Why Confederate Generals Feared Ulysses S. Grant More Than Any Union General

Why Confederate Generals Feared Ulysses S. Grant More Than Any Union General

In the spring of 1861, a 39-year-old leather tanner from Galena, Illinois, walked into a military recruiting office and asked for a job. His name was Ulysses S. Grant. He was not the man anyone would have chosen to save the Union.

The Union had plenty of generals that year. Men with prestigious military educations, men from important families, men who looked the part and had the confidence of the establishment. Grant had none of those things.

He was given command of a single regiment of untrained volunteers. His first assignment was to march them north from Illinois. A soldier who saw him arrive at the camp would later write, "He don't look as if he knew enough to find cows if you gave him hay."

By 1865, that same man would unconditionally surrender to him.

Grant attended the United States Military Academy at West Point. He graduated in the middle of his class, unmemorable and average. In the Mexican-American War, Grant proved he could fight. He was brave, even reckless at times.

But he was also unimpressed with the war itself. In his memoirs, he would later write that he believed it was an unjust conflict, fought for the wrong reasons. He saw men dying for a cause he didn't believe in.

In 1854, Grant resigned from the army. He was done with military life. What happened next was almost comic in its failure.

Grant tried business in California during the gold rush. He managed to fail while fortunes were being made on all sides. He lost money, made bad decisions, and fell into debt.

By 1860, Grant was working as a clerk in his father's leather goods store in Galena, Illinois. This is where the future general of the Union armies was when the Civil War began, behind a counter selling leather goods, apparently destined to be forgotten by history.

When the war came, Grant didn't wait to be conscripted. He walked into a recruiting office and asked to help train volunteers. At first, nobody wanted him.

The political generals with connections got the good assignments. Grant got the undisciplined rabble. He was given the 21st Illinois Infantry, a unit so chaotic that soldiers were routinely drunk, disobedient, and dangerous to themselves and each other.

What Grant did in the next few weeks was remarkable. He instituted strict, unforgiving discipline. He ordered that no one could leave camp without a pass. He punished deserters and held daily drills.

He was fair. He never asked his men to do anything he wouldn't do himself. But he was also absolutely unbending.

Within weeks, the 21st Illinois went from a mob of rowdy volunteers to a functioning military unit. Grant was promoted to colonel.

His new assignment was strategic. He was given command of the district of Cairo, a position on the Mississippi River. The river was vital to the Union strategy. It was the highway through the South, and whoever controlled it controlled the war in the West.

Grant's early movements in Cairo were modest and cautious. That changed when he met the enemy.

In the fall of 1861, Grant led his first expedition into the field. He was pursuing a Confederate colonel named Thomas Harris, who was operating in northern Missouri. Grant had never fought a real battle.

As he approached the area where he expected to find the Confederate forces, his heart began racing. In his memoirs, Grant recorded this moment with remarkable honesty.

"As we approached the brow of the hill from which it was expected we could see Harris's camp and possibly find his men ready formed to meet us, my heart kept getting higher and higher until it felt to me as though it was in my throat," he wrote.

When they reached the hill, the Confederate camp was empty. Harris had fled at the first sign of Union approach. The Confederates had been as afraid as Grant was.

In that moment, Grant realized something crucial. "I never forgot," he wrote, that the enemy "had as much reason to fear my forces as I had his."

Fear was not weakness. Fear was universal. The difference was that Grant was willing to advance despite the fear.

In February 1862, Grant was promoted to major general. He was given command of the Army of the Tennessee with a mission to break Confederate control of the Western Rivers. His first targets were Fort Henry and Fort Donelson.

The Fort Donelson assault was brutal. The Confederates fought hard. Grant's men had to climb hills under fire and attack entrenched positions. But they advanced.

When the Confederate commander, General Simon Buckner, sent Grant a note requesting terms of surrender, Grant's response was simple and absolute. Unconditional surrender.

Grant was born in that moment. Buckner surrendered. Over 21,000 Confederate soldiers laid down their weapons. The Union had its first major victory.

Three months later, Grant faced his first major test when Confederate forces under Albert Sidney Johnston attacked his army at Shiloh, Tennessee, catching them partially unprepared.

The first day was catastrophic. Grant's forces were nearly driven back into the Tennessee River. His men were panicked, disorganized, dying by the hundreds. Many officers called for retreat, called for surrender, called for negotiations.

Grant ignored all of it. He repositioned his lines, rallied his officers, and organized a counterattack for the next day.

On April 7th, Grant attacked. The Union forces drove the Confederates back across the same ground they had gained the day before. It was a Union victory, but an ugly one. Nearly 24,000 casualties in two days, the bloodiest battle the continent had ever seen.

The northern press called him a butcher. Politically connected generals demanded his removal. Lincoln refused to remove him.

The president understood something his advisers didn't. In a war of survival, a general who wasn't willing to fight was worse than a general who made mistakes.

Grant's next target was Vicksburg, Mississippi. The city sat on the highest bluffs of the Mississippi River. It was the last Confederate stronghold on the river.

The city was strongly fortified. The terrain was difficult. But Grant had an idea that made his entire command confused.

He decided to cross the Mississippi River south of Vicksburg, then march inland to attack the city from behind. It meant leaving his supply lines behind. It meant operating in enemy territory with limited support.

His chief of staff, William Sherman, pulled him aside and told him the plan was too risky. Grant nodded, listened respectfully, and then did it anyway.

In the space of two weeks, Grant's army crossed the Mississippi River, defeated and separated two Confederate armies, marched deeper into Mississippi, encircled Vicksburg, and began the siege.

The tempo of operations was shocking. Confederate commanders couldn't react fast enough. They were used to war moving at a measured pace. Grant moved like a man who understood that speed is more valuable than perfection.

The siege lasted 47 days. On July 4th, 1863, Independence Day, Vicksburg fell. The entire Mississippi River was now in Union hands.

The Confederacy was literally cut in half. Confederate officers began writing about Grant in their correspondence. They called him relentless. They called him dangerous.

In the fall of 1863, a federal force under General William Rosecrans was trapped in Chattanooga, Tennessee. They were cut off, starving, and facing Confederate lines that seemed unbreakable.

Lincoln sent for Grant. Grant arrived and immediately reorganized the supply lines. He opened the "cracker line," a route that allowed supplies to reach the trapped soldiers.

Then he planned his assault. The Confederates held the high ground at Lookout Mountain and Missionary Ridge. Both positions seemed impregnable.

Grant attacked anyway. In a moment that shocked both the Union and Confederacy, his men charged up Missionary Ridge and drove the Confederates off the summit. Chattanooga was secured. The gateway to the Deep South was open.

By this point, Grant had won at Fort Donelson, at Shiloh, at Vicksburg, and at Chattanooga. He had done it all while the northern public was calling him a drunk, a butcher, and a mediocre commander getting lucky.

In March 1864, President Lincoln promoted Grant to Lieutenant General, the first man to hold that rank since George Washington. Grant was given command of all Union armies.

He moved east to face Robert E. Lee and the Army of Northern Virginia. For the next year, Grant would fight Lee in a series of bloody battles. The Wilderness, Spotsylvania Courthouse, Cold Harbor, Petersburg.

The Northern press crucified him. Anti-war elements called him a murderer. Democratic politicians demanded he be replaced. But Lincoln held firm.

Grant was fighting a different war than previous Union commanders. His key insight was this. The Confederacy could not win a war of attrition.

The North had 22 million people. The South had 9 million, of whom 3.5 million were slaves not contributing to the war effort. The only way the Union could lose was if it stopped fighting.

Grant coordinated operations on all fronts. He had Sherman marching through Georgia while he fought Lee in Virginia. He kept the Confederacy under pressure everywhere simultaneously.

General James Longstreet, Lee's most trusted lieutenant, wrote in despair, "That man will fight us every day and every hour till the end of the war."

General Joseph Johnston wrote, "His strategy is to hammer continuously with superior numbers until they yield."

General Braxton Bragg wrote to Jefferson Davis that Grant was using warfare in a manner the Confederacy had no defense against.

By the winter of 1864-65, the war was clearly lost for the Confederacy. It wasn't lost because Grant was a brilliant strategist in the traditional sense. It was lost because Grant understood a fundamental truth about modern war.

The side with the will to endure and the resources to sustain that will always wins eventually.

By April 1865, Robert E. Lee's army was starving, exhausted, and outnumbered five to one. Grant had it surrounded at Appomattox Courthouse. Lee had no choice. He surrendered unconditionally.

When Grant entered the room where Lee waited, he was wearing a simple blue uniform. No elaborate dress, no ceremonial sword. Just a soldier meeting another soldier.

In the years after the war, the mythology was rewritten. Robert E. Lee became the noble defender, the tragic hero. Grant became the drunk, the butcher, the man who won only because he had more men.

But the Confederate generals who fought him never saw it that way.

They feared Grant for four reasons. First, he had learned early that the enemy was just as afraid as he was. Instead of being paralyzed by that fear, he advanced anyway.

Sherman explained it this way. "I am a damned sight smarter man than Grant. I know a great deal more about war than he does, but he beats me because he don't care a damn for what the enemy does out of his sight, and it scares me like hell."

Second, Grant understood logistics as warfare. Most generals thought of logistics as support for warfare. Grant thought of logistics as an offensive weapon.

By controlling supply lines, he could control enemy movements. He could starve them out. The Mississippi River campaign was pure logistics warfare.

Third, Grant understood that speed prevented coordination. The Confederacy had interior lines of communication. They could move forces between theaters faster than the Union.

But Grant didn't give them time to move. He attacked everywhere simultaneously with relentless tempo. By the time the Confederates could respond to one threat, Grant had created another.

Fourth, Grant understood that the North couldn't lose if it didn't stop fighting. Lee was fighting as if it were possible for the South to win through brilliant tactics. Grant was fighting as if he simply needed to keep the pressure on until the Confederacy collapsed.

It was not romantic. It was not a fair fight. But it was inevitable.

Grant never gloried in the killing. He hated war as much as he had hated it in Mexico. But he would not stop fighting. This was the quality that made Confederate generals fear him most.

When Lee surrendered at Appomattox, Grant offered terms that were extraordinarily generous. Lee's soldiers could keep their horses. They would need them for plowing. They could keep their sidearms. They would not be prosecuted for treason.

Grant treated the defeated Confederate general with respect. When his men started to fire a salute at the news of Lee's surrender, Grant immediately ordered it stopped.

He was relentlessly focused on winning, but he was not cruel about it. He understood war as something that had to be fought with total commitment, but also something to be ended with honor.

After the war, Grant was celebrated as a hero. He was eventually elected president, but his presidency was far less successful than his generalship. He was not a politician.

In his final years, Grant lost most of his money to bad business ventures. He was sick with cancer and broke. But he wrote his memoirs.

In those memoirs, Grant revealed the man behind the legend. A man who had struggled with fear but conquered it. A man who had failed in business but succeeded in warfare.

Grant died in 1885, having completed his memoirs just days before his death.

General Joseph Johnston said of him, "I had no idea of the resources of Grant for offensive operations until that campaign at Vicksburg. He won my admiration."

General James Longstreet said, "He was a man of strong determination, iron will, clear head, and a readiness to assume responsibility. These are the elements of military success."

These were men who had fought against Grant, who had opposed him, who had tried to defeat him. Yet they all came to the same conclusion.

Grant was different because he understood war differently. Not as a game to be won through brilliant maneuvers, but as a contest of wills where the side with the will to endure and the resources to maintain that endurance would prevail.

What made Confederate generals fear Ulysses S. Grant was not his brilliance. It was his clarity.

He saw the war plainly. He understood what had to be done. And he was willing to do it regardless of cost, regardless of criticism, regardless of fear.

That made him not a brilliant general, but an inevitable general.