In July 1863, as the Confederate Army of Northern Virginia marched into Pennsylvania, Lieutenant General James Longstreet commanded the First Corps at the Battle of Gettysburg. His after-action report, written on July 27, 1863, offers a direct account of the decisions and missteps that shaped the Confederacy’s most catastrophic defeat. Longstreet described how, on the night of June 28, his scouts reported that the Federal army had crossed the Potomac River and appeared to be pursuing the Confederates. He sent word to General Robert E.
Lee recommending that the army position itself on the eastern side of the mountains and prepare to meet the advancing enemy. The next day, he received orders to move part of his force and encamp at Greenwood. Most of his troops began marching on the morning of June 30, with the exception of Major General George Pickett’s division, which remained in Chambersburg to guard the army’s rear. By about 2 p.
m. , two divisions and the reserve artillery had reached Greenwood and made camp. Brigadier General John Bell Hood was ordered to leave one brigade and an artillery battery on guard duty at New Guilford along the road toward Emmitsburg. The following day, the troops resumed their march toward Gettysburg.
However, the advance was significantly delayed when Major General Edward Johnson’s division from the Second Corps entered the same road from Chambersburg, followed by a long wagon train that obstructed the route. Despite these delays, Major General Lafayette McLaws’ division reached Marsh Creek, about four miles from Gettysburg, shortly after dark. Hood’s division arrived near the town around midnight. On the morning of July 2, Longstreet received orders from Lee to use the forces available to him, move around the enemy’s left flank, and reach the Emmitsburg Road.
The Federal forces had been driven back the previous day by Lieutenant Generals Richard Ewell and A. P. Hill, and had established a strong defensive line stretching from Cemetery Hill along the Emmitsburg Road. Longstreet believed his available forces were not strong enough to launch a successful attack, so he waited for Brigadier General Evander Law’s brigade to rejoin Hood’s division.
The brigade finally arrived around noon. Once the troops were assembled, the movement began, but engineers sent by Lee and Longstreet initially directed the column along a road that would have exposed the entire operation to danger. Time was lost searching for a more concealed route. Around 4 p.
m. , McLaws’ division moved into position opposite the Federal left flank. Hood’s division advanced to the right, taking a position that partially wrapped around the enemy’s left. The Federal first line of defense along the Emmitsburg Road did not appear significantly stronger than the positions held by the two Confederate divisions.
Artillery opened fire immediately. Hood’s division attacked the enemy’s left while McLaws’ division moved directly against the Federal front. The enemy was forced from its original position and pushed back toward a strategically located hill. The slope was steep, the ground rough, and stone walls and fences at the base of the hill added significantly to its defensive strength.
Federal soldiers sheltered behind these stone barriers and defended every position with notable determination. Still, the Confederate troops continued to push them back, position by position, until nearly dark. At that point, a strong Federal force confronted several brigades of Major General Richard H. Anderson’s division, which was supporting the left flank.
One of Anderson’s brigades was forced to retreat, another was deprived of the support it needed, leaving the left flank exposed and vulnerable to being turned. At almost the same moment, Brigadier General William Wofford’s brigade of McLaws’ division was also forced to withdraw. Under these circumstances, Longstreet decided it was unwise to continue advancing until the rest of the army arrived. The cost in leadership was severe.
General Hood was seriously wounded shortly after his division entered the fighting and had to leave the battlefield. Brigadier General George T. Anderson, one of Hood’s brigade commanders, was also badly wounded. McLaws’ division lost two brigade commanders: Brigadier General William Barksdale was mortally wounded, and Brigadier General Paul Semmes suffered wounds he later died from.
By the end of the fighting on July 2, Longstreet’s forces held the ground they had captured on the right. On the left, the troops withdrew to the defensive position the enemy had previously occupied near the Peach Orchard. During the day’s battle, the forces under his command captured four artillery pieces and two regimental flags. On the morning of July 3, Longstreet prepared to resume the attack from the right.
His original plan was to move around the hill occupied by the enemy’s left flank and capture the position through a combined attack against its flank and rear. He believed this operation would require considerable time but would not be particularly difficult to execute. Only minutes after issuing the first orders for this movement, Lee joined him and presented a different plan. Lee ordered an attacking column formed from Pickett’s division, Major General Henry Heth’s division, and part of Major General William Pender’s division.
These troops were ordered to advance directly against the main Federal position on Cemetery Hill. The distance the troops would have to cross was extremely long. They would have to move across open ground, fully exposed to enemy artillery for the entire advance. Longstreet believed it would be difficult to achieve any meaningful result under these conditions.
He noted that about two-thirds of the troops assigned to the attack had already fought a violent battle just two days earlier, with Pickett’s division being the only major formation that remained relatively fresh. Pickett was ordered to organize his division behind whatever protection the terrain could offer from Federal artillery. The formation was aligned so that the center of the attacking column would advance toward the prominent angle in the enemy’s defensive line. Brigadier General James Pettigrew, commanding Heth’s division, was ordered to advance on the same general line and strike the enemy’s position alongside Pickett.
Pickett arranged his division with two brigades in the front line and a third following as support. Brigadier General Cadmus Wilcox’s brigade was instructed to move behind Pickett’s right flank to protect that side from Federal counterattacks. Heth’s division, under Pettigrew, was organized in two lines. Behind Pettigrew stood part of Pender’s division, then commanded by Major General Isaac Trimble.
All available artillery batteries from the First and Third Corps, plus several from the Second Corps, were placed in the most favorable positions. Their objective was to concentrate fire on the chosen point of attack and on the hill occupied by the enemy’s left flank. Colonel James Walton, chief of artillery for the First Corps, worked with Colonel Edward Porter Alexander to position the batteries and coordinate with artillery officers from other corps to determine the signal that would begin the bombardment. Around 2 p.
m. , Pickett reported that his troops were ready and positioned on the most protected ground available. Orders were given for Walton to begin firing. The signal guns sounded, and almost immediately, the Confederate batteries opened fire as one.
At first, the bombardment appeared highly effective. The Federal artillery on the hill at the enemy’s left was quickly silenced. However, the guns on Cemetery Hill continued to respond with great intensity. Although many Federal batteries were forced to withdraw, fresh guns were repeatedly brought in to replace them.
Alexander was instructed to find an observation point where he could accurately assess the effect of the Confederate bombardment and report when he believed the time had come to begin the infantry advance. After the artillery had been firing for some time, Longstreet rode to the position occupied by Major James Dearing’s batteries. From what he could observe, the Federal army was bringing new artillery into battle about as quickly as the Confederates were forcing their batteries to withdraw. He concluded that the infantry attack must begin soon if anything was to be accomplished before nightfall.
When Longstreet reached Alexander’s position, he learned that Alexander had already notified Pickett that the time had come to attack. Longstreet then gave Pickett a personal order to advance. At almost the same moment, he discovered that the Confederate artillery ammunition had reached such a low level that the batteries would not be able to begin another effective bombardment. Even under more favorable circumstances, this was not an attack he would have endorsed.
He later wrote that if he had believed he had the authority to cancel the operation, he would have withdrawn the order. The infantry began its advance in an impressive manner. The soldiers maintained their lines with notable precision as they crossed the field under Federal artillery fire, showing exceptional discipline, composure, and determination. About halfway between the starting position and the Federal defenses, the troops reached a shallow valley.
This depression provided some protection from enemy fire and allowed the men to pause briefly, rest, and rearrange their ranks. After only a short pause, the advance resumed. The lines were still moving forward in relatively good order when Federal artillery began firing canister shot at close range. The concentrated fire was so violent that the left side of the attacking formation staggered under its weight.
Despite the intensity of the bombardment, the troops continued to advance. Pickett’s men did not appear to be stopped by the enemy artillery. They only halted when they were close enough to return fire with their rifles. At this critical moment, Anderson’s brigade received orders to advance and support Pettigrew’s and Trimble’s formations, which had begun to retreat.
After firing on the Federal line, Pickett’s soldiers continued their advance in a determined assault. They broke through the enemy defenses, captured several artillery pieces, and took control of part of the Federal fortifications. At almost the same time, the formations that had previously shown signs of hesitation began to collapse. Their ranks broke apart, and soldiers retreated across the field in complete disorder.
During the retreat, more men fell to enemy fire than had fallen during their original advance against the Federal position. This disastrous development gave the enemy valuable time to concentrate nearly its entire force against Pickett’s division. There was now a serious danger that Pickett’s lines would break completely or that his troops would be annihilated before Anderson’s division could reach them. If Anderson continued too far without adequate support, his own division would also be in grave danger.
For this reason, Anderson was ordered to halt his advance. Within a short time, Federal forces attacked Pickett’s division from the front and both sides. Because of the intensity of the concentrated attack, the survivors of Pickett’s forces were forced to retreat. About half of the men who were not killed or wounded were captured by the enemy.
Brigadier General Ambrose Wright of Anderson’s division, accompanied by every available officer, was instructed to organize the withdrawing soldiers and gather scattered men behind Anderson’s line. Several officers from Longstreet’s own staff were also sent to help restore order. Anticipating a counterattack, Longstreet rode his horse to the front of his artillery positions to observe the battlefield and personally supervise the batteries. Federal forces advanced on several different occasions from a number of different positions, but these movements proved to be only reconnaissance attacks.
Each time the Confederate artillery opened fire, the advancing enemy troops quickly withdrew. These limited advances and retreats continued until dark, when the Federal forces returned to the protection of their strong defensive positions. Longstreet then pulled his line back toward the Gettysburg Road on the right, while the left of his command connected with the right flank of A. P.
Hill’s corps. After dark on July 3, Longstreet received orders to make all necessary preparations for the army’s withdrawal. Instructions were passed through the command immediately, and preparations began before dawn on July 4. That night, the troops were pulled from their positions.
Longstreet’s command began marching behind A. P. Hill’s corps. The movement was severely hampered by heavy rain and roads that became extremely difficult to traverse.
Despite this, the command reached the mountain tops early on the night of July 5. On July 6, the troops advanced and continued toward Hagerstown. The soldiers and draft animals were completely exhausted and could no longer maintain a rapid pace. Longstreet considered himself fortunate to discover that they could still reach Hagerstown in time to support and relieve the wagon trains at Williamsport, which were under serious threat from enemy forces.
The command reached Hagerstown at about 5 p. m. , then moved along the Sharpsburg road and camped about two miles from the town. Detailed reports of casualties suffered during the campaign, including numbers of killed, wounded, and missing, were to be forwarded separately.
Longstreet’s report remains one of the most important firsthand accounts of Gettysburg. It portrays an army crippled by poor coordination, delayed movements, and a command structure where a subordinate’s professional judgment was overruled with catastrophic results. The questions he raised about what might have happened if different decisions had been made, or if leadership had been more cohesive, continue to surround one of the most significant turning points of the American Civil War.