In May 1945, Reichsführer Heinrich Himmler, the head of the entire SS state, found himself in British custody, dead by his own hand after biting into a cyanide capsule. His post-war reputation was immense, acknowledged even by his enemies as a man who had wielded extraordinary power through a police and security empire that controlled the lives of millions and commanded an army of 900,000 men. Yet for all his power, Himmler never moved to take the ultimate step that many around him considered both logical and necessary in the final months of the war: he never sought to remove Adolf Hitler and seize the leadership of the Reich for himself. From 1943 onward, Himmler had consistently undermined his Führer behind his back, engaging in secret attempts to secure a separate peace with the Western Allies.
He had even aided the July 1944 plot to assassinate Hitler at the Wolf’s Lair, knowing of the conspiracy in advance and doing nothing to stop it, before carrying out the brutal suppression of the plotters with such enthusiasm that his own involvement was never revealed. But the most extraordinary challenge to Hitler came not from the army, but from within Himmler’s own SS, a conspiracy that the Reichsführer himself appeared unable or unwilling to lead. In late 1944, Hitler, in a decision of staggering recklessness, gave command of Army Group Upper Rhine on the Franco-German frontier to Himmler, a man with no real military experience. The task was to support Hitler’s last great offensive in the west, the Nordwind operation launched on New Year’s Day 1945.
Himmler’s subsidiary attack achieved some limited gains, and on the 25th of January 1945, Hitler promoted him to command Army Group Vistula on the Eastern Front, ordering him to halt the Soviet advance into Pomerania. Completely inadequate to the task and without a proper military staff, Himmler failed publicly and disastrously, eventually resigning his post due to stress-induced illness. From that moment, the relationship between Hitler and Himmler was broken, though outward loyalty remained. While Himmler struggled at Army Group Vistula in January 1945, a conspiracy began to form in the highest ranks of the SS.
The plotters were convinced that Hitler was no longer fit to lead and that terms must be sought with the Western Allies before the complete destruction of Germany. Four SS Obergruppenführers were named post-war as the core of the conspiracy: Felix Steiner, commander of the 11th SS Panzer Army; Richard Hildebrandt, Himmler’s chief liaison officer to Army Group Center; Curt von Gottberg, deputy commander of the Replacement Army; and Otto Ohlendorf, a mass murderer from the Einsatzgruppen who had become a top SS economics advisor by 1943. Standing beside them throughout was Walter Schellenberg, head of SS foreign intelligence, who happened to be one of the few men who understood the fate of the entire Reich was now resting on a hesitant man who seemed incapable of decisive action. The plotters identified Hitler’s powerful secretary, Martin Bormann, as a man who needed removing.
Bormann had been encroaching on the SS’s power over the security police and the Gestapo, and it was no secret that he disliked Himmler and sought to undermine him at every opportunity. The conspirators knew they could not act without Himmler, but Steiner worried about whether the hesitant Reichsführer would actually move. Himmler, through Schellenberg, had opened a fresh round of communications with the West through Count Folke Bernadotte of the Swedish Red Cross and former Swiss President Musy. By the spring of 1945, Himmler was using Jews from his concentration camps as diplomatic pawns, negotiating the release of certain groups in exchange for access to high Allied officials.
Rumors of Himmler’s machinations spread even to Berlin’s propaganda machine. On the 17th of March 1945, Joseph Goebbels noted in his diary that Swedish news coverage presented Himmler as the guarantor of peace for Germany, a powerful German clique allegedly offering Hitler’s head as surety. The army presented the same threat. Colonel General Heinz Guderian, acting chief of the general staff and Hitler’s advisor on the Eastern Front, confronted Himmler twice regarding Hitler’s removal in March 1945.
He had first sounded out top Nazi leaders about peace with the West, but Foreign Minister Joachim von Ribbentrop was evasive, citing loyalty to Hitler, and Grand Admiral Karl Dönitz refused. When Guderian finally spoke to Himmler, asking him to mediate with Hitler, Himmler replied that it was still too early for such a step. The following day, Guderian told Himmler bluntly that the war could not be won and begged him to use his contacts with neutral nations to secure an armistice. Himmler again refused, maintaining that it was too early.
Guderian persisted, insisting it was five minutes past twelve, not five minutes to twelve, but after ten more minutes of persuasion, he concluded that Himmler was simply afraid of Hitler. By the 28th of March, a top secret Special Operations Executive report had reached London from a Danish agent, claiming that Himmler had initiated three peace feelers via Sweden, Switzerland, and the Vatican, hinting that Hitler’s deposition was not an obstacle to an understanding, even on the basis of capitulation, as long as Himmler remained in power. That same day, Winston Churchill’s daily briefing included a decoded cable reporting an intense conflict of opinion between Hitler and Himmler, with Hitler remaining adamant about severe measures and Himmler suddenly advocating leniency. The SS conspirators believed Hitler’s deteriorating health and mental state were grounds for his removal.
On the 13th of April 1945, Schellenberg walked alone with Himmler at his Wustrow headquarters. Himmler said, “Schellenberg, I don’t think that we can let the Führer go on any longer,” and asked whether his medical experts were sure about their diagnosis of Hitler’s Parkinson’s disease. Schellenberg confirmed the diagnosis and insisted that it was time for Himmler to act. But Himmler seemed incapable of taking that step.
Schellenberg wrote that Himmler repeatedly asked what he could do, a breach between him and Hitler having clearly commenced. That same day, Albert Speer met with SS Obergruppenführer Hans Kammler, head of the V-weapons program. Kammler, usually confident, was downcast and told Speer that efforts were being made within the SS to get rid of the Führer, and that he was willing to hand over all files on Germany’s jet aircraft and V-weapons to the Americans in exchange for immunity, inviting Speer to join him. In London, Admiral Sir Andrew Cunningham, the First Sea Lord, recorded in his diary that Churchill had mentioned that Himmler appeared to be trying to show he was not as bad as painted.
Churchill said that if it would save further expenditure of life, he was prepared to spare even Himmler, an extraordinary admission that the British were negotiating with Himmler via Sweden. When Cunningham suggested there were plenty of islands Himmler could be sent to, the conversation ended, but the implication of a possible immunity deal hung in the air. Schellenberg’s plan advanced on the 19th of April, the day before Hitler’s last birthday. He organized a meeting between Himmler and Finance Minister Count von Krosigk, along with Labor Minister Franz Seldte.
Von Krosigk was blunt, demanding that Himmler seize power, force Hitler to announce a plebiscite, and abolish the People’s Courts. Seldte spoke with Schellenberg for two hours, then met Himmler and repeated the demand, telling him that the substance of the entire German people was at stake. On the 21st of April, in a shattered Berlin now under Soviet attack, Himmler met with Hermann Göring, Hitler’s legal successor since 1941. Himmler claimed that Count Bernadotte was a negotiator sent by General Dwight D.
Eisenhower and that he had undeniable proof he was considered abroad to be the only person who could maintain peace and order. Göring doubted whether the Allies would accept him as a negotiator. Over the two to three-hour meeting, Himmler kept returning to the succession, asking variations of what would happen if Göring could not take over after Hitler’s death, eventually asking Göring to nominate him as Chancellor upon succeeding Hitler. Göring said he could not legally do that.
Two days later, Göring was arrested by the SS on Hitler’s orders via Bormann, charged with attempting to take power while Hitler was still alive, a false accusation Bormann was happy to engineer. Göring appealed to Himmler to order his release, but Himmler said his detention had been ordered by the Führer and it must be a mistake, telling him to sit tight. As Hitler sought to control the Battle of Berlin from his bunker, the SS plotters hastened his end. On the 22nd of April, General Steiner categorically refused to attack with his forces to relieve Berlin, citing a lack of troops and armor.
A plotter himself, he may have calculated that letting the Soviets finish off Hitler was the fastest path to a Himmler succession. That same day, Himmler was at his Hohenlychen headquarters with an escort battalion of 600 well-equipped SS troops. Gottlob Berger, a Hitler loyalist, arrived and was aghast that Himmler had not marched to the sound of the guns in Berlin. Berger shouted at him, “What kind of Reichsführer are you?
Why don’t you speak to the Führer in person? ” Himmler then did, and Hitler allowed him to bring his battalion to the city, though Himmler left them behind to stiffen the defenses of the government quarter and returned to Hohenlychen. On the 23rd of April, Schellenberg met Count Bernadotte at the Swedish Consulate in Flensburg, telling him that Hitler was finished and would not live more than a couple of days. He claimed that Himmler had decided to meet General Eisenhower personally to offer the surrender of the Western Front, asking Bernadotte to carry this message.
Bernadotte later reported that Himmler, though tired and admitting Germany was finished, was still calm and coherent. Himmler wanted to capitulate the entire Western Front while continuing the fight in the East, but Bernadotte said this was not acceptable to the Allies. Earlier that day, Albert Speer had visited Himmler and found him drawing up plans for a future government. Himmler told Speer that Europe could not manage without him, and that after spending an hour with Eisenhower, the Allies would realize they were dependent on him.
He claimed he and Göring had an agreement that he would be premier, and invited Speer to join his cabinet. Speer later overheard Generalfeldmarschall Wilhelm Keitel swearing his complete loyalty to the Reichsführer SS, which must have convinced Himmler that he was about to become Hitler’s successor. But on the 27th of April, the British deliberately leaked details of Himmler’s secret peace negotiations to preserve Allied unity and reassure Stalin that no separate peace was being discussed. By the following day, the German people knew of Himmler’s betrayal.
Martin Bormann had finally brought down his number one opponent, presenting Himmler’s actions as barefaced treason. On the 28th of April, Himmler was stripped of all his offices of state and completely disgraced, though the SS continued to follow his orders. Otto Ohlendorf saw Himmler shortly after and wrote that he was no longer the same man, asking the queerest questions and making the most absurd proposals. He had lost his self-confidence, his aim, and his ambition.
Himmler considered death in battle. On the 30th of April, he moved to Schloss Kaukhorst, not far from Dönitz’s headquarters at Ploen. Later that day, he summoned Dönitz to a meeting at Luebeck, keeping the Grand Admiral waiting in a building full of senior SS leaders. Dönitz asked whether the report was true that Himmler had sought contact with the Allies through Bernadotte.
Himmler denied it, and they parted amicably. Then the hammer fell. At 18:07 hours, Bormann sent a message from the Führerbunker: Hitler was dead, and he had named his new successor as Reich President, Grand Admiral Karl Dönitz. Later that evening, Dönitz telephoned Himmler and asked him to come to Ploen.
Himmler arrived about midnight, escorted by six heavily armed SS officers. Dönitz handed him Bormann’s telegram. As Himmler read it, an expression of astonishment, indeed consternation, spread over his face. All hope seemed to collapse, and he went very pale.
Finally, he stood up and bowed, saying, “Allow me to become the second man in your state. ” Dönitz replied that it was impossible. Himmler left at 1:00 a. m.
on the 1st of May 1945. His machinations were at an end. He did not attempt to assert his claim to the succession, but placed himself unreservedly at the disposal of Dönitz.
Twenty-two days later, on the 23rd of May 1945, Himmler, a fugitive in British custody, would be dead by his own hand, a final act that closed the most bizarre and destructive political career of the Nazi state, and one whose secrets, including the generals’ plot that never fired, remained buried with him.