Major General Winfield Scott Hancock, commander of the Union Second Corps, faced the decisive moment of the Battle of Gettysburg on July 3, 1863. His corps had been severely depleted by fighting on the previous day, leaving his line thinly manned. In the early afternoon, Confederate forces launched a massive artillery bombardment from roughly 115 to 150 guns, followed by an infantry assault of more than 15,000 men known as Pickett’s Charge. Hancock’s units, including General John Gibbon’s division and General Alexander Hays’ division, held the center of the Union line along Cemetery Ridge.

Key supporting units included the Vermont Brigade under General George Stannard, Colonel Norman Hall’s brigade, Colonel Arthur Devereux’s 19th Massachusetts, the 42nd New York, and the Philadelphia Brigade under General Alexander Webb, which included the 69th and 71st Pennsylvania regiments. The Confederate assault, spearheaded by General Lewis Armistead, momentarily breached the stone wall before being driven back. CONTENT:
The Union center at Gettysburg had been so weakened by the second day’s fighting that by July 3, nearly every able-bodied man in the Second Corps was needed just to hold the ground already occupied. One brigade held in reserve by General Howard, Colonel Carroll’s command from General Hayes’s division, saw no action with the Second Corps that day except for the 8th Ohio regiment.
The morning was relatively quiet along the Union front, though heavy firing on the right indicated the enemy was concentrating against the 12th Corps. Skirmishers clashed sporadically, and the corps artillery traded fire with Confederate guns. An eerie stillness settled over the field from 11 a. m.
until about 1 p. m. Then, on what seemed to be a signal, the enemy opened the most intense artillery barrage Hancock had ever witnessed. Confederate cannon, averaging about 1,400 yards from the Union lines, formed a crescent stretching from Gettysburg to a point facing Round Top mountain.
Estimates placed their number between 115 and 150 guns. The sky was filled with bursting shells, and the open ground behind the lines was soon swept clear of anything not fixed in place. The infantry held their ground with remarkable resolve, seeking cover behind their hastily built breastworks and the natural features of the land. Hardly a straggler was visible.
Understanding what the bombardment meant, the corps artillery answered the enemy bravely despite being poorly supplied with shot, sustaining an unequal fight that brought distinction to the artillery service. Brown’s Battery of the 1st Rhode Island, severely depleted the previous day and out of canister, withdrew before the cannonade ended. The other batteries continued firing until only canister shot remained, then fell silent. After one hour and forty-five minutes, the enemy’s fire slackened, and infantry was immediately observed in the woods beyond the Emmittsburg Road, preparing to charge.
A dense skirmish line moved forward, followed by two extended battle lines, reinforced by compact infantry columns. Their formations displayed a steadiness and exactness that compelled admiration from those witnessing the historic moment. The Confederate left extended just beyond the right flank of General Hayes’s division, while their right was roughly opposite General Gibbons’s left. Their battlefront spanned no more than two of the corps’ diminished divisions.
The entire assault force was estimated at more than 15,000 men. No effort was made to impede the enemy’s progress until their leading line came within about 700 yards, when weak artillery fire opened against them. The column suffered no significant loss and never paused, pushing forward within musket range without drawing Union fire, as the men showed a marked determination to hold their volley until it could be lethal. Two regiments from Stannard’s Vermont Brigade, attached to the First Corps, were positioned in a small copse ahead of and at a sharp angle to the main line.
They fired first, obliquely, into the enemy’s right flank, causing those troops to fold slightly toward their left. The Confederates continued advancing steadfastly without halting to return fire. The rifled artillery, having spent all its canister, was pulled back or left idle, awaiting the infantry clash. When the enemy came within 200 to 300 yards, they met a withering fire from Gibbons’s and Hayes’s divisions, which they swiftly answered.
The battle grew fierce and widespread. Before Hayes’s division, the combat was relatively brief. Cut down by canister from Woodruff’s battery, by fire from two regiments Hayes had placed on his extreme front and right, and by volleys from supporting lines behind, the enemy broke in disarray, abandoning 15 flags and nearly 2,000 prisoners to that division. Confederate troops not shattered before the third division shifted rightward, reinforcing the assault against Gibbons’s division.
Two regiments of the Philadelphia Brigade, the 69th and 71st Pennsylvania, were positioned behind a low stone wall and a slight breastwork they had hastily erected. The rest of the brigade stood behind the crest some 60 paces to the rear, arranged to fire over the heads of those in front. As the enemy line, spearheaded by General Armistead, nearly reached the stone wall, most of Webb’s brigade stationed there abandoned their post, though fortunately they did not retreat entirely. Through the personal courage of General Webb and his officers, they were promptly reformed behind the crest now held by the brigade’s remnants.
Encouraged by this apparent vulnerability, the enemy pressed forward more boldly, many crossing the breastwork the Union troops had vacated. The fighting became extremely brutal and intimate as Confederate battle flags were soon seen flying atop the stone wall. At that critical moment, Colonel Devereux, commanding the 19th Massachusetts, requested permission to shift his regiment right and forward to the point where the line was breached. Hancock consented, and that regiment, along with the 42nd New York on its right, advanced immediately.
As the enemy had now withdrawn from Colonel Hall’s front, Hall rapidly moved his command by the right flank to bolster General Webb’s position, followed directly by Harrow’s brigade. The maneuver was executed with some disorder, as men left ranks to fire from the breastwork. The situation was now highly irregular. Men from all brigades had partially lost regimental cohesion, yet individually they stood firm.
The eagerness of individual commanders to seal the enemy penetration, compounded by battle smoke and the ferocity of close combat, caused this confusion. Nevertheless, the breach was now sealed. In orderly formation, the line would have stood four ranks deep. The colors of various regiments were pushed forward, defiantly waving against the enemy’s long array of battle flags.
The men pressed steadfastly after them, spurred by their officers’ energetic commands and example. After moments of savage combat, the enemy troops were driven back, casting down their weapons and seeking safety in flight or by prostrating themselves to evade the Union fire. The battle flags were theirs no longer.
The Confederate assault, the South’s last great gamble of the war in the East, had been broken against the Union center.