In January 1864, General Robert E. Lee submitted a detailed account of the Gettysburg campaign to Confederate authorities in Richmond. The dispatch, addressed to General S. Cooper, was intended to clarify the events of July 1863 and the decisions that shaped the battle's outcome.
Lee’s report covers the Confederate advance into Pennsylvania, beginning with the march toward Cash Town. On June 29, Hill’s Corps was directed to move forward, with Longstreet following the next day. Pickett’s division remained at Chambersburg to guard the rear until relieved by another command.
On the morning of July 1, a brigade under General Pettigrew was sent toward Gettysburg to procure supplies. Instead, the unit found the town occupied by federal forces. Pettigrew withdrew without engaging, and Hill arrived with Pender’s division that evening.
At dawn on July 1, Hill advanced with two divisions to assess enemy strength, which was believed to be primarily cavalry. Heth’s leading division encountered enemy scouts three miles west of Gettysburg and pressed forward. Two brigades engaged the foe but were outnumbered and forced back, with Brigadier General Archer taken prisoner.
When Pender’s division arrived in support, Heth reorganized his forces. The attack resumed with artillery support, and the Confederates drove the enemy back through successive lines. By 2:30 p.m., Ewell’s corps arrived via the Middletown Road, and a general offensive was ordered.
The federal line crumbled, and Union troops retreated through Gettysburg with severe losses. Major General Reynolds, commanding the opposing forces, was killed during the fighting. The Confederates captured over 5,000 prisoners, three artillery pieces, and several regimental colors.
The Federals regrouped on a ridge south of Gettysburg, fortifying it with infantry and artillery. Prisoner interrogations revealed that two corps of the army formerly led by Hooker were present, now under Meade’s command. Lee noted that the fortified heights were untenable for a direct assault with his four depleted divisions.
Ewell received orders to seize the enemy-held hill if feasible, but to avoid a general engagement until reinforcements arrived. Johnson’s division was delayed by its march from Carlisle, and the enemy occupied the position before Ewell could secure it. Darkness prevented a full assessment of federal strength.
Lee resolved to postpone offensive action until Longstreet’s arrival. Two of his divisions camped about four miles to the rear that night. Anderson’s division of Hill’s Corps reached the field after the day’s fighting had concluded.
Lee explained that a withdrawal through mountainous terrain with the army’s wagon trains would have been perilous. Remaining idle also carried risk, as the countryside offered scant provisions and enemy control of mountain passes threatened foraging operations. Battle became inevitable.
The federal position was formidable. Their right anchored on two dominant elevations, with lines stretching along the Emmitsburg Road and backed by a steep ridge. Stone walls and rail fences provided ideal defensive cover while impeding the Confederate advance.
The plan called for a concentrated thrust against the enemy’s left flank. Longstreet received orders to deploy McLaws’ and Hood’s divisions against that flank, while Hill’s corps demonstrated against the federal center. Ewell was to simulate an attack on the enemy’s right.
At 4 p.m., Longstreet’s artillery commenced bombardment, followed by Hood’s division advancing on the far right. McLaws coordinated with four of Anderson’s brigades in echelon to support the left. The Federals were driven from their Emmitsburg Road positions into a ravine and behind stone fences.
Wilcox’s and Wright’s brigades breached successive enemy lines and overran guns. Wright’s men reached the ridge crest but were isolated without support from McLaws’ lagging left and Anderson’s unengaged brigades. Both units withdrew under flanking fire.
As darkness fell, Longstreet consolidated gains on the right but recalled his left to original positions. The action yielded four cannons, hundreds of prisoners, and two regimental colors.
On the Confederate left, Johnson initiated artillery fire and advanced three brigades up the slope of Cemetery Hill. Early committed two brigades against the hill’s defenses. Johnson’s troops scaled the rugged incline under heavy fire, and elements of Steuart’s brigade breached the works.
Early’s assault overran infantry behind fences and captured the crest and several guns. However, an unsupported right flank was counterattacked by fresh forces, forcing a withdrawal. Coordination faltered in the darkness, and Pickett’s delayed arrival precluded renewed attacks.
Lee noted that General Ewell had ordered General Rodes to synchronize his attack with Early’s advance. But when Early launched his assault, Rodes’ troops were still deploying and unable to assist. Isolated and unsupported, Early was compelled to withdraw.
The day’s fighting exacted a heavy toll. Among the wounded were Major General Rodes, Brigadier Generals Jones, Semmes, G.T. Anderson, and Boxdale, as well as Colonel Avery. Boxdale and Avery succumbed to their wounds, while Semmes and Rodes later died after being evacuated to Virginia.
Despite the setbacks, the partial success on the right suggested that with tighter coordination and reinforced artillery support, a breakthrough remained possible. The original plan was retained. Longstreet, now bolstered by Pickett’s three brigades, would lead the primary assault at dawn.
Overnight, Ewell reinforced Johnson’s division with troops from Rodes and one of Early’s brigades. However, Longstreet’s preparations stalled. His advance was delayed by federal forces holding the rocky heights on the enemy’s far left, which threatened to enfilade his lines.
Before Ewell could be notified of Longstreet’s delay, Johnson renewed his assault. Though his men repelled a federal counterattack and briefly seized portions of their trenches, the enemy’s concentrated reserves flanked Johnson’s position. By 1 p.m., outnumbered and outmaneuvered, Johnson withdrew.
The failure to synchronize attacks allowed the Federals to shift reserves freely. Lee noted that Longstreet’s hesitation stemmed from legitimate tactical concerns, but the lack of unified action doomed the day’s objectives.
To strengthen Longstreet’s position, Heth’s division and two brigades from Pender’s command under Major General Trimble were deployed. Hill received orders to hold his line and reinforce Longstreet if needed.
At 1 p.m., a concentrated artillery barrage opened fire, intending to cover the infantry advance. The plan called for guns to displace forward with the assault. The two-hour cannonade initially drew fierce counter fire, but federal batteries gradually slackened.
Longstreet organized four assault columns. Pickett’s division formed the right, Heth’s division the left, each in two lines. Wilcox’s brigade supported Pickett’s right flank, while Lane and Scales brigades under Trimble backed Heth.
The troops advanced resolutely under devastating artillery and musket fire. As they closed, federal guns reignited, but Confederate artillery had expended most of its ammunition during the preliminary bombardment and could no longer suppress them.
The right flank momentarily pierced the federal line, overrunning forward works and seizing guns. But enfilading fire from Cemetery Hill and the main ridge shattered their cohesion. Federal infantry swarmed both flanks, and the assault dissolved into a bloody retreat.
The cost was staggering. Pickett’s brigade commanders Armistead and Garnett were killed, and Kemper was mortally wounded. Major General Trimble and Brigadier General Pettigrew were severely wounded. Countless officers and men fell or were captured.
Lee also addressed the campaign’s crippled mobility due to absent cavalry. Though Robertson’s and Jones’s brigades were recalled from Blue Ridge passes, Stuart’s delayed arrival left the army blind. His circuitous route fatally slowed intelligence on enemy movements.
Lee concluded that the assault’s failure underscored systemic issues: inadequate artillery support, poor reconnaissance, and disjointed coordination. While valor abounded, tactical and logistical shortcomings sealed the outcome.
The army, though bloodied, withdrew without pursuit, preserving its core for future operations. Lee’s dispatch remains a somber record of a battle where grand strategies were undone by circumstance, and the choices made on those ridges sealed the fates of thousands.