The written orders General George Custer received on June 22, 1876, were explicit. Signed by acting assistant adjutant general E.W. Smith, the instructions directed Custer to proceed up the Rosebud River in pursuit of the Indian trail discovered by Major Reno. The department commander expressed full confidence in Custer’s zeal and ability, declining to impose precise orders that might hinder his actions.
The instructions suggested Custer continue southward, possibly to the headwaters of the Tongue River, then turn toward the Little Big Horn. Colonel Gibbon’s column was already en route to the mouth of the Big Horn, with hopes that the Indians would be nearly encircled by the two columns. Custer’s troops were rationed for 15 days, and he was not expected to arrive at the Little Big Horn before July 5th or 6th.
At noon on June 22nd, the regiment marched out of camp in column of fours, followed by its pack mules. Generals Terry, Gibbon, and Custer reviewed the regiment as it passed. The pack trains proved troublesome at the outset, with cargo falling off and mules straggling, but efficiency improved after Lieutenant Mathey took charge.
After encountering the Indian trail, the regiment encamped at 4 p.m., having marched 12 miles. At sunset, Custer addressed his officers in a somber gathering. He stated that trumpet calls would only sound in emergencies and that marches would commence at 5 a.m. sharp. He emphasized that troop commanders were experienced officers, and only the timing of departure and arrival at camp would be regulated from headquarters.
Custer expressed his reliance on the officers’ judgment and loyalty. He estimated they might encounter at least 1,000 warriors, potentially supplemented by young men from the agencies, totaling 1,500. He had consulted reports from the commissioner of Indian Affairs to reach this number. Custer declined General Terry’s offer of additional troops from the Second Cavalry, believing the Seventh Cavalry could defeat any force that might combine against them. He also declined Gatling guns, fearing they might hinder movements due to inferior horses and challenging terrain.
Custer’s address was unusual, as he typically did not share his thoughts so openly. His manner was conciliating and subdued, leaving a deep impression on those present. As the officers dispersed, Lieutenant Wallace remarked to Lieutenant Godfrey, “I believe General Custer is going to be killed.” When asked why, Wallace replied, “Because I have never heard Custer talking that way before.”
That night, Godfrey inspected the herd and came upon the Indian scouts’ bivouac. Scout Mitch Bouyer asked if Godfrey had fought the Sioux before and how many he expected. When Godfrey estimated between 1,000 and 1,500, Bouyer replied, “Well, I can’t tell you, we are going to have a damned big fight.”
At 5 a.m. on June 23rd, the march up the Rosebud began. Eight miles in, they encountered the first Indian camping site, indicating a large village. They passed through three camping sites, studying pony droppings, tracks, and lodge trails to estimate the size of the village. They encamped at 5 p.m., having marched 33 miles.
On June 24th, they encountered numerous camping sites, all appearing to be of similar strength. They passed a larger camp where grass had been grazed by large herds and found the frame of a Sun Dance lodge with a white man’s scalp inside. This was where Indians from the agencies had joined the hostiles.
During a halt, Custer’s headquarters flag was blown down by a southerly breeze, falling toward the rear. Godfrey picked it up and replanted it, but it fell again. He secured it with sagebrush. The incident seemed insignificant at the time, but Lieutenant Wallace later mentioned it as a bad omen.
The day’s march was tedious, with many long halts to allow scouts to work ahead. They camped under a bluff at sundown, hiding the command as much as possible, having marched 28 miles. Fires were extinguished after supper, and they prepared to march again at 11:30 p.m.
At around 9:30 p.m., Godfrey and Lieutenant Hare retired for a brief nap, but were soon interrupted. Custer requested the presence of all officers at headquarters immediately. Custer informed them the trail led to the Little Big Horn and they would march immediately to conceal themselves near the divide before daylight. This would allow time to study the terrain, locate the village, and plan the attack for the 26th.
The night march was challenging due to dust and noise. At 2 a.m. on June 25th, they halted to await news from the scouts, having marched about 10 miles. Before 8 a.m., Custer rode bareback to each troop, giving orders to prepare for the march and sharing information about the location of the Indian villages.
Just before departing, Godfrey observed Custer in a serious conversation with the scouts. Bloody Knife mentioned they would find enough Sioux to fight for two or three days. Custer smiled and remarked, “I guess we’ll get through with him in one day.”
The march resumed at 8 a.m. and continued until 10:30 a.m., when they halted in a ravine and were instructed to maintain silence and conceal themselves. They had marched approximately 10 miles.
In Indian warfare, a commander rarely has the opportunity to reconnoiter the enemy’s position in daylight. If signs indicate a hot trail, the commander judges the distance and attempts to reach the village by night, making dispositions for a surprise attack at dawn. The attack must be made swiftly, often without knowledge of the opposing force’s numbers.
It was well known to the Indians that troops were in the field, and a battle was fully expected. However, the close proximity of the column was not known until the morning of the battle. Several young men had left the hostile camp that morning and saw the dust raised by the troops. They returned to the village, warning that troops were approaching. The attack was not a surprise.
The Indian camp had been pitched at the site for two or three days. The location was not chosen as a battlefield but as a convenient camping spot. In anticipation of Sitting Bull’s prophecy, the village had massed together.
The Little Big Horn River is a rapid, winding mountain stream 20 to 40 yards wide with a pebbled bottom and abrupt soft banks. The surrounding topography includes an undulating prairie plateau and rough, broken terrain with high, precipitous hills and deep, narrow gulches.
The command had followed the trail up a branch of the Rosebud, nearing the summit of the mountains forming the divide. Scouts had spotted smoke rising above the village and pony herds grazing in the Little Big Horn Valley, approximately 12 to 15 miles away. Due to high bluffs screening the village, it was impossible to discover more of the enemy than already reported.
Captain Yates’ troop had lost a pack of hard bread during the night march, and a detail was sent back to recover it. Captain Keogh reported that the detail had returned, and Sergeant Curtis described finding an Indian opening a box of hard bread with his tomahawk. The Indian fled upon seeing the soldiers.
This information was promptly taken to Custer, who sounded officer call. He recounted Keogh’s report and mentioned that scouts had seen Indians observing their movements along the ridge. He believed their presence had been discovered, making further concealment unnecessary. He decided to attack the village immediately, rather than waiting until the next morning, to prevent the village from scattering and escaping.
The regiment was divided into battalions. Major Reno’s advanced battalion comprised Troop M, Troop A, and Troop G. Captain Benteen’s battalion comprised Troop H, Troop D, and Troop K. The pack train under Lieutenant Mathey’s charge was escorted by Troop B, led by Captain McDougall.
Reno’s battalion marched down a valley that developed into the south branch of a small tributary to the Little Big Horn, now known as Reno Creek. Custer’s column trailed Reno closely, bearing to the right and rear. Benteen’s battalion was ordered to the left and front, towards a line of high bluffs approximately three or four miles distant.
Benteen was instructed to send word to Custer if he encountered anything and to engage any enemy he came across. If he reached the high bluffs without sighting the enemy, he was to continue to the next line of bluffs until he could see the Little Big Horn Valley. It is evident Custer believed the Indians would not withstand a daylight attack and that some would attempt to escape up the valley. This idea likely influenced his decision to send Benteen’s battalion to the left.
Benteen’s march was arduous, traversing rough, steep hills and deep valleys. The obstacles forced the battalion to the right, eventually bringing them within sight of the trail about a mile distant. Many horses were greatly fatigued. Benteen wisely decided to follow the trail of the rest of the command, and they joined it just ahead of the pack train.
During this march, they occasionally saw Custer’s battalion marching at a rapid pace. They heard loud cheering and a few shots two or three times, but the cause of these demonstrations is unknown. After joining the trail, they came to a water hole where a stream of running water originated. Benteen halted to water the horses.
While watering, they heard firing in advance. Lieutenant Weir grew impatient and started off with his troop, taking the advance. The rest of the battalion soon followed, catching up with Weir. They were now several miles from the Reno battlefield.
As they left the water hole, the pack train arrived, and the thirsty mules plunged into the morass despite the packers’ efforts. They passed a burning tepee, presumably fired by their scouts, containing the body of a warrior killed in the battle with Crook’s troops on the Rosebud on June 17th.
Reno’s command and scouts followed the Indians closely until he received orders to move forward at a rapid gait and charge the village, with the whole outfit supporting him. According to Reno’s official report, this order was given near the burning tepee. Lieutenant Cook, adjutant, informed him that the village was only two miles ahead and gave the aforementioned order.
The Little Big Horn bottom is generally flat and one to two miles wide, with heavy timber along the stream. Reno’s battalion moved at a trot to the river, where he delayed to water the horses and reform the column. He then sent word to Custer that he had the enemy in front of him and that they were strong.
Reno moved forward in column of fours, then formed the battalion in line of battle across the valley, and later deployed as skirmishers. The hostiles fell back firing occasionally but made no decisive effort to check Reno’s advance. However, when the horses of two men became unmanageable and carried them into the Indian camp, the Indians developed great force, opened a brisk fire, and made a dash toward the foothills on the left flank. The Ree scouts fled, abandoning the field.
Reno realized he was being drawn into a trap. He could not see Custer or any other support. He decided to defend himself and give up the mounted attack. During the advance, the troops began to cheer in response to the whoops of the hostiles, prompting Reno to yell, “Stop that noise.”
As Reno did not see the whole outfit within supporting distance, he disobeyed his orders to charge the village and instead dismounted his command to fight on foot. The movements of the Indians around the left flank and the flight of the scouts caused the left to fall back. The command became defensive in the timber, covered by the bank of the old riverbed.
Reno’s loss at this point was one wounded. The position was strong, protected in front by the bank and fringe of timber. The duration of their stay in the bottom after being attacked in force is disputed, with some estimating a few minutes and others about an hour.
After one man was killed close to Reno, he gave orders to mount and get to the bluffs. But this order was not generally heard or communicated. He countermanded the order, then repeated it, but again it was not widely understood. Individuals who observed the preparations of those near Reno informed their troop commanders, who then gave orders to mount. Due to the noise of the firing, many did not know of the order until it was too late to accompany the command.
Reno’s command left the bottom in troop organizations but in a straggling formation, with Reno leading the retreat. After exhausting his revolver shots, he threw them away. The hostile strength pushed Reno’s retreat to the left, forcing them to find an alternative ford where they struck the river. A pony trail led up a funnel-shaped ravine into the bluffs, where the command became jammed and lost all semblance of organization.
Lieutenant Donald McIntosh was killed shortly after departing the timber. Dr. DeWolf met his demise while ascending one of the bluffs. Lieutenant B.H. Hodson’s horse leaped from the bank into the river and fell dead, with the lieutenant suffering a leg wound likely from the same bullet that killed the horse. Hodson cried out, “For God’s sake, don’t abandon me.” He was assured he would not be left behind. Hodson grasped a comrade’s stirrup strap and was taken across the stream, but soon after was shot and killed.
During the retreat, Private Diver of Troop F engaged in a hand-to-hand conflict with an Indian. His horse was killed, but he then shot the Indian, captured the Indian’s pony, and rode to rejoin the command.
Reno’s casualties thus far were three officers, including Dr. DeWolf, and 29 enlisted men and scouts killed. Seven enlisted men were wounded, and one officer, one interpreter, and 14 soldiers and scouts were missing. Nearly all the casualties occurred during the retreat and after leaving the timber.
Scout Charlie Reynolds and Isaiah Dorman, interpreter from Fort Rice, were killed in the timber on the right of Reno’s second position. Bloody Knife was killed by Reno’s side. The Ree scouts continued their flight until they reached the supply camp at the mouth of the Powder on the 27th. The Crow scouts remained with the command.
Interpreter Fred Gerard recalled that only one Crow scout, Curly, and Mitch Bouyer, Crow interpreter, accompanied Custer’s immediate command. All other Crow scouts were with Reno. Curly likely did not participate in the fight at all but left Custer just before the fighting commenced. He went to the high ridge back of Custer Ridge, watched the battle long enough to see that Custer would be defeated, and then made his way to the Big Horn River, where he waited for the arrival of the steamboat Far West.
Not long after departing the water hole, Sergeant Knipe of Troop C met Benteen’s column with an order from Custer to the commanding officer of the pack train to hasten its pace. As he passed the column, he exclaimed to the men, “We’ve got ’em, boys!” From this and other remarks, they inferred that Custer had attacked and captured the village.
Shortly afterward, they were met by Trumpeter Martin of Troop H, bearing a message signed by Colonel Cook, adjutant. The message read: “Benteen. Come on. Big village. Be quick. Bring packs.” The postscript added: “Bring packs.”
A riderless horse was the only living thing in their front. Benteen inquired of the trumpeter what had transpired. Martin informed him that the Indians had skedaddled, abandoning the village.
The column had been marching at a trot and walk according to the terrain. They now heard firing, initially straggling shots which grew more pronounced as they advanced, appearing to come toward them. The column took the gallop with pistols drawn, expecting to meet the enemy. They thought Custer was driving the Indians before him in his effort to communicate with the pack train, never suspecting their forces had been defeated.
As they formed in line to meet their supposed enemy, they came into full view of the Little Big Horn Valley. The valley was filled with horsemen riding to and fro in clouds of dust and smoke, as the Indians had set the grass ablaze to drive the troops out and cover their movements. On the bluffs to their right, they saw a body of troops engaged. An engagement also appeared to be occurring in the valley, but due to the distance, smoke, and dust, it was impossible to discern if those in the valley were friends or foes.
A brief uncertainty arose regarding the direction they should take. Some Crow scouts passed by, driving a small herd of ponies, and one of them said “soldiers” and motioned for the command to go to the right. Following their directions, they soon joined Reno’s battalion, which was still firing.
Reno had lost his hat and had a handkerchief tied about his head, appearing very excited. Benteen’s battalion was ordered to dismount and deploy as skirmishers on the edge of the bluffs overlooking the valley. Shortly after, the Indians withdrew from the attack.
Lieutenant Hare approached Godfrey, grasping his hand heartily and saying with emphasis, “We’ve had a big fight in the bottom, got whipped, and I am glad to see you.” Godfrey was satisfied he meant what he said, as he had already suspected something was amiss but was not prepared for such startling information.