A celebrated Confederate painting known as “The Last Meeting” depicts Generals Robert E. Lee and Stonewall Jackson conferring on the eve of the Battle of Chancellorsville. The oil painting, created by artist Everett B. D.
Julio, originally debuted in 1869 under the title “Heroes of Chancellorsville,” during a period when the Lost Cause narrative was gaining significant momentum across the South. The artwork shows Jackson leaning forward in his saddle, attentively listening to Lee, while Lee gestures forward with his gloved right hand, appearing to lay out a plan of action. Three unnamed figures stand in the shadows, possibly representing Jackson’s staff officers. The scene captured a moment when Confederate forces seemed invincible in the Eastern theater, and the image reinforced the memory of Confederate glory during a time when Southern Reconstruction was facing political attack and civil violence.
Regardless of one’s position on these issues, images like this reminded everyone of the Confederate army’s days of triumph when the nation of the Confederacy appeared destined for independence. Historians and enthusiasts have long wondered what words were exchanged between these two generals during that pivotal meeting. That question leads directly to a historical controversy: who was actually responsible for the brilliant flanking movement that became the defining maneuver of Chancellorsville? Two notable accounts offer conflicting answers.
One comes from Lee himself, and the other from Major General John B. Gordon, a respected Confederate commander who recorded the account of a witness who had been present. In 1867, Lee wrote a letter to Albert Taylor Bledsoe, a minister, professor of mathematics, lawyer, and the founding editor of the “Southern Review,” a significant historical journal. Bledsoe had written to Lee directly to ask who deserved credit for the flanking movement.
Lee’s response, dated October 28, 1867, and written from Lexington, Virginia, reveals much about his loyalty to Jackson and his personal character. Lee stated that he had not read the article about Chancellorsville in the latest issue of the journal, nor had he read any of the books published by either side since hostilities ended. He explained that he had no desire to revisit his memories of those events and was satisfied with what he already knew, but he acknowledged that he had learned from others that Jackson’s biographers credited Jackson for the success of the Army of Northern Virginia, describing his movements as independent of the overall plan and made on his own initiative. Lee expressed great reluctance to do anything that might detract from Jackson’s well-deserved fame, insisting that no one was more convinced of Jackson’s worth or appreciated him more than he did.
However, Lee argued that this understanding of events could not be correct. Every movement of an army, he noted, must be carefully planned and properly organized, and Jackson was too skilled a soldier to violate that basic military principle. Lee recalled that during the operations around Chancellorsville, he joined Jackson, who had been placed in command of the advance when skirmishers from the two approaching armies met. Lee stayed with the troops until the entire Union army recrossed the Rappahannock River.
He stated clearly that there was no doubt about who was responsible for Confederate operations, nor who would have borne the blame for any failure. He asked that his comments be for Bledsoe’s private information only. The other account appears in Major General John B. Gordon’s 1904 memoir, titled “Reminiscences of the Civil War.
” Gordon shared a version of the Lee-Jackson meeting as told to him by the Reverend Beverly Tucker Lacy, a man of faith and close associate of Jackson who had been promoted to chaplain of his corps. Lacy accompanied Jackson constantly. He buried Jackson’s amputated arm and was at his side when Jackson died. According to Gordon’s account, at the beginning of the move toward General Hooker’s army at Chancellorsville, a remarkable meeting occurred between General Lee and General Jackson.
Jackson approached the commanding general and said, “General Lee, this is not the best way to attack Hooker. ” Lee replied that he had to rely to some extent on reports from others, especially his engineers, who considered the current route a very good way to approach. Jackson responded sharply, “Your engineers are mistaken, sir. ”
When Lee suggested Jackson had not had the opportunity to examine the situation, Jackson insisted he had, having ridden over the entire field on his horse.
His reconnaissance had shown him the strengths and weaknesses of the whole position, and he returned to report that a better road existed. Lee then asked what should be done, and Jackson advised taking the route he originally suggested: attack from the flank. When Lee asked what came next, Jackson insisted on making the movement immediately. Gordon wrote that Jackson’s infantry rushed along the by-road through the dense woods, and soon their fierce battle cries were heard from the flank as their red battle cross fluttered over General Hooker’s breastworks.
The two accounts of the Lee-Jackson meeting remain in tension over the origins of one of the most famous tactical maneuvers of the Civil War.