under enemy fire appeared too great for success, especially since two-thirds of the men assigned to the attack had already fought intensely two days earlier. Only Pickett’s division was fresh. Pickett was instructed to align his troops using whatever cover could be found from enemy artillery, with the center of the attack aimed at the enemy’s strongest point. Pickett arranged two brigades in front and a third in support, while Wilcox’s brigade was stationed behind the right flank as protection.
Heth’s division, under Brigadier General Johnston Pettigrew, formed two lines reinforced by part of Pender’s division under Major General Trimble. All available guns from the First and Third Corps, supplemented by some from the Second Corps, were positioned to concentrate fire on the point of attack and the enemy’s left. Colonel Walton, chief of artillery for the First Corps, and Colonel Alexander coordinated the timing of the barrage with other artillery officers. Around 2 p.
m. , Pickett reported his men ready and concealed behind the Confederate guns. Walton was ordered to commence firing. The signal cannons fired, and the full artillery line responded with vigor.
The enemy’s batteries on their left were quickly silenced, but those on Cemetery Hill continued fierce resistance. Although numerous enemy guns were disabled, fresh pieces were rapidly brought forward to replace them. Colonel Alexander was instructed to find the best vantage point to observe the bombardment and to advise the optimal moment for the infantry to advance. Longstreet rode to Major James Dearing’s battery and witnessed the enemy hurriedly replacing artillery almost as fast as Confederate fire could strike it.
He concluded that an assault had to be made immediately if anything was to be achieved before nightfall. Longstreet directed the batteries to replenish their ammunition chests and prepare to support the infantry. He then learned that Alexander had already informed Pickett that the time was at hand, and Longstreet issued the final order to proceed. It was only then, he wrote, that he discovered the ammunition reserves were so depleted that the artillery could provide little meaningful support.
He acknowledged that he would not have sanctioned the attack under more favorable circumstances, but it was too late to countermand the order. The advance began in excellent formation, with every regiment maintaining its alignment with precision and meeting enemy fire with steady resolve. Roughly midway to the enemy line, a shallow ravine offered momentary shelter, and the ranks paused briefly before pressing forward once more. Then the enemy guns began firing canister, a storm of iron, and the Confederate left began to falter, though the movement continued.
Pickett’s men scarcely halted, pausing only to deliver return volleys once within range. Major General Anderson’s division was dispatched to reinforce the increasingly unsteady lines of Pettigrew and Trimble. After exchanging fire at close quarters, Pickett’s troops made a final charge, only to break and fall back in disarray. Longstreet noted that more casualties were sustained during the retreat than during the initial advance.
The collapse allowed the enemy to concentrate its force on Pickett’s division, threatening annihilation before Anderson could intervene. Longstreet wrote that Anderson’s position would have been jeopardized if he advanced too far without support, so he ordered him to halt. Soon the enemy assailed Pickett’s division from multiple directions, driving it back and capturing half of those not already killed or wounded. General Wright of Anderson’s division, along with all available officers, was directed to rally the scattered troops behind Anderson’s position, and staff officers were dispatched to assist.
Anticipating a counterattack, Longstreet rode forward to the artillery to supervise its fire. The enemy probed the Confederate lines with minor advances, each withdrawing when met by the guns. This continued until nightfall, when the enemy finally broke contact. The Confederate line then withdrew to the Gettysburg road, linking with Lieutenant General A.
P. Hill’s right. After darkness fell, orders arrived to prepare for a general retreat, and the necessary work began before dawn on July 4. That night the troops commenced their withdrawal, and Longstreet’s command followed the rear guard of A.
P. Hill’s corps. Torrential rain and wretched roads slowed the march, but the army reached the mountains by the night of July 5. On July 6, the exhausted soldiers and animals moved toward Hagerstown, though they could manage little speed.
Longstreet wrote that he was deeply troubled the army could not reach Hagerstown in time to protect its threatened supply trains at Williamsport. The command arrived around 5 p. m. and encamped about two miles from the town.
Reports cataloging the dead, wounded, and missing had already been forwarded, and Longstreet closed his dispatch as lieutenant general commanding the First Army Corps of the Department of Northern Virginia. After the guns fell silent over Gettysburg, the field was heavy with unresolved questions. Longstreet’s testimony revealed not only the failures of Confederate command but also the haunting possibility of what might have been. In retreat, his men carried more than physical wounds; they carried the burden of vanished opportunity.
The march toward Hagerstown marked not merely a withdrawal but the beginning of a deeper reckoning for the Confederacy. While the Union hailed victory, the Southern army was forced to confront painful realities about its leadership and its cause.