Edward Porter Alexander commanded the Confederate artillery tasked with softening the Union line before Pickett’s Charge at Gettysburg. His account offers a rare perspective: not from an infantry leader or a general, but from the artillery officer responsible for making the assault possible.
The order to begin the barrage was to come from General James Longstreet personally, once all infantry units were properly arranged. Alexander was told to focus his fire on a group of trees in the enemy’s position, which he was mistakenly informed was the town’s burial ground.
Around 9 a.m., Alexander began reorganizing his batteries and positioning them for the bombardment. The enemy offered little disruption, firing only intermittently. Alexander found this curious, noting the Federals could have forced his men into shelter or depleted their ammunition before the infantry was even assembled.
He could only explain their inaction by imagining they understood the difficult situation the Confederates would soon face.
Of Longstreet’s 83 cannon, eight were kept on the far right to protect the flank. The other 75 were arranged in an uneven line roughly 1,300 yards long, stretching from the Peach Orchard to the northeastern edge of Spangler’s Woods.
While occupied with this work, General Pendleton suggested Alexander take nine 12-pound howitzers from Hill’s Corps, remarking that the corps had no use for weapons with such limited range. Alexander accepted and placed them under shelter near the rear of the leading column, planning to have them accompany the infantry when it moved forward.
A few hundred yards to the left and behind Alexander’s line, the artillery of the Third Corps under Colonel Walker began. This consisted of 60 pieces spread along Seminary Ridge as far as the Hagerstown Road, plus two Whitworth rifles placed nearly a mile further north on the same ridge.
Within this space were 20 rifled guns from the Second Corps under Colonel Carter. Another four rifles from the same corps under Captain Graham were located about a mile and a half northeast of Cemetery Hill. These 24 guns were instructed to fire solely solid shot, as their explosive shells were unreliable.
It was a remarkable failure, Alexander observed, that of the 84 guns from the Second and Third Corps scheduled for action, 80 were in a single line parallel to the enemy’s position. Fifty-six guns were left inactive. He believed many of these should have been positioned in and around the town to rake the shaft of the fishhook formation and create crossing fire with the guns from the west.
Federal artillery at the start of the cannonade numbered 166 guns. During the action, 10 additional batteries were brought forward from reserve, increasing their total engaged to 220, compared to the 172 employed on the Confederate side.
The arrangement of the infantry ranks took considerable time, and the formation selected was not well fitted for such a formidable objective. Six brigades, approximately 10,000 men, composed the front line. Only three brigades formed the second line, which was considerably shorter on the left and followed about 200 yards behind the first.
The remaining brigade, Wilcox’s, was stationed behind the right of the column. It was not set in motion with the main force and, being directed forward 20 minutes or more afterward, was far too delayed to provide any help whatsoever.
Both sides of the attacking column were exposed, and the left flank lacked any supporting units to the rear. Alexander noted the formation was certain to deteriorate quickly under enemy fire. Still, he reasoned that no formation could have prevailed, and this sparse arrangement likely resulted in fewer losses than a denser one would have suffered.
Shortly before noon, a fierce artillery duel erupted on the Confederate left, continuing for a full half hour. It has frequently been mistaken for the ordered bombardment preceding Pickett’s Charge. It originated between skirmishers in front of Hill’s Corps contesting control of a house.
Hill’s artillery initially joined the fire, reportedly by his command. Alexander considered this extremely ill-advised, as it wasted a considerable quantity of ammunition, the shortage of which was keenly felt later in the fight. Not one gun from his own corps fired, nor did the enemy across from them.
When the firing ceased, complete stillness fell over the field, extending even to the skirmishers out front and to the enemy’s rear areas. From behind the Federal lines, the Confederates had listened all morning to the sounds of Johnson’s engagements.
Alexander’s 75 guns had all been meticulously positioned and prepared for an hour. While the infantry brigades still had not reached their proper alignment, he waited for the signal from Longstreet. It occurred to him to summon the nine howitzers under Major Richardson so they might lead the advance for several hundred yards before engaging.
Only after the cannonade had commenced did he discover these guns had been relocated and could not be found. It later emerged that Pendleton had withdrawn four of the pieces, and Richardson, with the remaining five, had shifted away to seek shelter during Hill’s earlier cannonade.
Alexander made no objection, believing that had these guns gone forward with the infantry, they would inevitably have been abandoned on the field and perhaps drawn a counterattack following the repulse of Pickett’s Charge.
Some half hour or more before the bombardment began, Alexander was taken aback by receiving a note from Longstreet. It read: “Colonel, if the artillery fire does not have the effect to drive off the enemy or greatly demoralize him so as to make our effort pretty certain, I would prefer that you should not advise Pickett to make the charge. I shall rely a great deal upon your judgment to determine the matter and shall expect you to let General Pickett know when the moment offers.”
Until that moment, Alexander had not doubted the army’s ability to carry the position, trusting in General Lee’s decision to order it. But here was a proposition that he should be the one to decide the question. Overwhelming reasons against the assault immediately seemed to confront him.
General Wright of Anderson’s division was standing with him. Alexander showed him the letter and expressed his opinion. Clearly, the cannonade was to be permitted to start. Then the responsibility would fall upon Alexander to determine whether Pickett should charge. If not, the army must retreat to Virginia to replenish its ammunition, and the campaign would be a failure.
Alexander understood that his guns could not drive off the enemy. But he clung to a vague hope that with cooperation from Hill and Ewell, something favorable might occur. He asked Wright, “What do you think of it? Is it as difficult to get there as it appears?”
Wright replied, “The trouble is not in going there. I went there with my brigade yesterday. There is a place where you can catch your breath and reform. The trouble is to remain there after you arrive, for the whole Yankee army is there in a bunch.”
Alexander failed to grasp fully all that this might imply. The issue seemed merely one of support, which was General Lee’s responsibility. He had observed several of Hill’s brigades forming to support Pickett and had heard a rumor that Lee had spoken of a coordinated attack by the whole army.
He resolved to see Pickett and engage his frame of mind. He found Pickett both cheerful and confident. Alexander felt that if the artillery fire commenced, Pickett must make the charge. He wrote to Longstreet: “General, when our fire is at its best, I will advise General Pickett to advance.”
It must have been with profound disappointment that Longstreet witnessed the collapse of his hope to prevent a futile massacre, for he was completely convinced of its hopelessness. Yet even he could scarcely have understood how utterly unprepared Hill and Ewell were to provide aid to his assault or to seize upon even a temporary advantage.
None of their artillery had been placed with any intention of offering cooperative fire, nor to follow the charge, and a great deal of their ammunition had been squandered prematurely. Although Pickett’s assault, when executed, actually overran the enemy’s guns, nowhere was there the slightest preparation to come to his assistance.
The entire weight of the operation fell upon the 10 brigades directly involved. The other 26 brigades and 56 fresh guns served only as widely scattered onlookers.
It was precisely 1 p.m. by Alexander’s watch when the signal guns were fired and the bombardment commenced. The enemy answered somewhat slowly at first, though soon with growing rapidity.
Having decided that Pickett must charge, Alexander grew impatient to launch him as soon as he could perceive that the fire was achieving any effect. He estimated that a half hour would pass between sending the order and the column reaching close combat. He dared not count on using more ammunition than one hour of such firing would consume, for they were distant from their supplies and had already fought for two days.
He resolved to send Pickett the order at the very first favorable indication and no later than after 30 minutes of firing. At the end of 20 minutes, no favorable development had taken place. More guns had been added to the Federal line than at the start. The entire line, about two miles long, was blazing like a volcano.
It appeared sheer madness to order a column in the heat of a July afternoon to undertake an advance of three-quarters of a mile over open ground against the center of that line. But something had to be done.
At 1:25, Alexander wrote to Pickett: “General, if you are to advance at all, you must come at once, or we will not be able to support you as we ought, but the enemy’s fire has not slackened materially, and there are still 18 guns firing from the cemetery.”
He had scarcely sent this note when a noticeable decline in the enemy’s fire occurred. As he watched, he observed other guns being hitched and withdrawn. The Confederates had often withdrawn from duels with Federal artillery to conserve ammunition for their infantry. The enemy, however, had never before practiced such economy.
After waiting several minutes and seeing that no fresh guns replaced those pulled back, Alexander felt certain the enemy was suffering under the punishment. At 1:40, he sent a second note to Pickett: “For God’s sake, come quick. The 18 guns have gone. Come quick, for my ammunition will not let me support you properly.”
This was followed by two verbal messages to the same effect, delivered by an officer and a sergeant from the nearest batteries. The 18 guns had occupied the precise point toward which the charge was aimed. Alexander had been mistakenly informed this point was the cemetery.
Soon only a few scattered Federal guns remained in action, and still Pickett’s line had not advanced, though it was positioned scarcely 300 yards behind Alexander’s guns.
Alexander later learned what had transpired after his first note was sent. It reached Pickett in Longstreet’s presence. Pickett read it and handed it to Longstreet. Longstreet read it and remained silent. Pickett asked, “General, shall I advance?”
Longstreet knew it must be done, but unwilling to speak the words, he turned in his saddle and looked away. Pickett saluted and declared, “I am going to move forward, sir.” Then he galloped off.
Longstreet, having sent away his staff, rode out alone and joined Alexander near the left flank of the artillery. The time was undoubtedly 1:50 or later. Alexander had become very anxious to see Pickett advance, fearing his ammunition would be exhausted.
He explained the situation to Longstreet, who responded sharply: “Go and halt Pickett where he is and replenish your ammunition.”
Alexander replied, “We can’t do that, sir. The supply train has very little. It would take an hour to distribute it and in the meantime the enemy would use the delay to their advantage.”
Longstreet appeared to hesitate. Both men were on foot. Longstreet then spoke slowly and with deep feeling: “I do not want to make this charge. I do not see how it can succeed. I would not make it now, but that General Lee has ordered it and is expecting it.”
Alexander sensed Longstreet was inviting a word of agreement and that if offered, he would again order Pickett halted where he stood. But Alexander was too aware of his own youth and inexperience to volunteer an opinion that was not directly requested. He remained silent while Longstreet wrestled with his decision alone and ultimately obeyed his orders.
The tension was short-lived and ended when General Garnett emerged from the woods behind them, riding at the front of his brigade. Alexander had served on the plains with him and with Armistead back in 1858. He now encountered Garnett for the first time since Longstreet’s Suffolk campaign.
Garnett saluted, and Alexander mounted and rode alongside him while his brigade swept past the guns. Then Alexander rode down the line of artillery, inquiring what ammunition each piece had left. Many had only canister remaining. These and all others having very few shells were ordered to hold their position. Those with a moderate supply of suitable ammunition were directed to limber up in advance.
During the cannonade, the reserve ammunition train had been moved from its original location, and the courier sent to it had not yet returned. Only about one gun in four from the center could be ordered forward. From the right, Major Haskell brought five from Garden’s and Fanner’s batteries, and from Major Echelman’s Washington Artillery.
Returning to the center, Alexander joined the few guns advancing from the batteries there and moved forward to a slight rise of ground just west of the Emmitsburg Road. Once they commenced firing, troops began to advance to attack the right flank of Pickett’s division. Echelman and Haskell, positioned to the left front of the Peach Orchard, soon also opened fire.
The charging brigades were now very close to the Federal lines, and the musketry was intense. As the Confederates watched, they saw the brigades disappear into the enemy’s position amid smoke and dust. They ceased firing to await the outcome.
It soon became clear through a gradual slackening of the fire and a stream of fugitives falling back to the rear, pursued by some gunfire, though not as much as Alexander thought might have been expected.
After perhaps 20 minutes, during which the firing had nearly stopped, Alexander was astonished to see Wilcox’s Alabama brigade moving forward alone. It had been with them at Chancellorsville and, just 60 days prior, had secured the victory at Salem Church. It had been sent to reinforce Pickett but was not incorporated into the main column. Now, when everything was finished, this single brigade was advancing alone, and there was no one present with the authority to stop it.
They numbered about 1,200, and on their left were roughly 250 men, the remnant of Perry’s Florida brigade. The sight was both absurd and tragic.
They advanced several hundred yards beyond the guns under a sharp fire, then halted and opened fire from some undergrowth and brushwood along a small ravine. Federal infantry soon moved out to assault their left flank. When Perry’s men fell back past the guns, Wilcox shifted by his right flank and, making a wide circuit, regained the Confederate lines at the Peach Orchard.
Wilcox’s loss in this charge was 204 killed and wounded. Perry’s loss was roughly proportional, with some prisoners taken as well.
While Wilcox’s brigade was making its charge, General Lee rode up and joined Alexander. He was completely alone, which could scarcely have occurred except by his own design. The guns were not firing but were holding their position to prevent any enemy pursuit.
Alexander had no doubt that Lee was apprehensive of a Federal counterattack and had come to the front to help rally the retreating men if necessary. Lee remained with them for perhaps an hour and spoke to nearly every soldier who passed, using words such as: “Don’t be discouraged. It was all my fault this time. Form your ranks once more when you reach cover. All good men must remain together now.”
At one point, loud cheering arose from the Federal lines, and Lee instructed Lieutenant Coloulston, the ordnance officer of Alexander’s battalion, to ride forward and learn the cause. Coloulston’s horse was not accustomed to the spur and balked. Coloulston was handed a stick and began to use it.
Lee said, “Oh, don’t do that. I once had a foolish horse, and I found gentle measures so much the best.”
Coloulston soon returned and reported that the Federals were cheering an officer who was riding along their line. Lee observed that he had thought it possible Johnson’s division, operating in the Federal rear, might have achieved some success. Clearly, he was not yet aware that Johnson had withdrawn to a defensive position around noon.
General Kemper was brought by on a litter. Lee rode over and said, “General, I hope you are not badly hurt.”
Kemper replied, “Yes, General. I’m afraid they have got me this time.”
Lee pressed his hand, saying, “I trust not. I trust not.”
Colonel Fremantle of Her Majesty’s Coldstream Guards had also joined the group. They sat on their horses on the slope behind the guns where they could see over the crest, but the cluster of horses remained hidden from the enemy.
After all the fugitives had passed, and there was still no indication of a counterattack, Lee rode away. Alexander continued to hold his line of artillery with a few adjustments until dark.
There were some advances by Federal skirmish lines, which the Confederates kept in check with their guns, occasionally having to use canister decisively. The Federal artillery did not interfere, for which Alexander was duly thankful.
Throughout the afternoon, Alexander quietly withdrew guns one at a time, sending them to the rear to be refitted. By 10 p.m., the entire line had been retired roughly to the position from which the attack had begun on the second day.
History remembers the generals, but Alexander’s account forces us to see the battle through the eyes of the man tasked with making it possible. A man burdened with a terrible split-second choice.